

# How ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ Relates to Voting Behavior - Social Structure, Social Identities, and Electoral Choice

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## **Abstract**

The last decades have seen the emergence of a divide pitting the new left against the far right in advanced democracies. We study how this universalism-particularism divide is crystallizing into a full-blown cleavage, complete with structural, political *and* identity elements. So far, little research exists on the identities that voters themselves perceive as relevant for drawing in- and out-group boundaries along this divide. Based on an original survey from Switzerland, a paradigmatic case of electoral realignment, we show that voters’ “objective” socio-demographic characteristics relate to distinctive, primarily culturally connoted identities. We then inquire into the degree to which these group identities have been politicized, i.e. whether they divide new left and far right voters. Our results strongly suggest that the universalism-particularism ‘cleavage’ not only bundles issues, but shapes how people think about who they are and where they stand in a group conflict that meshes economics and culture.

## **Introduction**

Major disruptive shifts in electoral politics across advanced democracies – the rise of right-wing populism and the fragmentation of the mainstream left and right in many European countries – continue to intrigue political scientists: are the drivers of these changes economic or cultural? In other words: do voters realign to new left and far right parties because of their “objective” material life conditions or because of values and ideas? In this paper, we show that integrating social identities into the study of electoral politics reveals this dichotomy as misleading. While socio-structural circumstances are relevant, their link to electoral behavior is less straightforward than narrow political economy models would have us think. Rather, individuals subjectively interpret their objective life conditions, and the ensuing group boundaries mesh economic and cultural elements. Furthermore, these interpretations need to be politicized to matter electorally. Hence, we need to know how voters belonging to particular socio-structural groups depict group boundaries between ‘them’ and ‘us’, which in turn underlie the divide between the new left and the far right. Hence, we study how objective social structural categories and subjective group identifications relate to each other and to electoral choice.

There is abundant evidence that objective social structural location continues to matter for electoral preferences even after the decline of class conflict, supporting the theory of electoral realignment rooted in an evolving social structure. Parties of the new left and the far right are located at opposing poles of a new divide that crystallized in the 1980s and 1990s throughout Western Europe (Bornschiefer 2010, Hooghe and Marks 2018, Rovny and Polk 2019). – labelled here universalism-particularism divide. These terms acknowledge that this divide, while initially centering heavily on issues such as cultural liberalism and immigration, has also come to incorporate distributive preferences (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). This emerging divide is

linked both to subjective perceptions of deprivation and status loss (Elchardus and Spruyt 2012, Gidron and Hall 2017, forthcoming; Burgoon et al. forthcoming; Kurer 2020), as well as to objective socioeconomic positions. Regarding the latter, political sociologists have amply shown that the *voters* of new left and far right parties are characterized by specific socio-structural attributes. In particular, support for far right parties is concentrated within the manual working class and among those with intermediate levels of education. “New left” parties, on the other hand, are disproportionately supported by socio-cultural specialists, that is, qualified employees working in client-interactive settings (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015, Oesch 2013, Oesch and Rennwald 2018). The urban-rural divide is also crucial for understanding support for far right versus new left actors and positions (e.g., Maxwell 2019, Iversen and Soskice 2019). These clear structural foundations of electoral alignment thus led many studies to infer voters’ electoral motives directly from their material life conditions in increasingly knowledge-based societies (e.g. Iversen and Soskice 2019, Manow 2018 for two recent examples).

With the data typically drawn from large-scale surveys, however, we can only identify the socio-demographic profile of new left and far right electorates, as well as their attitudes, but we are unable to grasp subjective politicized group identities that underlie and stabilize electoral realignment. These identities are crucial, because they ultimately inform the programmatic demands these electorates have and the appeals they are likely to respond to (Huddy 2001, Stubager 2009).

There is ample reason to think that voters’ self-identification does not simply mirror their ascriptive characteristics. The literature commonly characterizes voters of the far right as “losers” of modernization” (Betz 1994), “low/medium educated” (Stubager 2010), “(relatively) deprived” (Kurer 2018, Gidron and Hall 2017, Gidron and Mijs 2019, Burgoon et al forthcoming), “structurally threatened” (Mutz 2018), or experiencing “declinism” (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016). Political psychology would have us expect, however, that individuals

construct their identities in more positive terms. Hence, our ascriptive categories may not grasp the social identities these respondents would name as relevant.

In this article, we therefore study voters' own subjective perceptions of the social and political world surrounding them, and – in a second step - explore the politicization of these perceptions and how they contribute to predicting vote choice. To integrate social identity research into our study of partisan divides, we combine insights from social cleavage theory – which understands salient socio-political divides as being rooted in social structure, but translated into politics via collective identities – with applications of social identity theory in political settings (Huddy 2001, Mason 2018, Helbling and Jungkunz forthcoming), and recent ethnographic studies (Cramer 2016, Hochschild 2016), which focus more on individual perceptions of social group belonging. We ask three main questions. *First, how do key social structural variables (education, class and rural/urban residency) relate to social identities? Second, how do voters of new left and far right parties differ with regard to the social identities that are salient to them? And third, to what extent do subjective social identities mediate the relationship between the most important (objective) socio-demographic categories and the vote choice for these parties?*

We address these questions using data from an original representative public opinion survey in German-speaking Switzerland, where electoral realignment has been underway for several decades, with the new left and far right today constituting the strongest party blocks. Hence, we look at a paradigmatic case of realignment in which the universalism-particularism divide may well have attained the quality of a fully-formed cleavage.

The article is structured as follows: the theory section explains why an appropriate understanding of electoral change requires the explicit integration of social identities. After describing the design and data, we discuss our findings in three steps. We first show how key social structural attributes relate to social identities. We then present evidence of party

electorates' subjective identities to single out those identities that have indeed been politicized. In a final step, we predict party preference in a multivariate model, including both objective and subjective group belonging, to gauge the extent to which material conditions are linked to electoral preferences through identities. We conclude by reflecting on the significance of our findings for how we should think about long-term electoral transformations. Our results not only support theories of electoral realignment, they further suggest that realignment has led to the crystallization of distinctive, diametrically opposed collective identities. The universalism-particularism divide – beyond being a conflict over new issues – has come to structure how people think about who they are and about where they position themselves in an emerging group conflict that meshes economics and culture. This implies a durable new conflict structure, which may well underlie changing electoral dynamics in other advanced democracies, as well.

## **Theory**

### **Social structure, social identities, and changing cultural conflicts**

Successes of the far right in Europe and the US have reinvigorated inquiry into the social bases of the right-wing populist backlash against the new left. Ethnographic research (e.g. Cramer 2016, Hochschild 2016, Gest 2016, Wuthnow 2018), the political psychological literature (e.g. Huddy 2001, Mason 2018, Klandermans 2014), and the literature on populism (e.g., Spruyt et al. 2016; Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Akkerman et al. 2017; Van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018) all suggest that social identities are important for explaining recent electoral outcomes. Subjective identities affect vote choice both via informing programmatic policy demands, and via non-programmatic mechanisms such as group norms. Even if there is widespread evidence that e.g. social class and education continue to matter for vote choice, neglecting subjective social identities that link social structure and partisan identities prevents us from understanding electoral choices (Huddy 2001). Why do many far right voters doubt climate change, reject gay

rights, or oppose ‘big government’? These non-obvious stances need to be understood via voters’ perceived group interests, which might be non-programmatic (e.g. demarcation from outgroups), as well as programmatic. Both types of interests are rooted in voters’ social identities as members of politically relevant collectives.

We contend that these insights complement the fundamental tenets of social cleavage theory, which acknowledges the crucial role of collective identities underlying both economic and cultural cleavages (Bartolini and Mair 1990, Stubager 2009). It posits that collective identities are central both for overcoming the collective action problem, and in accounting for the durability of cleavages. What is more, cleavage theory in the tradition of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) conceives of the political space as multidimensional and is thus the ideal approach to studying how group identities render certain divisions more salient at the expense of others.

These expectations align with insights from social psychology and social identity theory. Social identity theory (and self-categorization theory) argues, first, that individuals harbor *multiple*, potentially conflicting identities (Tajfel and Turner 1979, Tajfel 1981). Second, the salience hierarchies of these multiple identities can change - to some extent - depending on context; and third, salient social identities are crucial for shaping behavior (see Duck and Fielding 2003, Haslam, Reicher, and Platow 2011, Platow and van Knippenberg 2001, Stubager 2009; Huddy 2001). The fact that social identities shape behavior is hardly surprising in light of their psychological functions: Social psychology emphasizes that group membership entails feelings of belonging, participation in a shared reality, and group-related emotions (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). These may be feelings of pride and deservingness (e.g. Van Oorschot 2006; Slothuis 2007), or of resentment and deprivation (Elchardus and Spruyt 2012, Gidron and Hall 2017, Teney, Lacewell, and De Wilde 2014). Such affective group ties shape political behavior via, as well as beyond rational programmatic positions, because they reflect individuals’ desire for self-esteem. Furthermore, shared group norms set parameters for what is appropriate in a

specific group (evident from ethnographic research describing ‘normative communities’ within advanced societies, e.g. Lamont 2000, Wuthnow 2018). Group conformity and norm adherence have been shown to be powerful motivators of behavior (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; Bicchieri 2006; Akerlof and Kranton 2010).

Beyond social identity theory and social psychology, recent ethnographic studies have revealed the crucial political significance of identities. Even so-called ‘losers’ of economic and social change have distinctive, often positively connoted understandings of group belonging, having to do with such things as the arduousness of their work, adherence to moral standards providing non-economic definitions of success, or with their geographical distance to urban centers of power and prosperity (Cramer 2016, Hochschild 2016, Lamont 2000, Wuthnow 2018). These, as well as important sociological studies of changing class structure in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and related identities (e.g. Vester et al. 2001; Savage et al. 2013; Savage 2015) – many of which build on Bourdieu’s sociology – highlight social markers and milieus that might be increasingly relevant for understanding contemporary electoral politics. They show that if we really want to comprehend *what voters want* (and what resonates with them), we have to develop an understanding of *who they are* in their self-identification. Without this effort, we cannot understand their electoral motives (affirmation of group membership or demarcation from other groups versus e.g. protest voting, issue-voting or personalized electoral choice), and hence the significance and durability of electoral realignment.

In this paper, we apply these insights to the study of the electoral divide between the new left and the far right in Europe. Specifically, existing research in the cleavage tradition suggests that shifts of aggregate lower-class support from the left to far right parties, or upper middle-class support for left-wing parties – patterns inconsistent with conflicts based on traditional accounts of distributive class conflict – reflect mobilization on the basis of new collective

identities. Since 1968, the traditional cleavages characteristic of the Lipset and Rokkan (1967) world have been complemented – and to some extent transformed - by new cultural divisions in advanced democracies. In a first wave of mobilization, the new social movements of the late 1970s and 1980s found expression in the emergence of the Green party family, as well as in a new left transformation of many established Social Democratic or Socialist parties (Inglehart 1984, Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998). Politicizing issues such as gender equality, the free choice of lifestyles, or solidarity with the Third World, this “new” left advocated a strong equality principle rooted in universalistic values. Subsequently, and to a large extent in reaction to the agenda of the new left, the far right put issues of community and national sovereignty on the political agenda (Ignazi 1992, Betz 2004). These issues represent polar normative ideals to the universalism of the new left (Bornschieer 2010). They find expression in the politicization of immigration, as well as in the insistence on the primacy of democratic majority decisions over rulings of courts or supra-national bodies (Hooghe and Marks 2018).

After the first transformation of cultural conflicts by the new left had given rise to a libertarian-authoritarian divide (Kitschelt 1994, Flanagan and Lee 2003), this mobilization of the far right reshaped cultural conflicts yet again. The resulting divide has been variously labelled as opposing Green-alternative-left (GAL) and traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (TAN) positions (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002), libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values (Bornschieer 2010), or as a divide exhibiting distinctive “grid” and “group” components (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). Finally, scholars emphasizing the struggle over borders prefer the terms “integration-demarcation” (Bartolini 2005, Kriesi et al. 2008) or “cosmopolitanism-communitarianism” (de Wilde et al. 2019, Strijbis et al. forthcoming). Here, we use the terms “universalism versus particularism” (Beramendi et al. 2015), since it remains an empirical question whether the new divide is exclusively cultural in nature, or whether it potentially encompasses economic issues as well. Indeed, recent research shows that some

social policies align more with cultural conflicts than with the traditional economic state-market cleavage (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). This is particularly relevant for the present context because we are interested in subjective group boundaries that may combine cultural and economic elements to shape partisan alignments.

Indeed, even if the new conflict has for the most part been characterized as cultural, the structural potentials that nourish it have been variably linked to cultural as well as economic modernization, and to the multi-faceted process of globalization (see Bornschieer 2018 for a review). Correspondingly, an extensive literature has analyzed the social structural basis of new left and far right parties, most notably *class* (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1998, Evans 1999, Kriesi et al. 2008). The finding that the manual working class is over-represented within the electorate of the far right is very robust (Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007, Oesch 2008, 2013, Bornschieer and Kriesi 2013, Oesch and Rennwald 2018, Ares 2017, Kurer 2020). Following Allardt (1968), others have delved into the role of higher *education* in fostering new group divisions both in terms of values and group identity (Waal et al. 2007, Stubager 2008, 2009, 2010, Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2013). In a pioneering study, Stubager (2009) revealed that in Denmark, educational groups exhibit antagonistic collective identities related to their educational achievement. This suggests that education has indeed the potential of becoming part of a full-fledged cleavage in Bartolini and Mair's sense (1990).

Beyond education and class, the spatial foundations of political divides have recently received greater attention, as divergences between 'cosmopolitan' cities and 'nationalist' towns and rural areas become apparent (e.g. Iversen and Soskice, 2019; Maxwell, 2019). This urban-rural divide is discussed mainly in light of territorial disparities in prosperity that emerge in knowledge-based economies (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018; Hobolt, 2016; Jennings and Stoker, 2016, Jennings et al. 2017), but important research in sociology and urban studies also indicates the emergence of cultural identities based in rural communities (Cramer 2016, Wuthnow 2018) or

rather cosmopolitan urban environments (Florida 2002, 2012; Savage et al. 2018; Cunningham and Savage 2015, 2017).

While we thus know that class, education and urban-rural residency matter for the vote along the universalism-particularism divide in objective terms, it is not clear whether these categories are salient for voters *themselves*. Voters usually do not self-identify as ‘low-educated’ or as ‘modernization loser’. How do voters themselves depict the group boundaries between ‘them’ and us’ that underlie the universalism-particularism divide? We hypothesize that voters indeed perceive themselves as members of their “objective” groups. Hence, we do not think that social identities are entirely unrelated to structural foundations. However, we suggest that the link between these structural foundations and other, more culturally connoted social groups should be at least as strong. In other words, even non-economic, cultural identities should be structurally rooted. Showing this link should help us overcome the false dichotomy between economic and culturalist explanations of electoral preferences.


### **Social identities and electoral preferences**

After theorizing the link between structure and identities, a second step in relating structural electoral potentials to actual electoral outcomes lies in the politicization of these identities, as not all structurally rooted identities are necessarily politically relevant.

We conceive of the link between collective identities and parties as interdependent. In other words, we do not make a directional argument in favor of a strong bottom-up versus top-down mechanism of group identity formation. In line with the argument by Bornschier (2010, see Figure 1 below), we would think that both mechanisms are plausible and at work<sup>1</sup>. The

1 Existing research provides evidence for both societal and elite-driven mechanisms of identity formation. Klar (2014), e.g., shows how social group settings affect policy preferences through horizontal communication and discussion. Kranendonk et al. (2018) focus on the identity-to-politics link created through the perception of

interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes is the reason why the politicization of social identities is a separate analytical step from studying the structural roots of these identities<sup>2</sup>.



**Figure 1:** Theoretical framework (adapted from Bornschier 2010)

Which social identities would we expect to matter? Substantively, we seek to tap into respondents’ sense of belonging to social categories already identified as electorally relevant in existing research (e.g. education, nationality, nature of work, or residence in cities versus peripheral areas). Thereby, in this paper we cover social groups commonly associated with the economic interpretations of the divide (such as educational and occupational groups), as well as groups commonly associated with the cultural interpretation of the divide (such as nationalism vs. cosmopolitanism).

shared grievances and group-based emotions. Meanwhile, research in political psychology has emphasized the role of political parties in identity formation in the US (Huddy 2001, Huddy et al. 2015, Mason 2018, Egan forthcoming).

2 This theoretical perspective is made plausible by two empirical aspects. First, as shown below, there is a range of social identities that are clearly rooted structurally, but which do not divide citizens politically (e.g. holding an apprenticeship degree, see Table 2 and Figure 2 below). Second, in our survey, we also asked respondents to describe ‘people who are like them’ and ‘people are not at all like them’ in *open* questions. Adjectives frequently named by voters to describe people like themselves do not correspond directly to terms used by elites in political discourse (e.g. ‘curious/interested’, and ‘open-minded’ for voters of the new left, or ‘honest’, and ‘down-to-earth’ by voters of the far right.)

People might identify with their educational group, as *education* has been robustly shown to shape very strongly where people position themselves along the universalism-particularism divide (e.g., Waal et al. 2007, Kriesi et al. 2008, Stubager 2008, 2009, 2010, Ivarsflaten and Stubager 2013). Further, far right parties recruit their voters over-proportionally from people with intermediate levels of education (i.e. vocational training) in manual occupations (e.g., Bornschieer and Kriesi 2013). *Class* is hence also likely to be relevant as a source of identity. Class schemes developed for advanced post-industrial societies refine vertical divisions – which were central to the classical state-market cleavage – by drawing horizontal distinctions based on a differentiation between organizational, technical, and interpersonal work logics (Kriesi 1998, Müller 1999, Oesch 2006, Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). As the final set of potential social identities directly related to social structure, we ask respondents about closeness to people in *urban and rural* environments. The antagonism between urban centers and the rural periphery has been highlighted especially by ethnographic research (Cramer 2016, Hochschild 2016, Wuthnow 2018).

Beyond identification with these straightforwardly structural groups, we investigate potential group identities more strongly related to the universalism-particularism conflict itself: Moving one step up the ladder from rural and urban identities, this primarily cultural divide is intimately related to identification with international communities (‘cosmopolitans’) vs. identification with members of the nation state (‘nationals’) (Inglehart 1977, Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2018). With respect to migration as a key issue related to the universalism-particularism divide, we are interested in how close respondents feel to ‘people with a migration background’. We expect identifications at the opposing universalistic pole to be structured not only by cosmopolitanism, but also by other elements of the left-wing liberal (upper) middle-class milieu. Inspired by Bourdieu’s (1979) sociology of “distinction”, we probe into this milieu by asking about closeness to ‘culturally interested people’, in terms of a lifestyle-related group

identity. Finally, we include ‘men’ and ‘women’ to cover gender identities or roles, the politicization of which was the core element of the women’s movement that fed into the transformation of the left. The overall hypothesis underlying the role of these culturally connoted identities is straightforward: We expect them to be relevant in mediating the effect of “objective” structural group membership on electoral preferences<sup>3</sup>.

## **Case selection, data and measurement**

### **Economic realignment in Switzerland: context and expectations**

Oesch and Rennwald (2018) show that partisan competition in Western Europe has become tripolar, with the left advocating statist and culturally liberal, universalistic positions, the parties of the traditional moderate right advocating relative fiscal conservatism, and the radical right offering a socio-culturally conservative, communitarian program to voters. Each of the three poles mobilizes a distinctive “electoral stronghold”, i.e. a social group voting over-proportionally for the party in question. For this reason, the authors expect this tripolar order to reflect a new, relatively stable configuration in most countries where the far right has been in parliament for several terms. Importantly, the main antagonism in this tripolar space is between the left’s cultural liberalism and the radical right’s national-conservatism. This is consistent with findings by Rovny and Polk (2018) on the rising importance of the universalist-particularist divide especially in continental Europe.

3 We do not consider partisanship itself as a group identity. In the US, partisan identity is often seen as a key predictor of vote choice (see e.g. Mason 2018). We contend that these findings from the bipartisan US context do not translate directly to the more European, multiparty context, where partisanship is less of an encompassing heuristic. Further, we note that when respondents were asked to describe their identities in open terms (see FN3), party labels did not appear prominently. Voters did include more general ideological labels such as ‘left’ and ‘right’ in the description of their *out-group* (along with features such as selfishness or arrogance) identities. However, respondents tended to use these generic terms rather than refer to actual partisanship.

Switzerland constitutes a *model case* of such an electorally realigned, tripolar political space. The country witnessed a comparatively early and strong transformation of the traditional conflicts the party system was built upon. For the purposes of our analysis, it thus constitutes a most likely case in which group identities that underlie the universalism-particularism divide can be expected to be salient. This divide is particularly strong in Switzerland given that the two partisan blocks situated at its poles are exceptionally strong. For one, the new left impetus was forceful. While it initially resulted in the formation of a number of new parties, the Social Democrats, together with the Greens, ultimately absorbed much of this electoral potential (Ladner 2007). In other words, these two major parties of the left – which together rallied around a quarter of the vote in the last parliamentary elections in 2015 – both adopt staunchly universalistic value positions (Nicolet and Sciarini 2010). As a result, the Swiss Social Democrats have over time also lost more of their working-class support than the mainstream left elsewhere (e.g., Rennwald and Evans 2014). On the other hand, Switzerland also harbors the strongest far right party in Western Europe. The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) reached its peak in 2007 at almost 30% of the vote, and has remained more or less stable at that level since. Similar to what the Social Democrats did on the left, the SVP also meshed several minor parties and organizations into a broad movement. The party and its voters’ programmatic preferences are very similar to those of far right parties elsewhere in Western Europe (McGann and Kitschelt 2005, Lachat 2008; Skenderovic 2009). Like other exponents of the far right, the SVP argues that the new left’s universalistic convictions clash with established cultural practices, and opposes immigration and cooperation with the EU. The parties of the traditional center-right – notably the Liberals and the Christian Democrats – are caught between the two poles of the universalism-particularism divide. Not least because they have found it difficult to define their position with respect to the new divide, they have lost considerable shares of their electorates.

Its political history, the programmatic profiles of the parties and their configuration vis-à-vis each other make Switzerland a model case of electoral realignment. Hence, we expect group categories related to nationality and origin, education, urban-rural residence, work logic and cultural lifestyle to be important aspects of (antagonistic) collective identities held by the electorates of the new left and the far right, because these categories relate to the poles of the highly salient and polarized conflict that is at the heart of our study.

### **Data, concepts and measurement**

Integrating social identities into the study of electoral behavior requires that we combine data on voters' party preferences and sociodemographic characteristics with data on their identities. To this purpose we implemented an *online survey* including standard measures of party preferences and socio-demographics, and measures of subjective social identities and their salience. In the introduction to the questionnaire, respondents were told that the survey was about social groups and politics in Switzerland, and prompted with the statement that everyone has different ideas about the groups that make up society. The survey was conducted by a social research company (GfK) in the German-speaking part of Switzerland in September 2018. The sample, which includes 1000 completed interviews, is representative of German-speaking Swiss citizens including quotas for education, age, and gender. In what follows, we describe the most important concepts and the measures of social identity used in the analysis.

In a series of closed-ended questions, we ask respondents about perceived *closeness* to a number of social groups. The main results shown in this paper are based on these questions, in which we presented voters with a list of 17 specific groups (in randomized order), asking them to indicate how close they feel to each group on a four-point scale ranging from 'very close' to 'not at all close' ("*How close do you feel to the following groups? By 'close' we mean, who is*

*likely to resemble you with regard to their attitudes, circumstances, and sentiments?”).*

Respondents were presented with the following selection of social groups (theorized above):

- Education: We use three categories, namely *people with higher education*, *people with vocational training*, and *people without a degree*.
- Occupational class: To tap into the traditional vertical class dimension, we asked respondents how close they felt to *wealthy people*, *people from the middle class*, and *people with humble financial means*.<sup>4</sup> We then went on to selectively tap into work logics that help make class distinctions a powerful tool in explaining preferences even in post-industrial societies, asking about *people who work with and for other people* (i.e., people with an interpersonal work logic, which are heavily over-represented in the new left electorate), *people who produce a concrete product in their job* (probing into the group identifications that may underlie the well-known over-representation of manual workers among the voters of far right), as well as (more generally) *people with a similar job as you have*.
- Rural/urban residency: We asked respondents how close they felt to *people in the countryside* and *urban people*.
- Universalism-communitarianism: We use three categories to measure identities linked to this aspect of the universalism-particularism divide, namely, *Swiss people*, *people with a migration background*, and *cosmopolitans*.
- Milieu theory: We probed into this by asking about *culturally interested people*, in terms of a lifestyle-related group identity.
- Gender: *men* and *women* cover gender roles.

<sup>4</sup> The categories we chose are ultimately closer to income than to class in terms of authority relationships Dahrendorf (1959) or exploitation (Wright 1997).

This choice of categories is not only theoretically grounded, but also validated by separate analysis of voters' responses to open-ended questions about perceived in-groups and out-groups asked at the beginning of the survey (available upon request). Unprompted, respondents refer to educational groups ("*students*", "*interested*", "*educated*"), occupation or work more broadly ("*hardworking*", "*self-reliant*"), residence ("*urban*", "*countryside*"), universalism-communitarianism ("*Swiss*", "*down-to-earth*", demarcation from "*foreigners*" versus "*open/cosmopolitan*"), and in various ways also to lifestyle or milieu ("*normal*", "*simple*", versus "*adventurous/enterprising*", "*unconventional*", "*open*").

Our main interest in this paper is how social identities (measured using the *closeness* question) contribute to explaining electoral choice between parties of the *new left* (Greens, Social Democrats, AL, Solidarités, PdA), and the *far right* (Swiss People's Party, EDU, SD). Center parties were aggregated into a distinct group that we do not focus on here (CVP, FDP, GLP, BDP, EVP). We measure party preference by asking which party respondents feel closest to.

We operationalized objective *occupational class* following the Oesch (2006) 8-class scheme on the basis of ISCO-3d codes. The ISCO-3d codes were derived from answers to three open questions regarding i) respondents' occupational tasks, ii) the characteristics of the firm and iii) respondents' hierarchical function. Occupational information is available only for working respondents who gave meaningful answers to these questions (i.e. not their spouses, non-employed, pensioners and students, creating 451 missing values)<sup>5</sup>. *Education* is recoded in three categories (below secondary, secondary, and tertiary degree) and we have a measure of objective *urban versus rural* residence. For the analyses, data is weighted by sex, age and education, and in addition by party preference for the analyses of electoral choice.

<sup>5</sup> Since the class category of "large employers" counted only 18 respondents and we have no explicit hypotheses on it, we dropped it from the analyses.

## **Results & Discussion**

### **Social structure and social identities**

In this first step of the empirical analysis, we study the structural “rootedness” of social identities. For this purpose, we regress perceived closeness to each of the 17 social groups theorized above on education, class and urban-rural residence, controlling for age and gender. This leaves us with 17 regression tables that we present in full in the appendix. Tables 1, 2a and 2b serve to summarize these findings. Table 1 provides the regression coefficients in an exemplary way for “Swiss people”, one of the culturally connotated groups. Table 1 thus allows us to showcase how we derive the structural divides underlying these social identities from the regression tables. We summarize findings from the full set of regressions in Tables 2a and 2b. Table 1 shows that closeness to “Swiss people” discriminates between educational groups, occupational classes, as well as residents in rural and urban areas. In other words, this cultural social identity has clearly identifiable structural foundations, the strongest (most robust) of which seems to be class (robust also in the multivariate model). Respondents with tertiary education feel significantly less close to “Swiss people”, even though the share of foreigners is higher among the low-skilled population in Switzerland than among the high-skilled. When it comes to class divides, we see that production workers feel clearly closest to “Swiss people”, followed by the other working-class categories (service workers and clerks).

**Table 1:** Ordered logistic regression relating education, class and urban-rural residence to feelings of closeness towards “Swiss people”

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Education: below sec.	0.140 (0.77)			-0.012 (-0.04)
Education: secondary	r			r
	.			.
Education: tertiary	-0.725*** (-5.28)			-0.318 (-1.49)
<30	r	.	.	r
	.	.	.	.
30-50	0.109 (0.58)	-0.283 (-1.12)	0.102 (0.55)	-0.285 (-1.13)
>50	0.084 (0.48)	-0.424 (-1.54)	0.208 (1.21)	-0.482 (-1.73)
female	r	r	r	r
	.	.	.	.
male	-0.176 (-1.41)	-0.186 (-0.96)	-0.239 (-1.95)	-0.184 (-0.94)
Small bus owners		0.447 (1.12)		0.230 (0.55)
Technical profs.		0.722* (2.02)		0.702 (1.95)
Prod workers		1.550*** (4.53)		1.384*** (3.86)
Managers		r		.r
		.		.
Clerks		0.739** (2.78)		0.582* (2.05)
Socio-cult profs.		-0.018 (-0.06)		-0.000 (-0.00)
Service workers		0.775* (2.48)		0.564 (1.63)
Urban			r	r
			.	.
rural			0.405** (2.84)	0.250 (1.28)
R2	0.021	0.031	0.007	0.035
BIC	2104.345	1080.287	2126.255	1095.200
N	997	530	997	530

**Table 2a:** Summary table of the main socio-structural correlates of feeling close towards different identity groups (for regression tables, see Appendix 1)

	Educational group identities			Class group identities			
	"People with tertiary education"	"People with apprentice-ship"	"People without a degree"	"Wealthy people"	"Low income people"	"People who work with other human beings"	"People who manufacture concrete products"
Education group closest	High	Medium	Low	High	Low		Low
Class closest	MNG & SCP	PW	PW	MNG & SBO	PW	SCP	PW
Class most distant	PW & SW	SCP	SCP	PW	TECH	TECH	MNG & SCP
Territorial group closest	Urban	Rural					Rural
Sex closest				Men		Women	Men

Note: Dark grey cells indicate that the socio-structural groups predict closeness to identity groups at  $p=0.001$ ; light grey cells indicate prediction of closeness to identity groups at  $p=0.05-0.01$ .  
 Abbreviations of the class coding: SBO = Small Business Owners, TECH = Technical professionals, MNG = Managers, SCP = Socio-cultural professionals, PW = Production Workers, SW = Service workers;

Among the middle classes, only technical professionals feel slightly closer to “Swiss people” than managers and socio-cultural professionals. Finally, respondents living in rural areas feel closer to “Swiss people” than respondents in urban areas.

When replicating the interpretation of these regression findings for all 17 social groups<sup>6</sup>, we find two main insights: first, the fact that membership in the “objective” structural categories consistently relates to subjective closeness to these categories validates the analytical value of the

6 Tables 2a and 2b do not show the identity groups “People with a similar job” and “Middle class people”, because they do not relate to any “objective” socio-structural predictors. This is interesting substantively, as it indicates that e.g. identification with the middle class is universally high, but as this paper focuses on divides, we only show the results in appendix I.

(subjective) social groups we intend to measure. This is obvious when it comes to education, territorial residency and sex, but it also holds for both the vertical and the horizontal dimensions of class: Closeness to wealthy people divides managers from production workers and, vice versa, closeness to people with low income divides workers from technical professionals. Regarding work logics, we find that socio-cultural professionals identify most closely with a social group defined by the interpersonal work logic, while technical professionals feel least close to this logic. Similarly, production workers identify significantly more strongly with the social group of people in product manufacturing jobs than managers and socio-cultural professionals do. These divides correspond to the expectations and confirm that these occupational class groups rely on criteria that are meaningful not only in the eyes of scholars, but also of individuals.

**Table 2a:** Summary table of the main socio-structural correlates of feeling close towards different identity groups (for regression tables, see Appendix 1)


	Territorial group identities		Sex group identities		Cultural group identities			
	"Urban people"	"People from the countryside"	"Men"	"Women"	"Cosmopolitans"	"Culturally interested people"	"Swiss"	"People with a migration background"
Education group closest	High	Medium			High	High	Low	High
Class closest	SCP	PW			SCP & MNG	SCP	PW	SCP & MNG
Class most distant	SBO & PW	SCP			TECH & PW	SW	SCP	PW
Territorial group closest	Urban	Rural			Urban	Urban	Rural	Urban
Sex closest		Women	Men	Women		Women		

Note: Dark grey cells indicate that the socio-structural groups predict closeness to identity groups at  $p=0.001$ ; light grey cells indicate prediction of closeness to identity groups at  $p=0.05-0.01$   
 Abbreviations of the class coding: SBO = Small Business Owners, TECH = Technical professionals, MNG = Managers, SCP = Socio-cultural professionals, PW = Production Workers, SW = Service workers;

The second insight, however, is that social identities of structural “objective” groups go *far beyond* the immediate corresponding groups. Highly educated people also differ from less educated respondents in their closeness to wealthy people, urban people and – most importantly – cosmopolitans, culturally interested people and people with a migration background. These links do not simply reflect composition effects (as they hold in the multivariate estimation). Similarly, people living in rural areas feel significantly closer to people in manual labor, to people who hold an apprenticeship as highest degree, and to Swiss people. Finally, objective class divides are tellingly reflected in subjective identity divides regarding education, urban-rural residence, cosmopolitanism, lifestyle, nationality and migration background. This network of relationships already indicates that specific aspects of group identity tend to cluster in systematic ways. Here, it is particularly noticeable that “objective” categories significantly predict closeness to the more culturally connoted social groups in every respect we examined and – what is more – in reinforcing, rather than cross-cutting ways. This provides evidence for the hypothesis that the structural foundations of the universalism-particularism cleavage are mobilized to a large extent through cultural identities.

Figure 2 illustrates the finding that cultural social identities are at least as strongly rooted in objective social conditions as the straightforward correlates themselves. The figure shows predicted probabilities of feeling “very close” to social groups by levels of education, class and residency. For each of these structural categories, we compare substantive effect sizes for the directly corresponding social identity and for “Swiss people” as a culturally constructed social identity (remember that all our respondents were “objectively” Swiss). The effects for the culturally connoted identity are as strong if not stronger than for the directly corresponding social identities. We interpret this as evidence that social structure may translate into attitudes and behaviour via social identities that depart from the focus on material life conditions. In other words: Knowing a person’s education level and how this characteristic relates to political

attitudes is insufficient for understanding individuals' *perceived* interests and thus the rationale underlying their political attitudes and choices.



**Figure 2:** Predicted probabilities of different “objective” socio-structural groups (*x*-axes) to feel “very close” to the corresponding social structural group and to “Swiss people”

### The politicization of social identities: identities and electoral preference

We have so far established that social structural groups differ significantly in terms of their social identities. The next step is to investigate which of these identities are politicized in the sense that they link structural and political divides. Hence, we explore how these identities contribute to predicting vote choice.

We first present descriptive evidence on how party electorates in Switzerland differ in terms of their social identities. In other words, we switch perspective by looking at social identities through the lens of party electorates. Figure 3 shows how the different party electorates diverge

in terms of identification with the same 17 different groups discussed above. It presents mean responses to the closeness questions by partisan preferences in terms of divergence from the sample mean. The point where the y-axis meets the x-axis represents the mean score for the entire sample (partisans and non-partisans).

Most relevant are the partisan differences between far right and new left that emerge from Figure 1. Looking at the dark and light grey bars, we see that new left voters reportedly feel much closer than far right voters to cosmopolitans, to people interested in culture, to people with a migration background, and to urban people, while they feel much more distant from Swiss nationals and people living in rural areas. Looking at Figure 1, it is striking how new left and far right voters are most distinctive in terms of their identification with culturally connoted groups (with the mean closeness scores almost always deviating in opposite directions from the sample mean).

To test for the significance of these differences between party electorates, we computed bivariate regressions of perceived closeness on partisan preference (Appendix 2): new left and far right voters differ in how close they feel to no less than 14 out of 17 groups, indicating that most of these identities are to some extent politicized<sup>7</sup>. In line with the descriptive evidence, differences are strongest regarding culturally connoted groups. This suggests that the politicization of structural group divides has occurred primarily in terms of these cultural groups, more so than through the politicization of the actual occupational class identities and educational identities. For instance, an (objective) interpersonal occupational work logic is one of the strongest predictors of the new left vote in Switzerland, but “working with people” is not the group that divides new left and far right voters most clearly. One structural divide that *is*


7 Only prompting respondents on people having a similar job (which means different things for different people), as well as male and female gender, does not yield significant differences.

explicitly politicized in its own terms is the urban-rural divide, and plausibly this has occurred through cultural frames at least as much as through economic ones.

While some specific identities appear distinctly more politicized than others, it is hard not to look at Figure 3 without identifying sets of identities that differ between new left and far right voters in the same ways. Relatedly, the previous step of the analysis showed that certain sets of identities share similar roots in social structure. Factor analyses (not shown) confirm that identities relate to each other in ways that correspond theoretically to the universalism-particularism divide. In particular, closeness to university-educated, urban, cosmopolitan, and cultured people load clearly onto a factor that seems to capture closeness to a liberal cosmopolitan elite, while national identity, rural identity and closeness to people with an apprenticeship are defining features of a second factor that might be interpreted as capturing attachment to a national “homeland”. Similar patterns emerge from analysis of responses to open-ended questions about identity that were asked in the same survey (analyzed separately). Furthermore, additional closed-ended questions in our survey indicate that voters themselves are aware of how some of these categorizations overlap and reinforce each others. All of these different analyses suggest that we might think of these specific group identities as jointly forming the boundaries of more overarching antagonistic collective identities that are taking shape in the conflict over universalism versus particularism. Here, we continue to work with the more specific identities to avoid losing valuable information, for instance regarding asymmetries of new left versus far right identities. In particular, the more fine-grained break-

8 A closed-ended question asked respondents to assess differences between urban and rural groups regarding a number of complementary characteristics, and another question asked them to do the same for educational groups. A clear majority of respondents felt that urban and rural people *also* differ “somewhat” or “very much” regarding education, occupation, social class, and lifestyle/leisure. Similarly, majorities of respondents felt that groups with high and medium levels of education differ from the lower educated regarding occupation and class, urban-rural residence, and lifestyle/leisure.

down may give us an indication of which group categories are (becoming) the most defining features of overarching collective identities.



**Figure 3:** Divergence of mean closeness to social categories for different party electorates from the sample mean (the y-axis cuts the x-axis at the sample mean = sample mean, 1 = not at all important / 4 = very important).

### Linking socio-structural attributes, identities and political preferences

Having presented results first from a bottom-up and then from a politicization perspective, we now go one step further and link structure, identities, and party preferences empirically. We do this by calculating logit regression models using partisan preferences as dependent variables and regressing them on both socio-demographic categories as well as on the social groups

which partisans report feeling closest or least close to. We calculate the models separately for the new left and the far right. In a first model, we include only our main structural variables: education, class, and urban-rural residence (along with age and gender as controls). In a second model, we add relevant in-groups and out-groups for the respective electorates.

In order to determine the most relevant in-groups and out-groups for every electorate (to be included in the models), we use the average closeness ratings each party electorate gives to each group. For every social group, we calculate the distance of partisans' average closeness from the sample mean (as shown in Figure 3). This allows us to determine which social groups partisans identify with or demarcate themselves from most distinctively. In the models we include the three groups with the largest positive (+), and the largest negative (-) difference between partisan mean and sample mean. Hence, we define as out-groups those to which a certain partisan electorate feels comparatively least close to. Note that this operationalisation does not necessarily imply depreciation of out-groups. Rather, out-groups are simply defined as the groups someone does not feel part of.

Left partisans most positively and distinctively (compared to the entire sample) identify with cosmopolitans, culturally interested people, and urban residents, while they feel distinctively less close than average to rural residents, Swiss people, and the wealthy. For voters of the far right, Swiss citizens, people in rural areas and people who hold a production job most clearly represent in-groups, while cosmopolitans, culturally interested people and people with migration background are primary out-groups. The results of the estimation are presented in Table 39. The table shows logit coefficients and standard deviations. Overall, the results demonstrate that there is indeed added analytical value of including subjective understandings of group belonging in our analyses of electoral preferences. Model fit increases substantively

9 Note that we exclude non-partisans here, as we are interested in differences between mobilized electorates.

when social identities are included, both for new left and far right party choice. The individual coefficients indicate whether socio-demographic criteria and social identities that resonate positively or negatively with a particular electorate indeed predict vote choice in the entire sample.

Looking first at the models including only objective socio-demographic categories, we observe that highly-educated respondents are significantly less likely to support the far right than people with secondary education (without controlling for class, respondents with higher education are also significantly more likely to vote new left than voters with mid-level education). The same holds for sociocultural professionals compared to the reference category, service workers (as well as production workers). By contrast, the odds of sociocultural professionals supporting new left parties are significantly higher than for service workers. Lastly, people in rural areas are significantly less likely to vote for the new left and more likely to vote for the far right than people in urban areas. All these findings correspond to expectations derived from the literature.

Turning to the models that include social identities, the results in Table 3 support the idea that subjective group perceptions contribute to explaining electoral choices, especially for the new left (less so for center parties, see Appendix 3). Feeling close to cosmopolitan and culturally interested (but not urban) people is positively correlated with a preference for new left parties, while closeness to Swiss, rural and wealthy people is negatively associated with leftism. This finding is interesting, as it indicates that demarcation from the rich continues to complement primarily cultural identities among new left voters who are objectively not poor on average. For far right parties, we find the expected strong and significant positive effect of closeness to Swiss nationals, but no effect of identification with production workers or rural people (holding all else constant). Nor do we find a significant negative effect of closeness to people with migrant background. Hence, feeling close or distant from people with migrant background does not predict vote choice for the far right, which is surprising at first glance. Despite migration

being a salient topic, anti-immigrant attitudes don't seem to reflect people's distance to migrants themselves, but rather how they think *about* societal diversity more generally. This resonates with the fact that we indeed find significant *negative* effects of feeling close to cosmopolitans and culturally interested people on the probability of far right preference. Note that, while such nuance is lost when we combine our measures of identity using factor analysis, the "liberal cosmopolitan" and "national homeland" factors discussed above predict new left and far right voting in the expected ways: when jointly included in a multivariate framework identical to that in Table 3 (not shown), a "liberal cosmopolitan" identity is positively and significantly related to new left voting and negatively related to far right voting. The signs are reversed for identification with "national homeland". The predictive power of "liberal cosmopolitan" as both a negative and a positive identity is stronger, however, indicating that far right voting might be to a large extent an expression of negative identification with urban liberal elites (in line with our main analysis).

To demonstrate the substantive significance of the results in Table 3, Figures 4 and 5 show predicted probabilities of left and far right party preference on the basis of the models including both social structural determinants and identities. We calculate probabilities for different levels of the most relevant positively and negatively correlated subjective group identities. As a reference for effect sizes, we also calculate predicted probabilities for the most important socio-demographic attribute.

We observe very large effect sizes of subjective identities, similar or larger than those of the most important socio-demographic categories. For the far right, the difference between respondents who feel close to Swiss nationals and those who do not is over 35 percentage points. Equally massive is the effect of demarcation from culturally interested people, especially when compared with the difference of around 20 percentage points in the predicted probability of support between respondents with below-secondary education and those with a

university degree (keep in mind that education is recognized as a key predictor of far right voting in the literature).


This massive identity-based polarization is mirrored on the left. Those who feel very close to “culturally interested” people vote for left parties with a probability of over 30 percent, while that probability is below 10 percent for those who do not feel close to this social group at all. Meanwhile, demarcation from wealthy people increases the likelihood of voting for the left by around 15 percentage points. We compare these effect sizes to the most important socio-demographic marker for left voting in our models, occupational class. The probability of small business owners in Switzerland voting for the new left is vanishingly small, while sociocultural professionals are estimated to do so with a probability of over 30 percent in our model. Taken together, Figures 4 and 5 illustrate how important social identities are in explaining partisan preferences in Switzerland. Importantly, effect sizes are not all that different from those of working-class identification on the vote for the left in the 1970s, when the traditional class cleavage was highly salient. Supplementary analyses reported in Appendix 4 based on the comparative *Political Action Survey* dataset<sup>10</sup> show that identifying as working class made the probability of voting for the left rise from 25% to 52% in the mid-1970s across a sample of 7 countries. This suggests that the social identities we are looking at in our own survey tap into something similarly “real” and sizeable as the identities related to the classical cleavages before electoral realignment took place.

<sup>10</sup> Available at [www.icpsr.umich.edu](http://www.icpsr.umich.edu) (ICPSR n° 9581)


**Table 3:** Logistic regressions explaining party preference with structural categories and subjective social identities—restricted sample (only partisans)

		Left	Left	Far Right	Far Right
Class	below secondary	0.197 (0.42)	0.101 (0.20)	0.096 (0.27)	0.134 (0.35)
	secondary	r	r	r	r
	tertiary	0.269 (0.94)	0.062 (0.19)	-0.813*** (-3.32)	-0.814** (-3.13)
	Small bus owners	-1.143 (-1.10)	-2.106 (-1.73)	-0.057 (-0.13)	0.160 (0.32)
	Technical profs.	0.469 (0.76)	0.140 (0.21)	-1.349** (-2.70)	-1.350* (-2.56)
	Prod workers	1.011 (1.93)	0.646 (1.12)	-0.515 (-1.28)	-0.666 (-1.50)
	Managers	0.340 (0.68)	-0.019 (-0.03)	-0.498 (-1.34)	-0.113 (-0.28)
	Office clerks	0.487 (1.06)	0.138 (0.28)	-0.621 (-1.86)	-0.416 (-1.16)
	Socio-cult profs	1.665*** (3.42)	1.414** (2.64)	-1.636*** (-3.53)	-1.329** (-2.71)
	Service workers	r	r	r	r
Residence	Urban	r	r	r	r
	Rural	-0.974** (-3.12)	-0.564 (-1.64)	0.536* -2.48	0.393 -1.63
Age	<30	r	r	r	r
	30-50	0.056 -0.17	-0.062 (-0.17)	-0.075 (-0.27)	0.005 -0.02
	>50	-0.107 (-0.29)	-0.228 (-0.56)	-0.452 (-1.50)	-0.298 (-0.90)
Sex	female	r	r	r	r
	male	-0.733** (-2.82)	-0.457 (-1.53)	0.475* -2.14	0.441 -1.84
Subjective group ids	Cosmopolitans		0.353* -2.1		-0.354** (-2.70)
	Cult. Interested		0.703*** -3.79		-0.465** (-3.22)
	Urban		0.404 -1.92		
	Rural		-0.454* (-2.19)		-0.039 (-0.24)
	Swiss		-0.399* (-2.00)		0.456** -2.7
	Wealthy		-0.752*** (-3.79)		
	Production job				0.209 -1.45
	Migration background				-0.267 (-1.79)
	Intercept	-0.992 (-1.68)	-0.981 (-0.83)	-0.247 (-0.51)	0.733 -0.74
	r2_p	0.118	0.247	0.094	0.168
N	520	514	520	511	

**Note:** logit regression models, cells show coefficients and std dev. \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .



**Figure 4:** Predicted probability of left party preference for different levels of the most important socio-demographic attribute and the two most relevant positively and negatively correlated subjective group identities (95% confidence intervals)



**Figure 5:** Predicted probability of far right party preference for different levels of the most important socio-demographic attribute and the two most relevant positively and negatively correlated subjective group identities (95% confidence intervals)

We have now looked at voters' social structural attributes and social identities side by side. However, the idea underlying our theoretical model and that of classical cleavage theory suggests that social structure translates into voting behaviour at least in part *through* identities. The structure of our data does not allow for an actual mediation analysis, but comparing the different models suggests that indeed the effect of socio-structural variables on party preference goes at least partially through identities. In particular, the effect of higher education (as opposed to secondary education) and socio-cultural professionals (as opposed to workers) on the vote weakens once we introduce the relevant identities into the model. Without controlling for class, a strongly significant effect of higher education on the left vote even becomes altogether insignificant once we control for identities.

## **Conclusion**

Polarization between parties of the new left and far right is often interpreted as evidence of a fully mobilized electoral cleavage, given the clear socio-structural underpinning of these electoral preferences. In this paper, we investigated whether a full-fledged universalism-particularism 'cleavage' has formed in Switzerland not only in terms of structure and political mobilization, but also in terms of collective identities linking the two. Our results support theories of electoral realignment, but we also go a step further by showing – from various perspectives – that realignment has led to the crystallization of distinctive collective identities. Beyond representing a conflict over new issues, the universalism-particularism divide has the potential to structure how people think about who they are and where they stand in an emerging group conflict that meshes economics and culture. Importantly, we show that even culturally connoted identities are structurally rooted, which strongly suggests that the often posited dichotomy between “objective” economic and culturalist explanations of electoral preferences is misleading.

We proceeded in three steps, looking first at how potentially relevant social identities are rooted in socio-structural categories. We find that educational, occupational and place-based groups are meaningful not only in the eyes of scholars but also of individual voters. However, culturally connoted identities are at least as important, and these cultural identities are also clearly anchored in socio-demographic groups.

In a second step, we looked at which of these identities are indeed politicized. We find striking differences in the self-perceptions of new left and far right voters, but we also find that not all social identities with roots in social structure relate to electoral preferences for the new left versus the far right. This finding highlights the role of agency and political actors in mobilizing structural potentials. Generally, we find strong evidence for a politicization of structural divides in culturally connoted terms: identities such as cosmopolitanism, nationality and cultural lifestyles are by far most distinctive between far right and new left voters. The only subjective identity, which clearly mirrors the sociodemographic divide is urban-rural residence. Education and occupational class groups, by contrast, come up more marginally in terms of distinctiveness. These identities may matter for the respective group (e.g. “production job” for far right voters), but they do not polarize across the electoral cleavage. Regarding education, left and far right voters do differ fairly strongly in how close (left) or distant (far right) they feel from “university graduates”. These observations suggest that even “economically” connoted social identities need to be culturally politicized to unfold their structuring potential.

In a final step, we brought together the societal and politicization-perspectives by including the most prominent identities in multivariate models of partisan preference. When defining in-groups and out-groups on the basis of distinctive closeness or distance (compared to all respondents), new left voters name cosmopolitans, culturally interested people and urban people as their in-group, and rural people, Swiss and wealthy people as out-groups. Far right voters, meanwhile, feel comparatively closest to Swiss and rural people, and to people who

hold a production job. They feel comparatively *least* close to cosmopolitans, people with a migration background and culturally interested people. Including these in-groups and out-groups in models of partisan preference substantially increases model fit, both for predicting new left and far right party choice. The effect sizes of several identities are on a par with the effects of the most established socio-structural predictors of vote choice.

We want to highlight that, while our analysis of *specific* identities can provide insights on the focal points of collective identities, various ways of looking at our data (in terms of identities' roots in social structure, their links to parties, factor analysis, or voters' perceptions of overlap between group categories) suggest that we may be witnessing the emergence of two overarching antagonistic identities that voters perceive as such (similar to class identities before realignment, which also bundled several group belongings). We might label these overarching identities "liberal cosmopolitan" and "national homeland", and think of their boundaries as being jointly defined by several of the categories we look at here. Our approach thus also contributes to our understanding of the basis of the growth of affective polarization that scholars have documented in the advanced democracies of North America and Europe (e.g., Mason 2018, Westwood et al. 2018, Gidron, Adams, and Horne 2019). Based on the Swiss case, this paper suggests that this polarization is related to an electoral realignment along a universalism-particularism divide, which is stabilized by collective identities that in turn are rooted in social structure. As Switzerland represents a paradigmatic case of a realigned party system, distinctive collective identities may also exist in other countries where realignment progressed early and forcefully, such as France or Denmark. Further, Switzerland could be at least a harbinger for cases of more recent realignment, such as the UK or Germany. In fact, given recent electoral developments in those countries, we might expect that collective identities over universalism versus particularism are being similarly crystallized across most advanced Western democracies.

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## Appendix

### Appendix 1 Ordered logistic regressions relating education, class and urban-rural residence to feelings of closeness towards different social groups

Feeling close to people "with a university degree"				
	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	-0.559** (-3.20)			-0.555 (-1.68)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	1.216*** (8.72)			1.025*** (4.88)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	-0.599*** (-3.30)	-0.540* (-2.22)	-0.554** (-3.12)	-0.516* (-2.10)
>50	-0.174 (-1.03)	-0.200 (-0.76)	-0.391* (-2.39)	-0.005 (-0.02)
female	.	.	.	.
male	-0.073 (-0.59)	-0.033 (-0.17)	0.069 (0.58)	0.026 (0.13)
Small bus owners		-0.676 (-1.78)		-0.164 (-0.41)
Technical profs.		-0.578 (-1.66)		-0.437 (-1.25)
Prod workers		-1.299*** (-4.16)		-0.799* (-2.43)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		-0.557* (-2.11)		-0.071 (-0.25)
Socio-cult profs.		0.083 (0.28)		0.076 (0.26)
Service workers		-1.098*** (-3.63)		-0.351 (-1.05)
Urban			.	.
rural			-0.396** (-2.87)	-0.191 (-0.99)
R2	0.057	0.029	0.008	0.056
BIC	2325.283	1233.559	2436.412	1220.819
N	996.000	529.000	996.000	529.000

**Feeling close to people "with an apprenticeship as highest degree"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	-1.295*** (-6.70)			-0.909* (-2.54)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	-1.069*** (-7.23)			-1.008*** (-4.56)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	0.470* (2.44)	0.352 (1.37)	0.596** (3.11)	0.311 (1.21)
>50	0.468** (2.63)	0.322 (1.15)	0.567** (3.20)	0.138 (0.49)
female	.	.	.	.
male	-0.042 (-0.32)	-0.091 (-0.45)	0.093 (0.73)	-0.121 (-0.60)
Small bus owners		1.082** (2.66)		0.633 (1.50)
Technical profs.		0.654 (1.78)		0.533 (1.43)
Prod workers		1.217*** (3.70)		0.846* (2.45)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		0.913** (3.27)		0.500 (1.70)
Socio-cult profs.		-0.296 (-0.98)		-0.273 (-0.90)
Service workers		0.269 (0.83)		-0.162 (-0.46)
Urban			.	.
rural			0.500*** (3.33)	0.507* (2.51)
R2	0.042	0.036	0.012	0.066
BIC	2016.655	1077.586	2071.237	1064.949
N	992.000	528.000	992.000	528.000

**Feeling close to people "without a completed degree"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	1.046*** (5.92)			1.337*** (4.11)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	-0.711*** (-5.35)			-0.574** (-2.79)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	0.397* (2.16)	0.972*** (3.95)	0.306 (1.71)	1.034*** (4.17)
>50	0.495** (2.90)	0.995*** (3.74)	0.644*** (3.85)	0.948*** (3.53)
female	.	.	.	.
male	0.025 (0.21)	-0.430* (-2.29)	-0.165 (-1.40)	-0.469* (-2.48)
Small bus owners		0.418 (1.12)		0.123 (0.32)
Technical profs.		0.114 (0.33)		0.047 (0.13)
Prod workers		1.123*** (3.70)		0.784* (2.44)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		0.245 (0.94)		-0.059 (-0.21)
Socio-cult profs.		-0.407 (-1.43)		-0.421 (-1.47)
Service workers		0.616* (2.06)		0.012 (0.04)
Urban			.	.
rural			-0.042 (-0.30)	-0.084 (-0.44)
R2	0.049	0.041	0.008	0.065
BIC	2414.271	1268.709	2507.705	1257.082
N	997.000	529.000	997.000	529.000

**Feeling close to "wealthy people"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	0.071 (0.41)			0.078 (0.24)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	0.437** (3.27)			0.445* (2.16)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	-0.412* (-2.25)	-0.137 (-0.56)	-0.412* (-2.27)	-0.131 (-0.53)
>50	-0.149 (-0.88)	0.131 (0.49)	-0.211 (-1.26)	0.223 (0.83)
female	.	.	.	.
male	0.391** (3.17)	0.769*** (3.96)	0.399*** (3.30)	0.795*** (4.08)
Small bus owners		0.181 (0.47)		0.491 (1.21)
Technical profs.		-0.582 (-1.71)		-0.539 (-1.57)
Prod workers		-1.236*** (-3.95)		-1.009** (-3.09)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		-0.334 (-1.28)		-0.099 (-0.35)
Socio-cult profs.		-0.133 (-0.45)		-0.125 (-0.43)
Service workers		-0.405 (-1.31)		-0.122 (-0.36)
Urban			.	.
rural			-0.251 (-1.78)	-0.374* (-1.97)
R2	0.013	0.032	0.009	0.040
BIC	2248.018	1164.204	2249.452	1174.454
N	997.000	530.000	997.000	530.000

**Feeling close to "middle class people"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	-0.312 (-1.62)			-0.476 (-1.32)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	-0.083 (-0.58)			-0.233 (-1.07)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	0.380 (1.91)	0.416 (1.59)	0.389 (1.96)	0.398 (1.52)
>50	0.534** (2.88)	0.561* (1.98)	0.512** (2.78)	0.515 (1.80)
female	.	.	.	.
male	0.027 (0.20)	-0.064 (-0.32)	0.083 (0.64)	-0.067 (-0.33)
Small bus owners		0.212 (0.53)		0.110 (0.26)
Technical profs.		-0.120 (-0.33)		-0.155 (-0.42)
Prod workers		0.236 (0.71)		0.146 (0.42)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		-0.198 (-0.72)		-0.293 (-1.00)
Socio-cult profs.		-0.406 (-1.30)		-0.398 (-1.27)
Service workers		-0.515 (-1.57)		-0.558 (-1.54)
Urban			.	.
rural			0.276 (1.80)	0.171 (0.84)
R2	0.006	0.012	0.006	0.015
BIC	1861.420	1012.454	1853.910	1027.870
N	999.000	530.000	999.000	530.000

**Feeling close to "low income people"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	0.914*** (5.01)			0.376 (1.10)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	-0.613*** (-4.55)			-0.426* (-2.05)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	0.450* (2.48)	0.190 (0.79)	0.375* (2.11)	0.171 (0.71)
>50	0.243 (1.44)	-0.071 (-0.27)	0.408* (2.48)	-0.162 (-0.61)
female	.	.	.	.
male	-0.130 (-1.05)	-0.263 (-1.38)	-0.298* (-2.47)	-0.278 (-1.46)
Small bus owners		1.626*** (4.03)		1.406*** (3.39)
Technical profs.		-0.206 (-0.59)		-0.275 (-0.78)
Prod workers		2.018*** (6.00)		1.791*** (5.12)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		0.724** (2.78)		0.502 (1.81)
Socio-cult profs.		0.316 (1.10)		0.315 (1.09)
Service workers		1.117*** (3.46)		0.767* (2.20)
Urban			.	.
rural			0.187 (1.32)	0.116 (0.59)
R2	0.038	0.055	0.007	0.061
BIC	2250.787	1140.731	2313.978	1152.754
N	998.000	530.000	998.000	530.000

**Feeling close to people "in a similar job"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	-0.169 (-0.90)			0.191 (0.54)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	0.075 (0.54)			0.258 (1.21)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	0.069 (0.37)	-0.153 (-0.61)	0.044 (0.24)	-0.141 (-0.56)
>50	-0.042 (-0.24)	-0.366 (-1.34)	-0.095 (-0.55)	-0.388 (-1.41)
female	.	.	.	.
male	-0.248 (-1.93)	-0.138 (-0.70)	-0.192 (-1.52)	-0.111 (-0.56)
Small bus owners		0.428 (1.08)		0.431 (1.05)
Technical profs.		0.386 (1.07)		0.478 (1.31)
Prod workers		0.443 (1.34)		0.525 (1.51)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		-0.213 (-0.79)		-0.139 (-0.48)
Socio-cult profs.		0.545 (1.82)		0.565 (1.88)
Service workers		-0.054 (-0.17)		0.000 (0.00)
Urban			.	.
rural			0.470** (3.19)	0.563** (2.84)
R2	0.003	0.012	0.007	0.021
BIC	2011.962	1058.795	1996.604	1068.189
N	998.000	530.000	998.000	530.000

**Feeling close to "people who work with and for other human beings"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	-0.103 (-0.57)			0.324 (0.96)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	0.150 (1.10)			-0.054 (-0.26)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	0.466* (2.52)	0.746** (2.96)	0.477** (2.58)	0.748** (2.97)
>50	0.739*** (4.27)	0.843** (3.07)	0.710*** (4.14)	0.822** (2.96)
female	.	.	.	.
male	-0.864*** (-6.68)	-0.916*** (-4.56)	-0.836*** (-6.63)	-0.916*** (-4.55)
Small bus owners		0.593 (1.52)		0.532 (1.32)
Technical profs.		-0.349 (-0.97)		-0.344 (-0.95)
Prod workers		0.272 (0.83)		0.213 (0.62)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		-0.237 (-0.89)		-0.276 (-0.98)
Socio-cult profs.		0.768* (2.51)		0.776* (2.53)
Service workers		0.044 (0.14)		-0.069 (-0.20)
Urban			.	.
rural			-0.105 (-0.73)	0.083 (0.42)
R2	0.032	0.052	0.031	0.053
BIC	2094.862	1088.110	2089.744	1105.681
N	997.000	529.000	997.000	529.000

**Feeling close to "people who manufacture concrete products in their job"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	0.340 (1.89)			0.642 (1.95)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	-0.463*** (-3.45)			-0.114 (-0.54)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	0.457** (2.58)	0.654** (2.77)	0.432* (2.47)	0.696** (2.93)
>50	0.888*** (5.34)	1.063*** (3.99)	0.972*** (5.92)	1.049*** (3.91)
female	.	.	.	.
male	0.317* (2.57)	0.356 (1.88)	0.239* (1.98)	0.359 (1.90)
Small bus owners		1.151** (2.85)		0.970* (2.31)
Technical profs.		0.994** (2.76)		1.002** (2.74)
Prod workers		2.051*** (6.06)		1.929*** (5.42)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		0.487 (1.86)		0.377 (1.34)
Socio-cult profs.		0.095 (0.34)		0.099 (0.35)
Service workers		0.633* (2.07)		0.367 (1.09)
Urban			.	.
rural			0.280* (1.98)	0.361 (1.87)
R2	0.028	0.070	0.020	0.077
BIC	2316.553	1188.306	2329.410	1199.513
N	995.000	526.000	995.000	526.000

**Feeling close to "people with a migration background"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	0.295 (1.66)			1.027** (3.01)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	0.359** (2.75)			-0.094 (-0.45)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	-0.152 (-0.86)	0.223 (0.96)	-0.179 (-1.03)	0.231 (0.99)
>50	-0.108 (-0.66)	0.344 (1.35)	-0.142 (-0.88)	0.334 (1.29)
female	.	.	.	.
male	0.099 (0.82)	0.086 (0.46)	0.052 (0.44)	0.056 (0.30)
Small bus owners		-0.341 (-0.86)		-0.384 (-0.93)
Technical profs.		-0.501 (-1.49)		-0.511 (-1.50)
Prod workers		-0.990** (-3.12)		-1.117** (-3.28)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		-0.365 (-1.43)		-0.440 (-1.58)
Socio-cult profs.		-0.149 (-0.53)		-0.175 (-0.62)
Service workers		-0.766* (-2.51)		-1.004** (-2.97)
Urban			.	.
rural			-0.438** (-3.14)	-0.473* (-2.51)
R2	0.004	0.013	0.005	0.028
BIC	2373.197	1211.064	2364.435	1212.500
N	996.000	529.000	996.000	529.000

**Feeling close to "urban people"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	0.337 (1.88)			0.395 (1.13)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	0.388** (2.96)			0.170 (0.83)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	-0.030 (-0.17)	0.267 (1.12)	0.026 (0.14)	0.341 (1.41)
>50	0.081 (0.49)	0.298 (1.15)	0.093 (0.56)	0.481 (1.80)
female	.	.	.	.
male	0.071 (0.59)	0.178 (0.93)	0.010 (0.09)	0.167 (0.85)
Small bus owners		-0.952* (-2.54)		-0.624 (-1.59)
Technical profs.		-0.244 (-0.72)		-0.311 (-0.90)
Prod workers		-0.708* (-2.14)		-0.563 (-1.62)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		0.115 (0.45)		0.231 (0.82)
Socio-cult profs.		0.144 (0.50)		0.118 (0.40)
Service workers		-0.335 (-1.09)		-0.242 (-0.71)
Urban			.	.
rural			-1.416*** (-9.62)	-1.368*** (-6.90)
R2	0.004	0.014	0.042	0.061
BIC	2366.275	1194.837	2271.331	1160.856
N	996.000	528.000	996.000	528.000

**Feeling close to "people from the countryside"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	-0.189 (-1.05)			0.023 (0.07)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	-0.658*** (-4.84)			-0.170 (-0.81)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	0.550** (3.04)	0.322 (1.34)	0.539** (3.00)	0.295 (1.22)
>50	0.599*** (3.56)	0.538* (2.04)	0.672*** (4.02)	0.421 (1.57)
female	.	.	.	.
male	-0.274* (-2.21)	-0.451* (-2.37)	-0.239 (-1.95)	-0.421* (-2.17)
Small bus owners		0.590 (1.49)		0.275 (0.66)
Technical profs.		-0.063 (-0.18)		-0.017 (-0.05)
Prod workers		0.840** (2.64)		0.723* (2.14)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		0.234 (0.91)		0.131 (0.47)
Socio-cult profs.		-0.199 (-0.68)		-0.162 (-0.56)
Service workers		0.487 (1.57)		0.319 (0.93)
Urban			.	.
rural			1.203*** (8.07)	1.307*** (6.41)
R2	0.023	0.025	0.042	0.065
BIC	2232.432	1162.415	2182.401	1137.156
N	996.000	530.000	996.000	530.000

**Feeling close to "cosmopolitan people"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	-0.508** (-2.94)			-0.228 (-0.72)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	0.446*** (3.44)			0.181 (0.90)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	-0.076 (-0.44)	0.221 (0.97)	-0.037 (-0.22)	0.217 (0.95)
>50	0.011 (0.07)	0.170 (0.68)	-0.081 (-0.51)	0.209 (0.83)
female	.	.	.	.
male	-0.073 (-0.61)	0.000 (0.00)	0.002 (0.02)	-0.005 (-0.03)
Small bus owners		-0.637 (-1.64)		-0.477 (-1.19)
Technical profs.		-0.805* (-2.36)		-0.807* (-2.33)
Prod workers		-0.725* (-2.32)		-0.585 (-1.78)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		-0.136 (-0.54)		-0.015 (-0.06)
Socio-cult profs.		0.039 (0.14)		0.030 (0.11)
Service workers		-0.702* (-2.39)		-0.525 (-1.64)
Urban			.	.
rural			-0.281* (-2.06)	-0.332 (-1.81)
R2	0.013	0.013	0.002	0.017
BIC	2561.905	1328.189	2583.451	1342.198
N	993.000	527.000	993.000	527.000

**Feeling close to  
"men"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	0.326 (1.75)			-0.160 (-0.46)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	-0.126 (-0.92)			0.061 (0.28)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	0.060 (0.32)	0.069 (0.28)	0.042 (0.23)	0.064 (0.26)
>50	-0.216 (-1.26)	-0.279 (-1.03)	-0.174 (-1.02)	-0.282 (-1.03)
female	.	.	.	.
male	0.625*** (4.86)	0.912*** (4.53)	0.557*** (4.42)	0.915*** (4.53)
Small bus owners		0.396 (0.98)		0.430 (1.03)
Technical profs.		0.536 (1.46)		0.550 (1.48)
Prod workers		0.295 (0.90)		0.340 (0.98)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		0.275 (1.03)		0.311 (1.08)
Socio-cult profs.		0.457 (1.54)		0.462 (1.55)
Service workers		0.642* (2.01)		0.719* (2.02)
Urban			.	.
rural			-0.129 (-0.90)	0.049 (0.25)
R2	0.014	0.024	0.012	0.025
BIC	2186.928	1141.315	2185.270	1159.700
N	995.000	529.000	995.000	529.000

**Feeling close to "women"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	-0.262 (-1.43)			0.303 (0.87)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	-0.222 (-1.63)			-0.394 (-1.88)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	0.072 (0.39)	0.145 (0.59)	0.114 (0.63)	0.141 (0.57)
>50	0.179 (1.06)	0.197 (0.73)	0.209 (1.24)	0.108 (0.40)
female	.	.	.	.
male	-1.101*** (-8.34)	-1.235*** (-6.03)	-1.080*** (-8.32)	-1.246*** (-6.07)
Small bus owners		0.535 (1.38)		0.308 (0.77)
Technical profs.		0.318 (0.87)		0.277 (0.74)
Prod workers		-0.024 (-0.08)		-0.245 (-0.74)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		-0.069 (-0.27)		-0.273 (-0.98)
Socio-cult profs.		0.264 (0.88)		0.273 (0.91)
Service workers		0.328 (1.02)		0.013 (0.04)
Urban			.	.
rural			-0.007 (-0.05)	0.221 (1.14)
R2	0.037	0.051	0.036	0.056
BIC	2146.240	1127.156	2142.778	1139.780
N	996.000	528.000	996.000	528.000

**Feeling close to "culturally interested people"**

	M1 education	M1 class	M3 rural/urban	M4 full
Low educ	0.209 (1.19)			0.056 (0.17)
Medium educ	.			.
High educ	0.690*** (5.17)			0.429* (2.11)
<30	.	.	.	.
30-50	0.184 (1.04)	0.142 (0.59)	0.155 (0.88)	0.178 (0.74)
>50	0.588*** (3.55)	0.485 (1.83)	0.490** (2.99)	0.594* (2.22)
female	.	.	.	.
male	-0.323** (-2.65)	-0.465* (-2.47)	-0.304* (-2.55)	-0.470* (-2.48)
Small bus owners		-0.034 (-0.09)		0.226 (0.56)
Technical profs.		-0.052 (-0.16)		0.009 (0.03)
Prod workers		-0.136 (-0.42)		0.096 (0.29)
Managers		.		.
Clerks		-0.150 (-0.59)		0.074 (0.27)
Socio-cult profs.		0.284 (0.96)		0.275 (0.94)
Service workers		-1.023*** (-3.39)		-0.756* (-2.30)
Urban			.	.
rural			-0.361* (-2.58)	-0.397* (-2.09)
R2	0.019	0.020	0.011	0.028
BIC	2366.889	1232.154	2381.032	1242.010
N	996.000	529.000	996.000	529.000

**Appendix 2:** Bivariate regressions - reported closeness to different social groups by party preference

		coefficient	standard deviation	z	P-value	95% confidence intervals	
		t	n				
1_university degree	center	0.098	0.188	0.520	0.603	-0.271	0.467
	<b>farright</b>	-0.783	0.189	-4.150	<b>0.000</b>	-1.152	-0.413
2_apprenticeship	center	0.191	0.199	0.960	0.336	-0.199	0.581
	<b>farright</b>	0.479	0.200	2.390	<b>0.017</b>	0.087	0.872
3_no apprenticeship	center	-0.322	0.185	-1.740	0.082	-0.685	0.040
	<b>farright</b>	0.347	0.183	1.900	<b>0.057</b>	-0.011	0.706
4_wealthy	<b>center</b>	0.864	0.190	4.540	<b>0.000</b>	0.491	1.238
	<b>farright</b>	0.388	0.189	2.050	<b>0.040</b>	0.017	0.758
5_middle class	<b>center</b>	0.550	0.207	2.660	<b>0.008</b>	0.145	0.955
	<b>farright</b>	0.451	0.208	2.170	<b>0.030</b>	0.043	0.860
6_modest means	center	-0.317	0.188	-1.690	0.092	-0.685	0.052
	<b>farright</b>	0.493	0.192	2.570	<b>0.010</b>	0.117	0.869
7_similar job	center	0.080	0.197	0.400	0.686	-0.306	0.466
	farright	-0.186	0.199	-0.940	0.349	-0.575	0.203
8_working with people	center	-0.150	0.192	-0.780	0.435	-0.526	0.226
	<b>farright</b>	-0.440	0.191	-2.310	<b>0.021</b>	-0.813	-0.066
9_producing products	center	0.069	0.188	0.370	0.712	-0.298	0.437
	<b>farright</b>	0.524	0.190	2.760	<b>0.006</b>	0.152	0.896
10_migration background	center	-0.271	0.185	-1.470	0.142	-0.633	0.091
	<b>farright</b>	-1.162	0.193	-6.030	<b>0.000</b>	-1.539	-0.784

11_urban	center	-0.338	0.188	-1.800	0.072	-0.707	0.030
	<b>farright</b>	-1.014	0.193	-5.250	<b>0.000</b>	-1.393	- 0.635
12_rural	<b>center</b>	0.671	0.192	3.500	<b>0.000</b>	0.296	1.046
	<b>farright</b>	1.168	0.195	5.970	<b>0.000</b>	0.785	1.551
13_cosmopolitans	center	-0.366	0.187	-1.950	0.051	-0.733	0.001
	<b>farright</b>	-1.410	0.192	-7.330	<b>0.000</b>	-1.787	- 1.033
14_men	<b>center</b>	0.403	0.195	2.070	<b>0.038</b>	0.022	0.785
	farright	0.255	0.194	1.320	0.188	-0.125	0.635
15_women	center	-0.010	0.191	-0.060	0.956	-0.384	0.363
	farright	0.063	0.192	0.330	0.742	-0.313	0.439
16_culturally interested	<b>center</b>	-0.383	0.189	-2.030	<b>0.043</b>	-0.754	- 0.013
	<b>farright</b>	-1.202	0.193	-6.230	<b>0.000</b>	-1.580	- 0.824
17_swiss	<b>center</b>	0.510	0.193	2.640	<b>0.008</b>	0.131	0.889
	<b>farright</b>	1.400	0.202	6.940	<b>0.000</b>	1.005	1.795

**Note:** Bivariate ordered logit regressions. Dependent variable: reported closeness to different social groups on a scale from 0=not at all close to 4=very close. Party preference is a factor variable (left, center, right), left is the reference category.

**Appendix 3:** Logistic regressions explaining center party preference with structural categories and subjective social identities – restricted sample (only partisans)

		Center	Center
Education	below secondary	.	.
	secondary	0.596 (1.37)	0.408 (0.91)
	tertiary	1.231** (2.69)	0.960* (2.01)
Class	Small bus owners	-0.132 (-0.30)	-0.023 (-0.05)
	Technical profs.	0.396 (1.05)	0.501 (1.25)
	Prod workers	-0.479 (-1.25)	-0.103 (-0.25)
	Managers	.	.
	Office clerks	0.063 (0.21)	0.136 (0.43)
	Socio-cult profs	-0.366 (-1.14)	-0.458 (-1.37)
	Service workers	-0.452 (-1.15)	-0.345 (-0.85)
	Residence	Urban	.
	Rural	0.047 (0.22)	0.126 (0.57)
Age	<30	.	.
	30-50	0.039 (0.14)	0.105 (0.37)
	>50	0.463 (1.56)	0.507 (1.61)
Sex	female	.	.
	male	0.147 (0.69)	0.010 (0.05)
Subjective group Ids	University		-0.063 (-0.44)
	Wealthy		0.230 (1.53)
	Cosmopolitan		0.253* (2.13)
	Modest means		-0.246 (-1.55)
	No apprenticeship		-0.325* (-2.34)
	Production job		0.038 (0.27)
	R2	-1.552** (-2.91)	-1.147 (-1.35)
BIC	0.045	0.078	
N	711.096	721.286	
	520	511	

#### **Appendix 4:** Gauging the effect of working-class identification on left party choice in the mid-1970s

To get a sense of the substantive magnitude of the effects of social identities on vote choice reported in Figures 4 and 5 in the main text, we assessed the corresponding impact of working-class identification on the vote for the left in the mid-1970s, using the classical *Political Action* study.<sup>11</sup> We base our analysis on the seven European countries included in the survey, excluding the US with its less pronounced class cleavage. The cases are thus those of Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Switzerland, and Finland. Based on the vote choice variable included in the survey, we created a dummy variable for left party choice that encompasses the vote for the major left in each country (excluding new left parties; in Italy, the dummy captures the vote for the Socialists as well as the Communists).

The *Political Action* survey includes a variable on class identification (V124). We use this variable to create a dummy variable that distinguishes respondents who identify as working class and those who do not. The original variable in the survey is constructed based on a combination of spontaneous identification as working class and a follow-up question posed to those who did not report a class identification. The latter respondents were asked whether they identify more as working class or middle class. Variable V124 in the survey combines this information into a single variable.

#### The substantive effect

The predicted probability of voting for the left rises from 25.2% for those identifying with another class than the working class to 52% for those identifying as working class. This difference in predicted probabilities is not all that different in magnitude to that of feeling very distant or very close to culturally interested people on the vote for the new left in our own survey (a difference of roughly 20%).

The predicted probabilities calculated in the *Political Action* survey remain unaffected by the inclusion of objective class membership. To operationalized class, we recoded the information in the survey based on ISCO-68 codes into a modified Erickson-Goldthorpe 8-class-scheme following Lachat (2007)<sup>12</sup>. The full results are available from the authors upon request.

11 Barnes, Samuel H., and Max Kaase, *Political Action: An Eight Nation Study, 1973-1976*, ICPSR study no. 7777.

12 Lachat, Romain. 2007. *A Heterogeneous Electorate: Political Sophistication, Predispositional Strength, and the Voting Decision Process*. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos.