



The decline of the working-class vote, the reconfiguration of the welfare support coalition and consequences for the welfare state

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Abstract

The central political claim of *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* is that class actors, through the instruments of the democratic process, can modify capitalism. Where working-class mobilization is strong, left parties have sufficient electoral support in the political arena to alter markets politically in ways that decommodify and thereby empower workers. The decline of traditional class voting, however, has profoundly changed this dynamic of welfare politics. We show that the political support coalition for welfare states has been reconfigured through two processes. On the one hand, the Left may have lost support among the traditional working class, but it has substituted this decline by attracting substantial electoral support among specific parts of the expanding middle class. On the other hand, the welfare support coalition has been stabilized through increasing support for the welfare state among right-wing political parties. We discuss the possible consequences of this ‘middle-class shift’ in the welfare support coalition in terms of policy consequences.

Keywords

Class voting, electoral realignment, partisan politics, social investment, welfare state

Introduction

The central political claim of *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* is that class actors, through the instruments of the democratic process, can modify capitalism. For Esping-Andersen, where unions and other actors organizing the labour market are powerful, they provide crucial electoral support to their representatives in the political arena. As power

in the political arena grows, left political parties look to ‘decommodify’ labour, transforming labour

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markets to serve workers' aims. In this framework, working-class power begets working-class power, as left parties both draw on the support of workers and, by means of policies, sustain and enlarge it.

Class, however, as the basis for both political mobilization and ensuing coalitions, has changed profoundly. When Esping-Andersen published *Three Worlds* in 1990, the industrial class structure had already entered its economic twilight. Today, the size of the manual working class is dramatically smaller than in the post-war period, with service sector employment outnumbering manufacturing in all European countries (Oesch, 2006: 31). At the same time, social groups that cut across traditional class boundaries have emerged (Oesch, 2013). In short, the socio-economic structure that defined the growth of the welfare state has dramatically changed.

What are the implications of these trends for the political coalitions around the welfare state in a post-industrial setting and – consequently – for the welfare state itself? Can advanced welfare states survive without a clear electoral foundation in the working class? In *Three Worlds*, Esping-Andersen himself suggests an affirmative answer, arguing that the institutions of the welfare state would supplant, in some ways, their political origins. For Esping-Andersen (1985), more universal social programmes, such as those in the Scandinavian countries, would sustain a coalition of blue- and white-collar workers around social programmes, thereby 'endogenously' stabilizing welfare support.

In this article, we build on these arguments, arguing that there has been a substantial reconfiguration in the underpinning support coalition for the welfare state; however, these changes are more general and less regime-based than Esping-Andersen suggested. We build on a large body of research showing that pro-welfare left parties have lost support among the working class. However, far from spelling an overall decline of the pro-welfare coalition, we make two arguments. First, left parties have attracted substantial electoral support among specific parts of the expanding middle class, substituting for a shrinking working-class base. Second, right-wing political parties have moved towards more political support for the welfare state. This reconfiguration of support within the Left and the reconfiguration of the cross-party support for

the welfare state have simultaneously stabilized the welfare state in the face of declining working-class support for the Left, but also changed it. The post-industrial welfare support coalition is predominantly anchored in the middle class, which tends to prefer social investment and activation policies over traditional redistributive policies.

These claims contribute to the literature in two key ways. First, despite widespread acceptance in the literature on political parties and party systems that traditional class voting is in decline, much of the welfare state and comparative political economy research has largely neglected these dynamics and their consequences. Most work on the partisan politics of the welfare state continues to conceptualize the preferences and behaviour of left parties through the lens of a traditional working-class constituency (for a critical assessment of this literature, see Häusermann et al., 2013). Even work explicitly examining changes in the electoral base of the Left, such as David Rueda's (2007) analysis of insider–outsider divides within the Social Democratic electorate, theorizes changes *within* the working class rather than the consequences of its broader decline. Second, we argue that the Left has found a new electoral constituency in parts of the middle class that substitutes for declining working-class support. While much work has analysed the changed electoral behaviour of the (new) middle classes (e.g. Kitschelt, 1994; Kriesi, 1998; Oesch, 2008), the consequences of these shifts for welfare politics remain clearly under-analysed. We show that while the 'middle-class shift' in the welfare support coalition has cemented new electoral foundations for the welfare state, it has also led to a change in policy prioritization, away from traditional 'pro-worker' policies. In short, understanding the contemporary politics of the welfare state still requires attention to class, but it equally requires explicit attention to the changed class character both within the Left and the Right.

Changing coalitions, changing welfare states?

In the late 1980s, when Esping-Andersen was writing *Three Worlds*, the question of how de-industrialization and the concomitant rise of new post-industrial

social groups might reshape welfare support coalitions was far from clear. The literature on electoral dealignment argued that class was becoming increasingly irrelevant for electoral choice; not only had traditional class groups shrunk but also electoral volatility had been increasing since the 1970s (Dalton et al., 1984; Franklin et al., 1992). Indeed, some analysts even predicted an eclipse of traditional class voting in favour of more issue-oriented voting (Dalton, 2008; Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009). While this work did not elaborate what such radical partisan dealignment would imply for welfare state politics, a clear implication was that as the working-class vote would no longer serve as a reliable political foundation for pro-welfare parties, dealignment could undermine support for the welfare state itself.

However, more recent electoral research has contested this early characterization of an entirely volatile electorate. A newer body of work argues that class, conceived in terms of individuals' occupation, continues to matter. This work, drawing on either better sources of longitudinal data (Knutson, 2006) or – crucially – new conceptualizations of class and class voting (Elff, 2007; Evans, 1999), shows that class continues to predict political preferences and vote choices (even if these preferences and the choices may have become different ones). Put differently, there has been electoral class *realignment*, not *dealignment* (Kitschelt and Rehm, in press). Hout et al. (1995) argue, for instance, even where 'traditional class-voting' (i.e. the blue-collar vote for the Left) has declined, 'total class voting' (i.e. the predictive power of occupational class on vote choice) remains strong.¹ This shift in the literature from a focus on traditional to total class voting coincides with a definitional shift in the understanding of class, one which we adopt. Contrary to earlier works on class formation and mobilization, this work understands 'class' in terms of socio-structural groups defined by a particular occupational task structure, which contributes to shape their resources, latent interests and preferences (Oesch, 2006).²

What are the implications of these socio-structural shifts for the welfare state? Esping-Andersen's work suggests that the answer is political. For Esping-Andersen, the preferences of class actors are partly derived from their economic position;

however, he argues that the existing social structure does not fully determine either the interests or the strength of class actors. In *Three Worlds*, Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that 'we cannot assume that a numerical increase in voters, unionization, or seats will translate into more welfare-statism' (p. 17). Instead, the electoral coalitions at the basis of left power – and thus of comprehensive welfare states – are political products, constructed by parties and the coalitions they strike. In building support for the welfare state, unions and Social Democratic parties needed to both mobilize internally and create coalitions with other groups. We contend that these assertions still hold: a reconfiguration of the pro-welfare support coalition implies a reconfiguration of the welfare state itself.

Building on these insights inspired by both Esping-Andersen and the realignment literature, we contend that it remains fruitful to conceptualize the politics of the welfare state in terms of societal class coalitions or – more generally – class groups;³ in doing so, we develop our argument in three steps: first, structural change has led to the expansion of a specific segment of the middle class with pro-welfare attitudes, as well as a rightward shift of the working-class vote. Both left- and right-wing parties have mobilized these changing electoral potentials. Hence, these shifts have neither doomed the welfare state nor left it with a 'classless' base; rather, left parties have gained a new class support base, and right-wing parties have moved towards more pro-welfare positions. Second, the extent of this electoral reconfiguration of the welfare state support coalition varies between different institutional regimes. And third, it is likely to have considerable consequences for the welfare state, because the pro-welfare middle classes show particularly strong support for policies of activation and social investment, rather than traditional income protection and decommodification policies. In the following, we discuss these three claims in turn.

First, structural change has driven the transformation of European electorates. Deindustrialization, tertiarization of the workforce and especially the educational expansion have all led to a decline of employment in the skilled and low-skilled industries and massive 'occupational upgrading', that is, the

expansion of occupational performance in the high-skilled service sector (Oesch, 2013, in press). While early scholarship on the expansion of an educated (service sector) middle class, namely, by Goldthorpe (1982), speculated that it would be a conservative social force, he was soon proven at least partly wrong. Rather, the educated middle classes, particularly in interpersonal service sector occupations (Kitschelt, 1994), have become the main progressive force in European politics. Much work traces the way these shifts in the post-industrial economic structure have affected voter preferences. A prominent line of work investigating these changes emphasizes the rise of non-economic issues that rival for voters' attention. Attention to non-economic issues is not new: scholars of electoral behaviour have long noted the crucial role of religiously motivated conservative voting within parts of the working class (Bartolini, 2000; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). What the 'new politics' literature identifies, however, is a transformed cultural conflict between post-materialist and materialist values (Inglehart, 1984), libertarian–authoritarian values (Kitschelt, 1994) or universalism–particularism (Bornschiefer, 2010; Häusermann and Kriesi, in press). Although these differing terminologies reflect varying temporal and substantial conceptualizations of a 'second' ideological dimension, they all point to a new line of conflict that cuts across the traditional class cleavage. They share the argument that the new middle classes have become the main electoral potential of the Left for reasons of cultural, rather than economic-distributive attitudes. However, it is important to note that although these social groups prioritize issues of cultural liberalism, they also hold clearly pro-welfare preferences (Häusermann and Kriesi, in press; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014).

Scholars debate the reasons for these pro-welfare attitudes of the new middle class. Some work emphasizes the interpersonal profile of new middle-class occupations as fostering egalitarian and solidaristic values (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014); others stress that the oftentimes atypical and more vulnerable occupational situation of these workers, many of whom are women, may explain their interest in state intervention (Häusermann, 2010; Häusermann et al., 2014; Marx and Picot, 2013), and yet others point out that

the occupations of the members of the 'new' middle classes are often closely related to the welfare state itself. Thereby, welfare states have to some extent created their own support coalition among the growing share of people whose employment is directly linked to the state, that is, both public sector workers and those employed in the welfare services such as health and education more generally (Heath et al., 1991).

Political parties have played a role in both driving and mobilizing these electoral shifts and transformations. As Esping-Andersen (1985) reminds us, individuals with shared attitudes towards the state do not automatically form into organized political actors. While changes in the economic structure have both put a variety of non-economic issues on the agenda and created a new cadre of middle-class voters employed in services with more economically left-wing preferences, in order for these to manifest politically, parties needed to act on them. We argue that parties of the Right and the Left have shaped the way these economic changes have emerged politically in crucial ways, simultaneously stabilizing support for the welfare state and modifying its underpinning support coalition.

Parties of the Left first responded to these shifts by targeting middle-class voters. Kitschelt (1994), Müller (1999) and Kriesi (1998) were the first to systematically examine realignment in Western European party systems. Collectively, they argue that voters in interpersonal service occupations have become the core electorate of the New Left, something we investigate further below. While this constituency fostered in particular the rise of green parties, it has also increasingly transformed the electoral profile of the traditional left parties.

On the right, Pierson (1996, 2001) influentially theorized that the sheer electoral importance of the welfare state implied that mainstream parties would converge on a welfare state stabilizing position. Moreover, culturally conservative parties have been attracting a substantial number of working-class votes over the past decades. These groups have explicitly mobilized working-class voters with regard to conservative and authoritarian attitudes, arguably as a counter-reaction to the aforementioned moves by progressive movements of the 1980s

(Bornschieer, 2010). As more working-class voters have moved to non-left parties for predominantly cultural reasons, however, they potentially alter the *economic* preference profiles of these parties, too, creating welfare state support among even the far-right (see Betz and Meret, 2012, or Mudde, 2007, on welfare chauvinism).

The political coalition underpinning the welfare state, then, has undergone two changes; the prime defenders of the welfare state, left-wing parties, now rely mainly on voters from the educated middle classes, and at the same time, the rightward movement of workers has created a more heterogeneous set of partisan actors supporting the welfare state.

Second, cross-sectional variation is important. While the shift towards growing service sector employment and left-mobilization of the new middle classes is occurring across all advanced welfare states, its translation into a large welfare state support coalition does not occur in an institutional vacuum. The existing institutional structure of the welfare state itself crucially shapes the options for parties. On the one hand, the shift to a post-industrial employment structure is partly a product of existing regime structures. The tertiarization of employment, the extent of public sector jobs and the overall size of the service class vary across welfare regimes. Indeed, welfare regimes contribute to shifts in the underlying group structure. On the other hand, welfare regimes also provide varying resources to left parties. Left parties who long relied on extensive cross-class coalitions have had more success in attracting the new middle classes, reproducing their existing strength through new social groups. More precisely, we argue that the reconfiguration of the welfare support coalition is most pronounced in the Social Democratic regimes – where both partly endogenous shifts to a post-industrial economic structure and the existing left mobilizing capacity are extensive – followed by the Christian Democratic countries, with less change in the Southern and Liberal regimes, where the expansion of the middle class has been less pronounced (in the Southern case) or where the structural power of the Left to mobilize new actors is more limited (the Liberal case).

Third, what are the implications of these shifts for the welfare state? Within the Left, the substitution of

middle-class for working-class support has not been neutral. As argued above, new middle-class voters support state intervention generally and redistributive policies specifically. In this sense, they do support income protection policies that aim at what Esping-Andersen has famously called decommodification. However, there is a shift in emphasis on other policies. The recent welfare state literature has extensively analysed the emergence of ‘new social policies’ (Bonoli, 2005), ‘social investment policies’ (Hemerijck, 2013; Morel et al., 2012) and the spread of ‘labour market activation’ policies (Bonoli, 2010) on the welfare reform agendas of European welfare states, well beyond the Nordic countries. These policies deviate from traditional social policy instruments, because they aim at fostering labour market participation rather than compensating for income loss (Gingrich and Ansell, in press) and they promote social inclusion through work and human capital investment, rather than transfers (Cantillon and Van Lancker, 2013). The main instruments are childcare services, education and active labour market policies. In this sense, they have ‘commodifying’, rather than decommodifying objectives. Although there is not yet a consensus in the literature about the precise profile and delimitation of social investment and activation policies, existing evidence suggests that the middle class is both the main beneficiary and the main supporter of such a supply-side-oriented welfare state (e.g. Van Lancker, 2013, on the distributive effect of childcare policies). Geering and Häusermann (2013) have looked at policy support on the basis of European Social Survey (ESS) 2008 and International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2006 data, which provide information on support for different types of social policies. They find that the ‘new middle class’ (i.e. high-skilled employees in interpersonal service occupations) has the highest predicted probability of supporting public childcare and education, considerably higher than the industrial working class. Conversely, support for providing the unemployed with a decent living standard and support for income redistribution are highest among the industrial working class.

Taking these preference profiles into account implies that when building welfare state support around a new core of new middle-class voters, left

parties in post-industrial contexts are under pressure to move away from policies supporting traditional income replacement and decommodification and towards new middle-class reform priorities. At the same time, welfare politics is coalitional politics. Thereby, the coalition space around broader welfare reform draws on new combinations of actors, such as middle-class and employer-based coalitions in favour of labour market activation or middle- and working-class coalitions in favour of encompassing reform strategies that involve both activation and compensation.

In sum, we argue that there is a new class profile at the core of left parties and a new space for cross-class alliances around the welfare state, which has real implications for its future politics and distributive policies. In this article, we show this argument in a number of steps. In the section ‘The decline of electoral support of the working class for the Left’, we demonstrate that the working-class vote for the Left has indeed declined almost uniformly across advanced European welfare states. The section ‘Sources of welfare state support’ turns to the two new stabilizing support bases: the rise of middle-class voting for the Left and party system reconfiguration around the welfare state. In both sections, we show that while these trends are common across countries, the existing regimes shape their implications in varying ways. In the section ‘Implications of this reconfiguration of the electoral support coalition for the welfare state’, we argue that this reconfiguration has – albeit not unambiguous – policy implications, namely, leading to a less pro-worker welfare state.

The decline of electoral support of the working class for the Left

To investigate the electoral coalitions underpinning pro-welfare parties over the long term, we turn to data for 15 countries from the 1970s to present, combining the 1972–2002 Eurobarometer (EB) survey trend file with six waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2012). Together, these data allow us to examine the evolution of class voting over a long time period for a number of countries.⁴ The panel, however, is somewhat unbalanced. The EB was only conducted in European Union member states,

meaning that Sweden, Finland and Austria are not included until 1995 and Switzerland not at all. Norway is included, but only from 1993. Moreover, not all countries participated in all six waves of the ESS. We discuss the implications of these data limitations where relevant.

To measure *vote choice* over time, we combine two sets of questions. The EB asks respondents both a retrospective vote choice question and a vote intention question. The ESS asks respondents a retrospective vote choice question. Although the EB retrospective vote choice question is more similar to the ESS vote choice question, it was asked only infrequently. In the EB, the correlation between the prospective and retrospective question is quite high ($r=0.81$, $p<0.01$), leading us to use the vote intention item in the EB. This yields a time series of vote choice from 1973 to 2012 with limited gaps.

We use the combined vote intention measure to create a dichotomous ‘Left party choice’ variable, limited to social democratic, green, socialist and communist parties (“the Left”) as measured by the original EB ZEUS coding schema. A dichotomous measure of voting for the main social democratic party yields similar patterns when used as an alternative dependent variable (see Appendix 1 for coding choices).

In order to measure *class* across the different surveys, we create four dummy variables, based on respondents’ occupation and education levels (Appendix 2 outlines the coding choices and their reliability), dividing respondents into employers (small and large), middle classes, manual workers and routine workers (low-skilled non-manual). We exclude retired voters and the non-employed from our analyses. While the ESS data allow for a more varied operationalization of the middle classes, the EB data do not contain continuous information regarding industry, sectors or work logics.

We first examine the evolution of working-class voting over time among employed voters. The decline of traditional class voting, that is, working-class support for the Left, is largely uncontroversial (Knutson, 2006), leading us to only briefly demonstrate these trends. To assess the class basis of voting, we first look at a classic measure of vote choice, a modified Alford index. This index involves a

simple difference between the percentage of the workers voting for the Left and all other employed voters, using the above outlined definition of left-wing parties.

We examine these results at both the country and regime levels. We follow Esping-Andersen's regime categorization, adding a fourth Southern Category. The Social Democratic regime includes Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland; the Christian Democratic regime includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands; the Liberal regime includes the United Kingdom and Ireland and finally, the Southern countries include Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy.

Figure 1 shows the results (using a 3-year moving average to compensate for small numbers of respondents). The clear story that emerges from Figure 1 is one of declining class-based differences, with only limited regime-based differences. In all welfare states, even those with a traditionally strong working-class base of the Left, the difference between workers' and non-workers' support for the Left has shrunk.

Because of concerns that descriptive data can be misleading in assessing class differences (Evans, 1999), we further run a two-stage regression model to evaluate class voting. In the first stage, we run a series of country-year level logistic regressions (this process yields 407 separate country-year regressions since 1980). In each regression, we regress the dichotomous left vote choice variable on a range of variables, including a dummy for being a member of the working class, a dummy for being an employer and a dummy for being a routine worker (middle-class respondents are the reference group), a country-year standardized measure of income, age in years, gender and education. The first stage model is kept relatively parsimonious because of missing data on other relevant variables.⁵

Comparing the coefficient on working-class status over time (Figure 1b, again using a 3-year moving average) reveals a similar pattern to the descriptive data. In the first stage, a positive value on working-class status suggests that working-class voters are more likely than middle-class voters to vote for left parties. Over time, a move towards a zero or negative coefficient suggests an erosion of

the difference between working-class voters and middle-class voters in their propensity to vote Left. Except the Southern countries, this outcome is similar in all regimes: there has been a reduction in the size of the coefficient on working class over time.

At the beginning of the observation period, in the early 1980s, working-class voters were clearly more likely to vote Left than middle-class voters, especially in Liberal and Scandinavian countries. While the working-class vote was always more split in the continental regimes and also in Southern Europe (Bartolini, 2000), workers were still clearly more likely to vote for the Left than the middle classes. However, by the late 2000s, this difference has completely withered in Scandinavia and even turned negative (albeit not always significantly so) in liberal and continental welfare regimes, indicating that in some cases middle-class voters are now more likely to vote for the Left than working-class voters. Multivariate analysis confirms the above results: time has a negative effect – meaning a reduction in the coefficient on working class – across the sample. This erosion is not less extensive in the Social Democratic regimes than the Liberal or Christian Democratic, with only the Southern regime demonstrating a different, more stable pattern (Appendix 3).

Sources of welfare state support

The previous section showed that the working-class vote for communist, socialist, green and social democratic parties has clearly declined in both relative and absolute terms, especially in Social Democratic, Christian Democratic and Liberal regimes, with a somewhat more stable development in the countries of Southern Europe. It is true that the working class and workers' parties always needed allies to support and develop the welfare state – such as the agrarian parties in Scandinavia or the Christian Democrats in continental Europe. Nevertheless, the political organization of the working class was the crucial political foundation of most welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1985, 1990; Stephens, 1979). Hence, what does this decline of working-class mobilization for the Left imply for the political support of the welfare state? What does its nearly uniform nature imply for differences among welfare states?




Figure 1. Declining working-class vote: (a) Alford index and (b) coefficient on working class for vote Left. SD: Social Democratic; CD: Christian Democratic.

When we turn from class differences in the propensity to vote for the Left to overall Left support, we see two quite different patterns. Figure 2 shows overall support for left parties across regimes, as well as support among the working class and middle class. Despite declining working-class support, there has been neither a generalized decline of Left vote shares nor a cross-regime convergence in left strength. The Left remains strongest in the South, with similar levels of strength in the Social and Christian Democratic regimes and lower support in the Liberal counties of the United Kingdom and Ireland. Assuming that these parties of the Left remain a pro-welfare force (something we confirm in Figure 4), Figure 2 suggests that the decline in traditional class voting has not led to decline in political support for the welfare state.

Furthermore, not only has the support for the Left remained remarkably stable, but so too have welfare states themselves. Although almost all welfare states have been extensively reformed – retrenched in some instances, expanded and recalibrated in others

(see, for example, Gingrich, 2011; Häusermann, 2010; Hemerijck, 2013; Palier, 2010; Pierson, 2001) – the overall size of the state in spending terms has remained predominantly stable.

How then do we account for the combination of a near-uniform decline in working-class support for the Left with an overall stability in support for the Left and the welfare state? As explained above, we argue that there has been a *dual substitution* in the support coalition for the welfare state: at the individual and partisan levels. First, while left parties have massively lost working-class votes, they have gained new constituencies among specific parts of the educated, pro-welfare middle class. Second, under pressure from both electoral shifts, as well as institutional feedback, traditionally right-wing parties have moved towards more pro-welfare positions. We examine these two sources of welfare support sequentially.

In order to investigate the first ‘substitution’, within the electoral constituency of the Left, we return to the EB–ESS combined data. As Figure 2 shows, the middle-class vote for the Left has




Figure 2. Percentage of workers, middle classes, routine workers and the employed electorate voting Left.

increased over time relative to the working-class vote. In the Social Democratic welfare states, the middle-class vote for the cumulative Left is now almost exactly equal to the working-class vote, at slightly above 40 percent. Since the mid-2000s, the share of middle-class voters choosing the Left in Christian Democratic and Liberal regimes has actually exceeded the working-class vote. Southern Europe, by contrast, shows a more stable pattern, with the working-class vote for the Left being clearly above average across the entire time period and the middle-class vote remaining stable (at the Left vote share average).

When we combine this information on the shift in the *behaviour* of these groups with the massive changes in the *structural size* of the groups, the picture that emerges testifies to a radical reshaping of the electoral base of the Left. Figure 3 shows how the relative shares of working-class voters and middle-class voters in the total electorate of the Left have developed over time. Middle-class voters have clearly become the largest share in the Left electoral base in all regimes.

Figure 3 shows, in line with our theoretical argument, a clear story of electoral substitution. With the exception of the Southern countries, the middle classes are now a very substantially more important part of the Left's employed base than workers. Left parties became predominantly middle-class based around 1990 in the Nordic, Continental and Southern European countries. In 2012, across the countries included in the sample, there were three middle-class voters casting a ballot for a left party for every worker doing so.⁶ Together, Figures 2 and 3 show that the proportion of the middle-class voting for the Left has grown, and the expanding size of this group means that it has become the core base for the Left. While these shifts are occurring everywhere (even in the Southern regimes where they are less pronounced), there are regime differences. Both the propensity of middle-class voters to vote Left and the importance of the middle class for left parties are higher in the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic regimes than the Liberal and Southern regimes.

Who are these new middle-class left voters? The literature suggests that they are largely drawn from




Figure 3. Changes in left parties' electoral base.

a clearly identifiable group of professionals and semi-professionals in interpersonal services; by contrast, professionals in managerial and technical occupations continue to vote predominantly for the right (Geiring and Häusermann, 2013; Häusermann and Kriesi, in press; Kitschelt and Rehm, 2014; Oesch, 2008). Our EB–ESS combined data do not allow us to operationalize variation *within* the middle class, but the ESS data from the 2000s bear out these claims. In the ESS sample, 51.2 percent of a combined group of socio-cultural professionals, semi-professionals and skilled service workers voted for a left-wing party, compared with only 47 percent of higher and associate manual and routine workers. By contrast, only 40 percent of high-skilled managers, associate managers and office workers voted for the Left. We see, then, a remarkable shift towards socio-cultural professional and skilled service workers as a core base for the Left. From the perspective of these parties, and across the six ESS surveys, socio-cultural professionals and skilled service groups amount to 28 percent of

pro-welfare parties' employed base (16 percent of the total base, when we include retirees and those out of the labour force), while workers constitute 21 percent of the employed base (10 percent of the total base).

When we look to further unpack the new service groups, distinguishing between private and public employees, we again face data constraints in terms of longitudinal analysis. However, two EB surveys, 1988 and 1994, and the ESS in the mid-2000 measure employment sector. We use these items to create a measure of public employment, including all government and public sector employees and employees of state-owned enterprises. Here, we again find interesting regime variation regarding both the size of these groups and their electoral choice. The Social Democratic regimes have clearly the highest share of public sector workers with around 35 percent in both time periods, followed by Christian Democratic and Liberal regimes, each with between 25 percent and 30 percent of public sector workers, and finally the Southern regimes with a little below 20 percent on average. We find similar differences when looking at




Figure 4. Party positions on welfare expansion over time, Manifesto data.

the share of respondents employed by the welfare state more directly. We cumulate the share of workers in public administration, education, health and social work for the mid-2000s (ESS data, NACE sector coding) and find about 27 percent in Scandinavia, 23 percent in Liberal and Christian Democratic regimes and only 13 percent in Southern European countries. More importantly, our data show that support for the Left among both public sector workers and welfare state employees is clearly higher than average in all regimes, with a particularly strong difference in Scandinavia. Again, the Southern regimes are different since support for the Left from public and welfare state workers is not significantly different from the other employees. In line with other work, these data confirm that the welfare state shapes the occupational structure of societies, directly feeding back into its own support (Esping-Andersen, 1993).

As parties' electoral base changes, the question arises of whether the parties themselves continue to represent clear stances vis-à-vis the welfare state.

We hypothesized above in terms of a second substitution effect that as workers move to the right, this could foster support among right parties for the welfare state, whereas the pro-redistributive attitudes of new socio-cultural professionals would solidify welfare support on the Left.

In order to trace and categorize party positions over time, we use the Comparative Manifesto Project database and aggregate political parties into party families (Appendix 4). The Comparative Manifesto Project provides systematic over-time coding of party positions in election manifestos. We examine the average position of parties of a party family on the item 'welfare state expansion' (per 504). Although manifesto data arguably measure both saliency and ideological positioning, they nonetheless provide a continuous time series from the 1970s to 2010 that allows us to tap underlying party support for the welfare state. Figure 4 shows the average position of the relevant party families on the issue of welfare state expansion over time. High values indicate high levels of welfare state support.

Two observations are important regarding Figure 4: first, on aggregate, the position of left parties has not shifted to the right, despite the massive inflow of middle-class voters to the Left. In Social Democratic and Southern regimes, left parties have even shifted to the left, and the level of welfare state support remained more or less stable in Christian Democratic regimes. The Liberal regimes, however, do not follow this trend; here, left parties have indeed shifted towards less pro-welfare positions than since the early 1980s.

The second important finding in Figure 4 is that right-wing parties have indeed shifted towards more pro-welfare positions in most countries. This is particularly true for the conservative and liberal parties in Scandinavia and for the Christian Democrats in continental and Southern Europe.⁷ Right-wing populist parties, where they exist, have also tended to shift to more pro-welfare positions over time, especially in Christian Democratic regimes, but the development is less clear and certainly far from strong pro-welfare positions (as some probably premature arguments about the rise of welfare chauvinism may suggest).

While the move of moderate right parties towards more welfare-supporting positions may also be due to institutional feedback mechanisms, as hypothesized by Pierson (1996, 2001), there is also a rather close correspondence of shifts in the electorate and party positions. Figure 5 shows the working-class vote for moderate and populist right parties over time. In Scandinavia and Continental Europe, over time support for moderate right parties among workers has grown and, more recently, for right-wing populist parties, as well. In Liberal and Southern regimes, the patterns are more stable, with fewer right-wing populist parties (except for Italy, but they do not mobilize the working class strongly).

What do these data imply for the reconfiguration of welfare support coalitions across different regimes? In Scandinavia, the Left is now equally strongly supported by the working and parts of the middle classes. Nevertheless, the positions of the main left parties have become decidedly more pro-welfare over time. More importantly even, the moderate right-wing parties have also moved towards pro-welfare positions so that there is a very broad

cross-class support coalition for the welfare state. In the Christian Democratic regimes, the left parties are now even more strongly supported by the middle class than by the working class, but again their favourable position towards welfare state expansion has remained stable. Here too, the Christian Democratic and right-wing populist parties have shifted towards more welfare-supporting positions. It seems that the continental European countries exhibit a pattern of reconfiguration that comes closest to the kind of status quo convergence Pierson had hypothesized.

In Liberal countries, by contrast, the electoral shifts of workers to the right and middle-class voters to the left have rather led to a more welfare-critical convergence. The Left's support for welfare state expansion has declined over time and almost converged with the conservatives on a comparatively low level, which may be due to the smaller endogenous institutional effects of the more residual liberal welfare state, and also to the majoritarian dynamic of party competition in these countries. Finally, the Southern countries show a more stable picture than the others: there is little electoral reconfiguration, and party positions have also remained more stable, although some right-wing parties have moved slightly towards more pro-welfare positions. This stability may result from the less programmatically structured political space in Southern countries, where parties have long adopted more particularistic policies (see the contribution by Manow, 2015). As a result, the working-class support for the Left remains high and stable in these countries, but equally, the Left has been more limited in its ability to attract additional constituencies. This picture suggests an interpretation of the Southern regimes as increasingly traditional insider welfare states.

Implications of this reconfiguration of the electoral support coalition for the welfare state

Does this dual substitution matter for the welfare state itself? As developed in section 'Changing coalitions, changing welfare states?' of this article, a




Figure 5. Support for right-wing parties.

changed electoral base might imply new policy priorities for the Left and thus transformed welfare politics, even if on aggregate, we see stable support for left parties. In this section, we examine the evolution of labour market policy and family policy across European welfare states to investigate whether we see evidence for such a shift.

In the traditional class-power model, labour market policy assumes a crucial role. For Esping-Andersen (1990) and other power-resource scholars, one of the central goals for left-wing parties involved insuring against the risks of unemployment. Recent work on occupational risk and the insurance functions of the welfare state continues to focus on unemployment-related policies, which are particularly crucial to those with specific skills or occupational risks (e.g. Bonoli, 2010; Gingrich and Ansell, 2012; Rehm, 2009; Rueda, 2007).

By contrast, scholars focusing on the social policies key to the post-industrial societies – notably the literature on ‘new social risks’ (Armingeon and Bonoli, 2006; Bonoli, 2005; Esping-Andersen,

1999) or ‘social investment’ (Gingrich and Ansell, in press; Hemerijck, 2013; Morel et al., 2012) – have made the point that other, typically post-industrial risk groups face different (or at least additional) risks requiring distinct policies. These new social policies comprise most clearly issues of work-care reconciliation. Left voters from the ‘new middle classes’ are highly sensitive to these policies, because for them the type and extent of labour market participation and family obligations are a key choice they have to make in the interest of their family’s welfare. In this sense, family policy services can be seen as a typical example of a more ‘middle-class’ welfare state strategy.

Our expectation thus is that where left-wing parties have a relatively stronger working-class base, they will tend to pursue more pro-worker policies (i.e. more generous unemployment insurance replacement rates). Where parties are competing more directly for the middle-class vote, we expect more investment in family policy and services, reflecting the interests of a broadened constituency.

In order to see whether the priorities of parties on the Left shift as the composition of their base shifts towards a more middle-class electorate, we construct a dataset combining the descriptive data on the composition of the voting base from the EB–ESS combined dataset with policy outcomes data. We focus on two policies: unemployment replacement rates as a typical welfare benefit in the direct interest of working-class voters and parental leave replacement rates as a typical hedge against ‘new social risks’ and ‘social investment’-policy instrument, which responds most directly to the needs and demands of the educated middle classes.

Data on replacement rates for unemployment and parental leave come from two sources. First, we draw on the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset Version 2, which provides replacement rate data for all 16 countries in our sample from 1970 to 2011 (Scruggs et al., 2014). The replacement rates data have the advantage of providing a measure of generosity based on existing policy, rather than spending data, which is affected by current macro-economic conditions. Unemployment replacement rates for single ‘average production workers’ are a standard measure of the generosity of the unemployment insurance system. To capture a similar measure for family policy, we examine the combined replacement for maternity and parental leave for the first 26 weeks of leave.⁸ This measure provides a gauge of the generosity of parental leave benefits (Gauthier, 2011).

In order to provide some preliminary and illustrative evidence of the effects of the left parties’ constituency profile on policy priorities, we run two types of time-series specifications. First, we run a pooled regression with a lagged dependent variable, year dummies, and with error terms adjusted for one-period autocorrelation and country-specific heteroskedasticity. Second, we run a country fixed-effects regression, also with a lagged dependent variable, year dummies, and country-clustered standard errors. In both cases, we lag all independent variables by 1 year. We linearly impute data for missing years.

Our key interest lies in whether left parties behave systematically differently based on the degree of support from the working class. To measure this, we interact Armingeon et al.’s (2012)

5-point scale of partisan control of cabinet (1 = right-wing hegemony to 5 = left-wing hegemony) with the modified Alford index discussed in section ‘The decline of electoral support of the working class for the Left’. We further include a measure of the overall percentage of the working class that supports the Left. In the analysis of unemployment replacement rates, we include controls for overall union density (Visser, 2011), the unemployment rate and gross domestic product (GDP) growth (Armingeon et al., 2012). In the analysis of leave replacement rates, we include a measure of female labour force participation (OECD, 2013) and the percentage of the population under 65 years and GDP growth (Armingeon et al., 2012)

Table 1 shows the results. In line with expectations, the interactive effect of the Alford index and cabinet control is highly statistically significant for unemployment replacement. Substantively, these results are quite strong: dominant Left cabinets with a predominantly working-class electorate are associated with predicted unemployment replacement rates that are more than two percentage points higher than those associated with left cabinets under the control of parties that have lost their working-class profile. These effects are yearly, so the cumulative effects are substantial.⁹

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1, however, show that there is no significant interactive effect between cabinet control and the Alford index for parental leave replacement rates.¹⁰

Figure 6 shows the interaction visually using in-sample predicted probabilities based on the first and third specifications. It shows that left governments with high levels of concentrated working-class support appear to expand unemployment replacement rates more; by contrast, left governments with a strong middle-class voter base are significantly less generous in terms of unemployment replacement rates. However, contrary to expectation, we find no differences in the propensity to support parental leave policies based on working-class concentration: where left-wing parties have a strong middle-class basis (i.e. whether the Alford index is low), the level of generosity in leave replacement rates is not significantly distinct to where its base is more concentrated in the working class.

Table 1. Determinants of unemployment and family policy replacement rates, in-kind spending.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	RR UE	RR UE	RR leave	RR leave
Lagged DV	0.973* (0.0092)	0.914* (0.0356)	0.992* (0.0109)	0.863* (0.0303)
Union density	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0007 (0.0004)		
Alford index	-0.121* (0.0367)	-0.0697 (0.0509)	-0.0336 (0.0363)	-0.0111 (0.107)
Cabinet composition	-0.0031* (0.0012)	-0.0024* (0.001)	0.0005 (0.0013)	-0.0007 (0.0012)
Alford*Cabinet	0.0384* (0.0098)	0.0340* (0.0101)		
WC support for Left	0.00745 (0.0137)	-0.0236 (0.0215)	0.0099 (0.0180)	-0.0090 (0.0487)
GDP growth	-0.00116 (0.0009)	-0.0009 (0.0008)	0.0011 (0.0015)	-0.0009 (0.0011)
Unemployment	-0.0004 (0.0004)	-0.0004 (0.0005)		
Female LFP			-0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0032* (0.0013)
Non-elderly population share			0.0019 (0.0036)	-0.0007 (0.0036)
Constant	0.0221 (0.0133)	0.0951* (0.0322)	-0.152 (0.126)	-0.0013 (0.325)
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	377	377	382	382
R ²	0.984	0.894	0.964	0.831

*significant at the 0.05 level.

RR: replacement rate; UE: unemployment insurance; DV: dependent variable; WC: working class; GDP: gross domestic control; LFP: labour force participation.




Figure 6. Predicted values of unemployment and parental leave replacement rates for different levels of working-class concentration in Left electoral support.

While we do not find a mirror effect for the two policy strategies, we nonetheless think that the absence of an effect regarding family policy may actually provide some evidence that declining working-class support does shape policy priorities for the Left. Left governments with a strong working-class profile do not lead to lower parental leave replacement rates (as their voters also benefit from them), but left governments with a strong middle-class base support this policy equally strongly.

Conclusion

The electorate in 2014 looks, in many ways, quite differently to how it did in 1990 when *Three Worlds* was published and most certainly to the period of welfare state expansion from the 1940s to the 1970s at the heart of *Three Worlds*' analysis. Traditional working-class voters now make up a much smaller share of the electorate, and indeed, the concept of class itself has changed along with the socio-economic structure. Moreover, in this article, we have shown that the working-class vote for the Left, in both relative and absolute terms, has declined, a decline that has occurred across regime boundaries.

This erosion would seemingly portend quite radical changes for the welfare state and for scholarship on it. For scholars of power resources, in particular Esping-Andersen, the electoral foundations of working-class power were crucial to the longevity of the welfare state. And yet, despite these shifts, the welfare state remains in place. We are hardly the first to note this situation; indeed, Paul Pierson's (1996, 2001) influential theorization of the 'new politics' pointed to precisely a replacement of old cleavages with generic support for the welfare state. While the findings here are, to some extent, supportive of these claims, they are also substantially distinct in emphasis. We find a real decline in working-class support for left parties – not simply a generalized levelling up of welfare support. This decline occurs partly from a pro-welfare move by right-wing parties, but also partly from a leftward move among middle-class voters.

The result is shifting welfare state coalitions that look quite different from those of the past. In Social Democratic countries, the entire political spectrum

has been pushed to more welfare-supporting positions. In Continental Europe, there has been a narrowing of partisan differences around a pro-welfare equilibrium. In the Liberal regimes, we see a rightward shift, as few left-wing competitors remain. Finally, in the residual and particularistic welfare regimes of Southern Europe, we see more stability over time. Indeed, although declining class voting, which cuts across regimes, would seem to belie their analytic utility, we confirm many of Esping-Andersen's early suspicions. Regimes have bred their support base, and they have done so in distinct ways.

However, these shifts do not imply stasis in the state itself; the new electoral coalition space has consequences. Where the working class is less aligned to the Left, it allows less generous unemployment policies, but not less generous social investment policies. Both dynamics suggest a key transformation in the state alongside its electoral constituencies.

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Notes

1. Many recent contributions have confirmed the ongoing structuring power of occupational location and occupational risk on political preferences and choice (e.g. Bornschieer, 2010; Häusermann, 2010; Häusermann and Walter, 2010; Kitschelt and Rehm, in press; Marx, 2014; Marx and Picot, 2013; Oesch, 2008; Rehm, 2011; Walter, 2010).
2. We also deliberately use 'too broad' notions of working and middle class, which do not denote homogeneous occupational groups anymore (Oesch, 2006). We do so in order to relate our argument to the earlier and broader literature on welfare state politics.
3. One could argue that electoral realignment is relevant for welfare politics only if welfare issues have remained salient for voters' party choice. Except for the working-class vote for the populist right (which is predominantly culturally motivated), this assumption indeed seems to hold. At the individual level,

economic preferences continue to explain party choice (Häusermann and Kriesi, in press), and at the macro-level, over time, parties tend to emphasize welfare issues rather more than less in their electoral manifestos (see Figure 4).

4. From 2002, Eurobarometer no longer includes a vote choice item in the survey instrument, leading us to use the European Social Survey (ESS) for more recent data.
5. We exclude non-employed individuals in the first stage; however, when we expand the sample to include the retired, unemployed and those not currently in the labour force, the results are largely similar.
6. This figure does not include weighting for country size.
7. On the debate between a 'social-democratization' of Christian Democracy versus a 'Christian-democratization' of Social Democracy, see Seeleib-Kaiser et al. (2008) as well as Van Kersbergen and Hemerijck (2004).
8. We use a standard 26-week period in order to calculate replacement rates, taking the maternity leave replacement rate multiplied by the number of percentage of the 26-week maternity leave covers and adding the parental leave replacement rate multiplied by the number of the 26 weeks that parental leave covers. In 2010, this measure ranged from a low of 14.5 percent in the United Kingdom to a high of 94 percent in Luxembourg.
9. Left-wing hegemony is given in 18.9 percent of the 638 country-years in our sample. It has occurred frequently in the Scandinavian countries, Greece, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom. For hegemonic left governments, there is substantial in-sample variation in the Alford index, from -0.049 to 0.34.
10. Further analysis probing these interactions confirms these null results. Other measures of the dependent variable – including total family spending and spending on day care – also yield null results (not reported, available on request).

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Appendix I. Welfare parties (multiple year).

	Main Social Democratic party	Other Left parties	Green parties
Austria	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)	Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ)	Grüne
Belgium	Parti Socialiste, Socialistische Partij/SP.A	Parti Communiste/Komm.Partij (PCK/KP, BKP or CPB), Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), PTB-UA	Ecolo, Agalev
Denmark	Socialdemokratiet (SD)	Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti, Socialistisk Folkeparti, Marx Lenin, Kommunistiske Arbejderparti (KAP), Faelles, Venstre Socialisterne	De Gronne, Enhedslisten
Finland	Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (SDP)	Vasemmistolitto (VAS), Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto, Demokraattinen Vaihtoehto, <i>Kommunistinen Työväenpuolue</i> (KTP), Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue (SKP), Suomen Työväenpuolue (STP)	Vihreä Liitto (Vihr), Ekologinen Puolue (EKO) Kirjava Puolue – Elonkehän Puolesta (KIPU/EKO)
France	Parti Socialiste	PCF, Lutte Ouvrière, PSU, SFIO, PS + MRG, Mouvement des Citoyen, Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire, Parti Radical de Gauche Divers Gauche	Ecologiste, Les Verts, Generation Ecologie, D
Germany	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)	Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands, Aktion Demokratischer Fortschritt, Linke/Partei Deutscher Sozialisten, Bündnis 90	Grüne, GAZ, Bunte Liste, Grüne Liste, Alternative Liste, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Greece	Panhellenic Socialist Party (PASOK)	Sinas, Kommounistiko Komma Elladas (KKE), Elliniki Aristera (EAR), KKE-ES, Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera (EDA), KODISO, Synaspismos (SYN), DIKKI, SYRIZA, Anticapitalist Left cooperation	Ikologi Enalakiki, Oikologoi Prasinoi
Ireland	Labour Party	Sinn Fein, Workers Party, Democratic Left, People Before Profit, Socialist Party, United Left Alliance	Green Alliance, Ecology Party, Green Party
Italy	Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI), Partito Democratico Della Sinistra (PDS)	Partito Comunista (PCI), Partito Socialista Italiano di Unita Proletaria (PSIUP), Rifondazione Comunista (RC), Democrazia Proletaria (DP), Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (PSDI), Progressisti, Socialdemocrazia per la Liberta, PSI + AD, Partito Radicale (PR), La Margherita, Comunisti Italiani	Verdi, Verdi Eruopeano, Verdi Arcobaleno, Girasole

Appendix I. (Continued)

	Main Social Democratic party	Other Left parties	Green parties
Luxembourg	Socialiste (LSAP/POSL)	KP-PC, Dei Lenk, SDP, PSI	Ecologist, GAP, GLEI, di Greng Groen Links
The Netherlands	Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA)	<i>Communistische Partij</i> (CPN), <i>Pascifistisch Socialistische Partij</i> (PSP), <i>Socialistische Partij</i> (SP), <i>Politieke Partij Radikalen</i>	
Norway	Arbeidpartiet (DNA)	Norge Kommunister Partiet (NKP + EKP + RV), <i>Socialistisk Venstre</i> , RyDT	
Portugal	Partido Socialista (PS)	Coligacao Democratica Unitaria (CDU), Partido Comunista Portuguesa (PCP), <i>Aliança Povo Unido</i> , PCP/CDU, Uniao Democratica Popular, Centro Democratico Social (CDS, CDS/PP), <i>Unida Esquerdas Democratica Socialista</i> , Partido Renovador Democratico (PRD), <i>Movimento Democratico Português</i> (MRPP), <i>Bloco de Esquerda</i> (BE), PCP/PEV, PCTP/MRPP	PEV
Spain	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	<i>Izquierda Unida</i> (IU), <i>Partido de los Trabajadores de Espana</i>	Lista Verde, Verdes
Sweden	Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP)	<i>Comunista de los Pueblos de Espana</i> , <i>Nueva Izquierda</i> <i>Vänsterpartiet</i> (V)	Ecologistas, Partido Verde Miljöpartiet (M)
United Kingdom	Labour		Green Party, Ecologists

Appendix 2

Occupational groupings

The item used to measure occupation varies within the Eurobarometer (EB) cumulative file and between the European Social Survey (ESS) and Eurobarometer. In order to construct roughly similar groupings, we use a combination of broad occupational groups, education levels and self-employment status.

ESS

We draw on Oesch's more fine-grained coding of 17 occupational groups, based on International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) codes, self-employment status and education level (Oesch, 2006). We break with Oesch in including an educational restriction for categorization as a socio-cultural professional/semi-professional and skilled service (requiring upper secondary education or above for classification in these groups). We also placed those with higher levels of education (upper secondary or above) working in 'routine' jobs as skilled service. These educational restrictions provide continuity with the EB coding. We code only those in current employment, excluding the retired, unemployed and those temporarily out of the workforce. We then aggregate these into four groupings: small and large employers (including agricultural workers), middle classes, working classes and routine workers.

1. The small and large employer grouping includes agricultural routine workers, large employers, small employers, self-employed professional and small proprietors.
2. The middle-class grouping includes socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals, skilled service workers, technical experts, higher managers, associate managers and skilled office workers.
3. The worker grouping includes technicians, skilled craft workers and technical routine workers.
4. The routine workers grouping include routine service workers and routine office workers.

EB

Within the EB data, three different forms of occupational coding are used, all of which are more aggregated than the ISCO categorization. We build on Knutsen's (2006) work on class voting using the EB series, but modify it slightly to include education, making the groupings more directly comparable to the categories we define in the ESS. We use a country-specific definition of upper secondary education, mapping the years of education onto the national threshold for ISCED-3 completion.

1. The small and large employer grouping includes the following:
 - a. EB 1-299: self-employed farmers/fishermen, professionals, owner shop/business proprietor
 - b. EB 300-260: self-employed farmers, fishermen, professionals, owner shop/business proprietor
 - c. EB 370-572: self-employed farmers, fishermen, professionals, shop owners, business proprietors
2. The middle-class grouping includes the following:
 - a. EB 1-299: general management, white collar with upper secondary education
 - b. EB 300-260: employed professionals, general management, middle management, other office employee with upper secondary education, non-office employed/non-manual with upper secondary education.
 - c. EB 370-572: employed professionals, general management, middle management, employed position desk with upper secondary education, employed position travelling with upper secondary education and employed position service with upper secondary.
3. The worker grouping includes the following:
 - a. EB 1-299: manual worker.
 - b. EB 300-260: skilled manual workers, supervisors and unskilled workers with an upper secondary education.

- c. EB 370-572: skilled manual workers, supervisors and unskilled workers with an upper secondary education.
4. The routine grouping includes the following:
- EB 1-299: white collar without upper secondary education
 - EB 300-260: unskilled worker without upper secondary, other office employee without upper secondary education, non-office employed/non-manual without upper secondary education.
- c. EB 370-572: unskilled worker without upper secondary, employed position desk without upper secondary education, employed position travelling without upper secondary education and employed position service without upper secondary.

In order to validate the measure across the EB and ESS, we examine the distribution of each category in 2002, the 1 year of overlap between the ESS and EB surveys. Table 2 shows the results. The coding schema yields roughly equivalent numbers of workers across the two samples in 2002. There are larger discrepancies in the middle-class and routine categories.

Table 2. Distribution of occupational groupings in 2002 across surveys.

	EB sample				ESS sample			
	Employers	Middle classes	Workers	Routine	Employers	Middle classes	Workers	Routine
Austria	17.67%	47.53%	19.12%	15.68%	15.05%	52.15%	18.46%	14.41%
Belgium	16.29%	46.38%	27.89%	9.45%	14.85%	47.98%	28.13%	9.13%
Denmark	7.10%	58.22%	22.27%	12.42%	11.51%	51.20%	27.72%	9.67%
Finland	15.59%	50.67%	23.87%	9.88%	14.62%	46.70%	29.25%	9.43%
France	12.05%	53.42%	26.13%	8.41%	10.81%	54.49%	23.31%	11.38%
Germany	12.18%	52.03%	26.69%	9.10%	14.22%	51.96%	26.58%	7.52%
Greece	38.56%	36.70%	14.54%	10.20%	41.92%	31.44%	17.02%	9.62%
Ireland	20.93%	41.39%	26.97%	10.72%	20.68%	45.73%	21.21%	12.67%
Italy	29.30%	45.07%	13.48%	12.15%	33.68%	32.87%	20.93%	12.63%
Luxembourg	10.82%	45.96%	24.39%	18.82%	15.59%	48.03%	23.85%	12.80%
The Netherlands	14.17%	53.91%	15.24%	16.67%	12.26%	55.51%	16.14%	16.22%
Norway					12.54%	64.99%	25.88%	8.03%
Portugal	24.32%	23.72%	27.39%	24.57%	24.00%	26.00%	27.87%	22.13%
Spain	19.36%	29.80%	34.34%	16.51%	21.50%	36.60%	27.35%	14.56%
Sweden	11.34%	48.66%	19.32%	20.68%	11.74%	48.21%	23.73%	16.32%
United Kingdom	10.93%	41.69%	36.62%	10.76%	13.72%	44.74%	19.21%	22.32%
Total	17.21%	45.35%	23.79%	13.65%	17.43%	47.79%	22.88%	12.77%

Appendix 3

Second-stage results

Table 3. Second-stage analysis of coefficients on Left vote.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vote Left	Vote Left	Vote Left	Vote Left
Time	-0.019* (0.004)	-0.009* (0.003)	-0.030* (0.007)	-0.017* (0.004)
Lagged DV		0.506* (0.0722)		0.434* (0.0907)
Southern regime			-0.534* (0.145)	-0.304* (0.110)
CD regime			-0.460* (0.128)	-0.273* (0.1078)
Liberal regime			-0.142 (0.128)	-0.934 (0.0866)
Southern* time			0.0208 (0.0105)	0.0124* (0.0044)
CD* time			0.0096 (0.0073)	0.00606 (0.0033)
Liberal* time			0.0014 (0.0076)	0.0004 (0.0042)
Constant	0.609* (0.0842)	0.292* (0.0458)	0.969* (0.126)	0.548* (0.147)
N	418	412	418	412
R ²	0.159	0.395	0.271	0.431

DV: dependent variable; CD: Christian Democratic. * significant at the 0.05 level.

Because these are drawn from a sampled dependent variable, we use the correction technique developed by Lewis and Linzer (2005).

Appendix 4

Party families (manifesto data (family name); various years)

Sweden

Socialist/Social Democratic: Social Democratic Party; Left Party; Left Communist Party;
 Green: Green Ecology Party;
 Agrarian: Center Party;
 Conservative: Christian Democratic Party; Moderate Party;
 Liberal: Liberal People's Party; People's Party;
 Right-wing populist: Sweden Democrats.

Norway

Socialist/Social Democratic: Norwegian Labour Party; Socialist Left Party; Socialist People's Party;
 Agrarian: Center Party;
 Conservative: Christian People's Party; Conservative Party;

Liberal: Liberal Party; New People's Party;
 Right-wing populist: Progress Party.

Denmark

Socialist/Social Democratic: Centre Democrats; Communist Party; Red-Green Unity List; Social Democratic Party; Socialist People's Party; Left Socialist Party;
 Conservative: Conservative People's Party; Christian People's Party;
 Liberal: Liberal Alliance; Liberals; Radical Party;
 Right-wing populist: Danish People's Party.

Finland

Socialist/Social Democratic: Democratic Alternative; Finnish Social Democrats; Left-wing alliance; People's Democratic Party;
 Green: Green Union; Greens of Finland;
 Agrarian: Finnish Center Party; Rural Party;
 Conservative: Christian Democrats; National Coalition;
 Liberal: Liberal People's Party; Progressive Party.

Belgium

Socialist/Social Democratic: Flemish Socialist Party; Socialist party;
 Green: Live Differently; Ecolo; Green!
 Christian-democrat and conservative: Christian People's Party; Christian Democratic Party; Christian Social Party;
 Liberal: List Dedecker; Reform Movement; Liberal Party; Liberal Democrats; Party of Liberty;
 Right-wing populist: Flemish Block.

Liberal: Livable Netherland; VVD;
 Right-wing populist: Liste Pim Fortuyn; Party of Freedom.

France

Socialist/Social Democratic: Communist Party; Socialist Party;
 Green: Ecology Generation; Greens;
 Christian-democrat and conservative: Center Democrats; Conservatives; Gaullists; Rally for the Republic; UDF; UMP;
 Right-wing populist: National Front.

Germany

Socialist/Social Democratic: Party of Democratic Socialism; Social Democratic Party; Left Party;
 Green: Greens Alliance; Greens;
 Christian-democrat and conservative: Christian Democratic Party;
 Liberal: Free Democratic Party.

Austria

Socialist/Social Democratic: Communist Party; Social Democratic Party;
 Green: Green Alternative; Green Party;
 Christian-democrat and conservative: Austrian People's Party;
 Liberal: Liberal Forum;
 Right-wing populist: BZÖ; Freedom Party.

The Netherlands

Socialist/Social Democratic: D66; Labour Party; Socialist Party;
 Green: Green Left;
 Christian-democrat and conservative: Christian Democrats; Christian Union; Catholic People's Party;

Spain

Socialist/Social Democratic: Communist Party; Socialist Workers Party; United Left;
 Christian-democrat: Center Democrats;
 Conservative: Popular Alliance; Convergence and Unity; Popular Party;
 Liberal: Liberal Party; Centrist Block; Union, Progress and Democracy.

Portugal

Socialist/Social Democratic: Independent Socialists; Left Block; Unified Democratic Coalition; Democratic Intervention; Democratic Movement; Communist Party; Democratic Renewal; Social Democratic Party; Socialist Party;
 Green: Ecologist Party; Greens;
 Christian-democrat: Center Social Democrats; Popular Party;
 Conservative: Democratic and Popular Party;
 Right-wing populist: Popular Monarchists.

Greece

Socialist/Social Democratic: Democratic Socialist; Communist Party; Panhellenic Socialist Party; Progressive Left;
 Christian-democrat: Center Union; Union of the Democrats;
 Conservative: National Alignment; New Democracy.

Italy

Socialist/Social Democratic: Proletarian Democracy; Democrats of the Left; Ulivo; Communist Party; Democratic Party; Democratic Socialist Party; Rifondazione Comunista;
 Green: Democratic Alliance; Green Federation;
 Christian-democrat: Biancofiore; Christian Democrats; Pact for Italy;
 Conservative: Casa della Libertà; Forza Italia; PdL;
 Right-wing populist: National Alliance, Northern League;

Liberal: Italia dei Valori; Liberal Party.

Conservative: Fianna Fail, Fine Gael;
Liberal: Progressive Democrats.

Ireland

Socialist/Social Democratic: Democratic Left Party; Labour Party; Socialist Party; United Left Alliance, Workers' Party;
Green: Green Party; Greens Ecology Party;

United Kingdom

Socialist/Social Democratic: Labour Party;
Conservative: Conservative Party;
Liberal: Liberal Democratic Party.