

Social Democracy in competition: voting propensities and electoral trade-offs

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Abstract

In the light of declining vote shares across Western Europe, the question how social democratic parties could attract voters through particular programmatic appeals has gained massive academic and political attention. However, each of the possible programmatic choices - “*Economic Leftism*”, “*Cultural Liberalism*”, “*Left National-Conservatism*” and “*Centrism*” - might potentially entail both voter gains, but also voter losses.

I use EES 2014 and 2019 data on individual voting propensities in 11 West European countries to evaluate these potential gains and losses and to identify winning, losing and trade-off strategies. Across time and countries, I find Cultural Liberalism and Economic Leftism to be the most promising strategies, with high potential gains from green and radical left parties and on average lower potential losses to the right, in particular to the radical right. Conversely, I find Left National-Conservatism to likely be a losing strategy in most countries, with much less to be gained from radical right electorates than to be lost at the other end of the spectrum to green or radical left parties. The prospects of a Centrist strategy appear more variable across countries.

The comparison of voting propensities over time reveals mostly stability in these patterns, but also three main developments: a) the competitive environment for social democratic parties has *intensified*, with massive increases in the electoral potential of green and radical right parties over time; b) the “centrist” trade-off has intensified in some countries (most clearly Germany and France) with much higher potential gains from the moderate right in 2019 than in 2014, but also higher potential losses to radical left and green parties; iii) Left national-conservatism – which appeared as a losing strategy in *all* countries in 2014 – emerges as a new trade-off in Finland and Denmark, with massively increased potential gains from the radical right, but equally increased potential losses to the radical left.

Hence, in 2019 it seems that the strategic choices for social democrats have become not only more intense but also more varied cross-nationally.

Introduction

In the wake of social and economic structural transformation, the composition of social democratic party electorates in Western Europe has changed profoundly over the past 30 years. Today, most social democratic parties find themselves torn strategically between different social and electoral constituencies they want to address, and for whose votes they compete with an increasing number of competitor parties (greens, radical left, different moderate right, as well as radical right parties). Hence, social democratic party leaders find themselves in highly controversial debates about both the historical and contemporary “mission” of their parties, as well as the electoral challenges and payoffs they face. These structural challenges are exacerbated by the experience of stagnating or dwindling vote shares, themselves partly the consequence of structural changes, partly the result of strategic mistakes or impasses. In this context, the question whether and where from additional voters could potentially be won has gained massive academic and political saliency.

The strategic choices to be made, however, seem daunting, since much of the literature suspects a number of electoral trade-offs – or even dilemmas - social democratic parties are likely to face when deciding on electoral appeals to rival parties’ voters. The assumption is that these trade-offs result from the increasing heterogeneity of the social-democratic electorate: if it is true that social democratic electorates today range from culturally liberal urban professionals to conservative suburban pensioners, and from unionized blue-collar workers to middle-class managers, then it may well be that these voters also diverge massively in their political preferences – and as a consequence in the alternative electoral options they are likely to consider. In such a scenario, social democratic parties would indeed face mainly two dilemmas: decidedly culturally liberal position could – while potentially winning over votes from the Greens - alienate voters towards the radical right - and vice versa. And similarly, more pronounced economically left-wing positions might yield some votes from radical left party constituencies, but at the cost of losing others to moderate right competitors – and vice versa.

However, while we do know that the social democratic electorate has transformed profoundly in socio-structural terms, we have less evidence on the preference heterogeneity of both

actual and potential social democratic voters. Moreover, estimating the terms of such trade-offs requires data on the relative size of sub-groups of voters who could either be lost or won. In this research note, I use the two most recent European Election Surveys (EES 2014 and 2019) data on individual voting propensities for different parties in 11 West European countries to study electoral potentials, overlaps and trade-offs. On the basis of this data, I answer three questions: A) Is there at all room for social democratic parties to (re-)grow?; B) Which programmatic strategies are “winning” (expected gains > losses), “losing” (expected losses > gains) or “trade-offs” (gains and losses roughly in balance)?; and C) in case of winning strategies or trade-offs, on which empirical-programmatic grounds would we expect potential social democratic voters to shift from their actual party choice to the social democratic party?

I find that social democratic parties have remained a realistic electoral option for very many voters: they have the highest voter potential of all party families in the aggregate and in almost all countries studied. Generally, potential voter gains concentrate in green and radical left parties, and to a lesser extent in moderate right parties, but only to a marginal extent in radical right parties, and the same largely goes for potential losses. Hence, contrary to what is often suggested, I find (to some degree with the recent exception of Finland and Denmark in 2019) little empirical indication of stark electoral trade-offs between green and radical right voters in either direction: potential voter gains from radical right parties are very low, but the likely cost of appealing to them through Left National-Conservatism seems high given the high shares of social democratic voters who can just as well imagine voting green. Hence, Left National-Conservatism seems to be a losing strategy in most countries. At the same time, Cultural Liberalism appears as a potentially winning or at least viable trade-off strategy in most countries, since potential gains from green parties are comparatively high and potential losses towards radical right parties low.

Hence, while electoral overlaps with radical right parties remain marginal in almost all countries, the situation looks different when it comes to moderate right electorates, with which overlaps are more important (also given the sheer size of the electorates of the main moderate right parties). Economic Leftism appears as a potentially winning strategy in several countries (especially in Southern Europe, where inter-block volatility is low), and as a viable trade-off in several others. Hence, given the generally much stronger electoral overlaps within the broader left spectrum (across radical left, green and social-democratic parties), both Economic Leftism and Cultural Liberalism appear as more promising strategies than

those oriented towards the moderate or radical right. Nevertheless, Centrism, addressing voters of the moderate right does appear as a viable trade-off strategy especially in continental Europe (France, Germany, Netherlands), where high numbers of moderate right voters can also see themselves voting for social-democratic parties.

The chapter is structured as follows. The following section explains why we would expect electoral trade-offs and dilemmas for social democratic parties along both ideological dimensions of the political spectrum. After presenting data and indicators, the empirical part of the chapter proceeds in three steps: I first evaluate the electoral potential and mobilization performance of social democratic parties to evaluate whether there indeed is room to (re-)grow. I then give an overview of potential electoral gains and losses, before evaluating more specifically the four programmatic strategies in terms of “winning”, “losing” or “trade-offs” across countries.

Potential electoral trade-offs

On average, social democratic parties across Western Europe have lost 10-15 percentage points of their vote shares over the past three decades, dropping from 30-35% to 20-25% of the votes in national general elections, as shown in Figure 1. Losses were strongest in continental and Nordic European countries (even dramatic in some of them, such as France or the Netherlands), but more recently, they were equally strong in Southern European countries. Importantly, this electoral crisis is specific to *social democratic parties*, rather than being a crisis of “the Left” overall, or of the “social democratic project” (Frega 2018). Indeed, the combined vote share of green, radical left and social democratic parties has remained largely stable, while social democratic parties specifically have lost vote shares.




Figure 1: Social democratic, radical left and green vote shares in national elections across Western Europe (15 countries)

Data: ParlGov

In the discussion of the reasons for this development, both the long-term trend of electoral decline and the near ubiquity of the social democratic crisis direct the attention to *structural developments* rather than country-specific, more situational variables. Among the structural changes, electoral realignments in the wake of socio-structural change towards a post-industrial knowledge economy are a key trend. As many contributions building on Kitschelt (1994) have shown, this societal and economic transformation – with its technological, demographic, institutional and political dimensions - has changed social structure, as well as policy challenges and agendas, thereby leading to a profoundly restructured political preference space in Western Europe along at least two dimensions, one dividing parties with regard to economic-distributive questions and a second dimension dividing them with regard to socio-cultural policy questions (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008, Bornschieer 2010, Beramendi et al. 2015, Oesch and Rennwald 2018, Rydgren 2013, Ares 2017, Manow et al. 2018, Polk and Rovny 2018, Rovny and Polk 2019, Benedetto et al. 2020).

More specifically, occupational upgrading, the educational expansion, as well as the changing role of women in society have expanded the “social democratic project” beyond its 20th century focus on the social-democratic class compromise, towards new policy demands, new voter groups and – also – new political parties in the broader spectrum of left-wing economic positions and/or left-wing socio-cultural policy positions. Demands for progressive

socio-cultural policies in particular have fueled support for various radical left and green parties in the expanded new middle classes (e.g. Kitschelt 1994, Oesch 2006, Häusermann and Kriesi 2015, Gingrich and Häusermann 2015). Most social democratic parties have over time integrated the demands of this “New Left” in their programmatic profiles and thereby diversified their electorate, so that they gather votes from very different social milieus. In terms of electoral sociology, a lot of attention has been devoted to the changing class composition of the social democratic electorate (Evans 1999, Knutsen 2006, Evans and Tilley 2017, Ares 2017), which has roughly shifted from a working-to-middle class ratio of 2:1 to the reverse, as Figure 2 below shows. Much of this class shift is due to structural change (i.e. deindustrialization and occupational upgrading), but it also reflects a declining propensity of working class voters to vote Left (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015, Häusermann 2018). Reversely, on the opposite end of the spectrum, working class voters today constitute the core constituency of radical right parties in Europe (Kriesi et al. 2008, Rydgren 2013, Oesch and Rennwald 2018).




Figure 2: Class Composition of Social Democratic Electorates

Data: Eurobarometer and ESS (Figure from Häusermann 2018: 158)

The upshot of these developments is that social democratic parties today draw their votes from different social groups, whose average policy preferences are highly diverse, to some extent even contradictory. Ample research has evidenced this claim time and time again, especially for socio-cultural policy preferences, with attitudes regarding immigration control, minority rights and environmental protection polarizing along education and class lines (e.g. Bornschier 2010, Kitschelt and Rehm 2014, Rennwald and Evans 2014, Häusermann and Kriesi 2015, Ares 2017). Hence, it is today largely established that in terms of social classes, blue-collar workers and socio-cultural professionals – the old vs. new core constituencies of the social democratic parties – hold the most opposite and pronounced attitudes on these issues. From this observation, many observers have concluded that social democratic parties face an electoral dilemma “on the socio-cultural dimension” of electoral competition, with culturally liberal positions appealing to their actual and potential new left middle-class electorate and culturally more conservative positions appealing to their actual and potential working class electorate.

Conversely, many studies have argued that social democracy is less conflicted when it comes to economic-distributive policy questions, as both their middle- as well as their working-class voters should continue to agree on generous welfare state policies and generally extensive market correction by the state (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014, Häusermann and Kriesi 2015, Ares 2017, Elsässer 2018). However, more recent contributions also point to a new and growing divide regarding distributive policies, namely regarding the allocation of resources to social policies that either replace income (social consumption) or create and mobilize human capabilities and earnings potential (social investment) (Morel et al. 2011, Hemerijck 2013, Häusermann et al. forthcoming). These studies show that middle- and working class voters are indeed divided over these two orientations of post-industrial social policy, with working class voters preferring consumption over investment and the new middle class being the strongest supporter of social investment (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015, Beramendi et al. 2015, Garritzmann et al. 2018, Häusermann et al. 2019a, Häusermann et al. 2019b, Häusermann et al. forthcoming, Bremer forthcoming).

The upshot of these voter and preference realignments is that social democracy has a number of different programmatic profiles it could credibly advocate in the knowledge economy, but in electoral terms, each of them is likely to come at a price.

The first scenario – “Economic Leftism” - would be to turn “back” to traditional left-wing policies of the 20th century (in particular consumption and market correction) while de-emphasizing socio-cultural questions. This is a strategy many critics of the so-called “third way” have proposed, based on the assumption that social democracy has lost voters to the radical left as a consequence of economic-centrist policies (e.g. Arndt 2013, Karreth et al. 2013). However, not only have radical left alternative options already firmly established in many countries, but it is also unclear how high the cost of such a strategy would be in terms of losing voters to the moderate right. The strategy may also entail a cost in terms of neglecting socio-cultural issues that are particularly salient in the wider electorate.

Two further programmatic strategies imply a clear and distinctive position also on the socio-cultural dimension of programmatic electoral competition. One of them could be called “Left National-Conservatism”, combining traditional left-wing economic positions (mostly on social consumption and market correction) with more conservative positions when it comes to socio-cultural policy issues (e.g. Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). This strategy – and the fact most social democratic parties have so far kept their distance to it - has received a lot of attention from political commentators in particular, as it can be presented as a “remedy” to alleged previous mistakes made by social-democratic parties in terms of neglecting working class concerns by moving towards all too culturally liberal and economically centrist positions. The payoffs of such a strategy, however, depend on the share of radical right voters who can actually imagine voting social democratic, as well as on the losses towards green parties in particular that such a move towards more national-conservatism may entail.

The opposite strategy is, of course, to move towards “Cultural Liberalism”, i.e. a decidedly left-progressive agenda, emphasizing socio-culturally liberal positions, while emphasizing social investment when it comes to social and distributive policies, given that social investment concerns resonate strongly with green voters (Häusermann et al. 2019). Abou-Chadi and Wagner (2019) have recently published findings that show such a strategy to be electorally successful. Its payoffs depend, again, on the share of green voters that are receptive to a social-democratic appeal to cultural liberalism, and on the share of voters that it may oust to radical right parties.

Aside from these three scenarios, which all imply the social democrats moving towards more extreme programmatic positions (i.e. “outbound” strategies, in Kitschelt’s terms), a fourth strategic programmatic option would be to emphasize more centrist positions both in terms of economic-distributive and socio-cultural issues, thereby appealing to voters of the center and

the main moderate right parties. This strategy comes closest to the idea of acting as a policy broker on the broader left spectrum of an increasingly fragmented party landscape, enabling and bridging policy-coalitions for expansive social policies (both consumption and investment) and culturally progressive policies. But there is also a risk to this position, of course: on the one hand, its payoffs depend on the potential vote gains among centrist and moderate right parties as compared to potential losses towards either radical left or green parties; on the other hand, such an “inbound” strategy may even imply lower vote shares overall, i.e. servicing as a “policy broker” to enlarge and stabilize the wider left-progressive coalitional spectrum.

Any of these four programmatic strategies could hypothetically be “winning”, “losing” or a “trade-off”, depending on whether the likely gains and losses in terms of votes sum up positively, negatively, or balanced. Few studies so far have started to evaluate these potential trade-offs and scenarios empirically (e.g. van der Brug et al. 2012, Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2019, Häusermann et al. 2019) at the individual level. However, relying on individual-level data on electoral and programmatic preferences is important, because of class heterogeneity: while it is true that socio-cultural professionals are on average most culturally liberal, those of them voting social democratic may be less so. Hence, even though we do know that social democratic parties count more SCP among their voters today than in the past, this does not automatically imply that they are also potential green voters. And while it has been shown clearly that blue collar workers are (with small business owners) the most culturally conservative class, it may well be that those workers who actually do vote social democratic (or can at least imagine doing so) deviate from their class mean on precisely these issues, i.e. that they are not on the brink of being lost to the radical right. Conversely, the high share of working class voters among the radical right electorate does not necessarily imply that these voters can be or are tempted by a left vote.

Therefore, I use individual-level data on voting propensities and programmatic preferences in this contribution. My goal is to get a sense of the relative payoffs of these strategies. Ideally, voting propensities should provide us with evidence on structural patterns of payoffs, i.e. independently of situational factors regarding campaign issues or candidates. Two aspects of my data allow me to interpret the findings in such a more structural sense: a) voting

propensity data indicates the self-reported evaluation of how probable it is that the respondent “*will ever vote*” for a particular party, on a scale from 1 to 10. This broad and unspecific formulation (“*will ever*”) identifies potential voters independent of a particular electoral context or of situational attributes. b) I use voting propensity data from the two most recent waves of the European Election Studies – 2014 and 2019. I will mostly report the findings from the 2019 data but discuss their stability or volatility over time to identify the main patterns that are stable over time.

These voting propensity data allow me to seek empirical answers to three sets of questions that will structure the empirical analysis:

- a) How large is the mobilization potential of social democratic parties? Is there room to (re-)grow?
- b) How large are the potential electoral gains (i.e. voters of rival parties who can also realistically imagine voting for social democratic parties) and where are they to be found? How large are the potential electoral losses (i.e. social democratic voters who can also realistically imagine voting for a rival party) and to which parties?
- c) Which programmatic strategies appear as “winning”, “losing” or “trade-offs” across the countries? Can we identify more or less promising strategies overall? What are the chances that potential gains can actually materialize on programmatic grounds (i.e. on grounds that are in the hands of the social democratic parties)? In other words: are there empirical reasons to think that potential voters may leave their parties in favor of the social democrats, because they differ on economic or cultural programmatic positions from the average electorate of the party they did choose?

Data, indicators

I use data from the European Election Survey 2014 and 2019 (Schmitt et al. 2016, Schmitt et al. 2019). The EES Voter Studies are fielded regularly right after the general elections to the European Parliament in the EU member states to a population-representative sample via face-to-face interviews. In this paper, I focus on 11 Western European countries for which the data from the 2019-early release was available: Austria, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK.

Voting propensities and vote choice in the most recent national general election are the main variables I use in the analyses. They are available for all major parties per country. In order to conduct the study comparatively, I recoded all national parties into seven party families: social democratic parties, radical left parties, green parties, conservative parties, Christian-democratic parties, liberal parties and radical right parties. The recoding scheme follows the ParlGov coding and figures in Appendix 1.

While social democratic parties are present in all 11 countries, the different party families of the moderate right in particular are not present in all countries and achieve very variable vote shares. Therefore, I have focused the analyses on the four main competitor party families of the social democrats: green parties, radical left and radical right, as well as the largest moderate right party family. In other words: “moderate right” in each country stands for either conservative, Christian-democratic or liberal parties, depending on their vote share¹.

Voting propensities are measured as follows (variable qpp8): “We have a number of political parties in (OUR COUNTRY) each of which would like to get your vote. How probable is it that you will ever vote for the following parties? Please answer on a scale where '0' means "not at all probable" and '10' means "very probable".”

Frequencies are highest for 0, 5 and 10, but on average about half of the respondents also choose values in between these three. Across the entire sample, the average voting propensity is highest for social democratic parties (around 4.2) and lowest for radical right parties (around 2.2). The standard deviation, by contrast, is highest for social democratic parties and lowest for radical right parties. I recoded potential voters as those indicating a voting propensity of 6 and higher (and I checked the main findings for robustness with a cutoff point of 7 instead).

Party choice is measured as follows: “Which party did you vote for in these last parliamentary elections?” This variable also allows me to capture abstention as one answer category. I measure party choice with this question referring to the last national election (even though this might be 2-3 years prior to the interview), rather than with the vote choice at the European elections, because European elections in most countries follow a different

¹ «Moderate right» denotes christian-democratic parties in Austria and Germany; conservative parties in Spain, Finland, France (2014), Italy, Sweden and the UK; and liberal parties in Denmark, France (2019), the Netherlands and Portugal.

dynamic than the national elections and I am mainly interested in a comparative assessment of national party systems.

I define as “potential electoral gains” those voters of rival parties who at the same time report a voting propensity for the social democratic party of 6 or higher. The size of this group is evaluated both as a share of the rival party itself (to see how likely social democrats are to win from them) and as share of social democratic vote share (to evaluate the relative size of the potential gains from the perspective of the social democratic party and to be able to compare it to potential losses). I define as “potential electoral losses” those voters that report having voted for the social democratic party in the last election, but who at the same time report a voting propensity of 6 or higher for any party of a rival party family. All findings are also checked with a cutoff point of 7 instead of 6, but the conclusions remain robust.

In order to evaluate how likely and based on which programmatic grounds potential gains might be realized, I compare the attitudes of rival party voters who *do* report a propensity to vote for the social-democratic party to those rival party voters who *do not* report such a propensity. For these attitudes, I rely on the following question: “Now I would like you to tell me your views on various issues. For each issue, we will present you with two opposite statements and we will ask your opinion about these two statements.” Answers are measured on a scale from 0 to 10 and I recoded all of them so that 10 stands for more left-wing/progressive attitudes.

Attitudes on the *socio-economic dimension* are measured through two items: *redistribution* “you are fully in favor of the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in (OUR COUNTRY) vs. You are fully opposed to the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in (OUR COUNTRY)”, and *state intervention* “You are fully in favor of state intervention in the economy vs. You are fully opposed to state intervention in the economy”.

Attitudes on the *socio-cultural dimension* are measured through three items: *same-sex marriage* “You are fully in favor of same-sex marriage vs. You are fully opposed to same-sex marriage”; *immigration* “You are fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration vs. You are fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration”; and *environmental protection* “Environmental protection should always take priority even at the cost of economic growth vs. Economic growth should always take priority even at the cost of environmental protection”.

In addition, I also include *self-reported left-right position*, which has been measured as follows: “In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. What is your position? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where ‘0’ means “left” and ‘10’ means “right”. Which number best describes your position?”. Control variables include education (low, medium, high, depending on the age of leaving education), sex and age.

Empirical analysis

I) Mobilization potential of social democratic parties

Figure 3 plots the share of respondents in each country who indicate that they can well imagine (≥ 6) voting at some point for the social democratic party, i.e. the *mobilization potential*. The figure also indicates (lighter area) the realized vote share in the last national general elections. The ratio between the vote share and the potential can be interpreted as the “electoral yield”. For 8 out of 11 countries, the yield ranges between 60 and 85% of the potential. Only in France, the Netherlands and Finland are yields markedly lower, which makes sense in terms of the massive electoral losses the social democratic parties had experienced in the national elections since 2017. All three countries, however, were in the average field of yield in 2014 and the overall mobilization potential of their social democratic parties has not markedly declined since 2014 (despite their electoral losses).

The main insight from Figure 3, however, is that social democratic parties in Western Europe are generally a viable electoral option for many more voters than those who actually gave them their vote. Importantly, the *unrealized potential* is not simply a function of the electoral performance and it remains stable over time within ± 5 percentage points of the 2014 value (with the exception of Germany where it declined from 41 to 24 percent and Italy where it declined from 45 to 32 percent), which implies that voting propensities indeed do not simply reflect the situational and momentous electoral performance of a party.




Figure 3: Social democratic electoral potential (voting propensity ≥ 6) and mobilization (vote) in 12 European countries

Figure 4 pools all countries and compares electoral potentials and electoral yields across party families for 2014 and 2019. We notice that the electoral potential of social democratic parties is actually *on average the highest of all* – clearly in 2014 and by a closer margin in 2019. Indeed, the main finding in Figure 4 relates to the drastic increase in the electoral potential of green, radical left and radical right parties. When it comes to green parties in particular, their mobilization potential now approaches the one of social democratic parties. For radical right parties, the increase in the potential is matched by an increased vote share, while this is the case to a much lower extent for green and radical left parties.

Nevertheless, Figure 4 clearly shows that the competitive environment for social democratic parties has markedly *intensified* over these five years. While in 2014, only moderate right parties had a potential electorate of a comparable size, green, radical left and radical right parties have a massively expanded potential in 2019, with the green parties in the aggregate almost closing the gap.




Figure 4: Electoral potentials (voting propensity ≥ 6) and mobilization (vote) for different party families in 11 European countries 2014 and 2019

The comparatively high electoral potential contradicts interpretations and assumptions according to which social democratic parties have “plateaued” or become obsolete to voters.

II Potential electoral gains and losses

Now that we have established that there is in most countries a substantive unrealized electoral potential, where are these voters to be found? In other words: which rival parties might new voters be won from? There are two ways of estimating these potential electoral gains. On the one hand, one can ask which electorates are most prone to vote social democratic, i.e. might be most receptive to electoral appeals? This information is important, as it reflects which other party electorates are “closest in reach” for the social democratic parties. However, it does not reflect the actual size of the potential gain, as close parties may be very small. Hence, on the other hand, one may want to estimate the potential gains by relating them to a

same denominator. I take the first perspective in this section II and the second perspective in the subsequent section III of the analysis.

Table 1 presents potential electoral gains for the pooled country sample by party family. The first row establishes the “propensity overlap”, i.e. the share of respondents who belong to both social-democratic and other parties electoral potential – irrespective of their actual vote choice. The second row indicates the share of people who have actually voted for green, radical left, moderate right or radical right parties, but who indicate that they can just as well imagine voting for social democratic parties. We see that green and radical left (potential and actual) voters are most likely to also belong to the social-democratic electorate, followed by the moderate right and (in terms of actual choice) abstentionists. The overlaps and potential gains from the radical right parties, by contrast, are much smaller. This ordering of party families according to potential gains for social democrats has remained the same since 2014 (see appendix 2 for the 2014 numbers). Potential gains from green and radical left parties have somewhat increased by around 5 percentage points, whereas the potential gains have remained overall stable when it comes to the parties of the Right.

| | Greens | Radical Left | Moderate Right | Radical Right | Abstention |
|--|--------|--------------|----------------|---------------|------------|
| % of potential "X" voters who are also potential SD voters | 45.1 | 41 | 30.2 | 21 | |
| % of "X" voters who are potential SD voters | 32 | 27.6 | 18.4 | 12.5 | 22,3 |

Table 1: Potential gains - electoral overlaps by party family 2019

| | | Greens | Radical Left | Moderate Right | Radical Right |
|---|----------------|--------|--------------|----------------|---------------|
| | All countries | 32 | 27.6 | 18.4 | 12.5 |
| % of "X" voters who are potential SD voters | Austria | 49 | | 17 | 7 |
| | Denmark | | 57 | 24 | 32 |
| | Finland | 39 | 49 | 19 | 19 |
| | France | 34 | 29 | 17 | 5 |
| | Germany | 24 | 17 | 29 | 9 |
| | Italy | 52 | | 13 | 9 |
| | Netherlands | 59 | 41 | 33 | 10 |
| | Portugal | | 30 | 15 | |
| | Spain | | 43 | 13 | 6 |
| | Sweden | 51 | 46 | 14 | 9 |
| | United Kingdom | 40 | | 8 | 19 |

Table 2: Potential gains - electoral overlaps by party family and country 2019

This general assessment also holds when we look at the numbers for the countries individually. Levels of overlaps and gains vary a lot between systems (reflecting more segmented and more volatile party systems), but *green and radical left parties have consistently the highest overlaps* with social democratic parties (except for Germany, where there seems to have been a distinctive differentiation among the parties of the left bloc). Potential gains from the radical right remain generally very low, with the exception of Denmark and Finland. Denmark is particular here, because the share of radical right voters who can imagine social democratic has more than doubled between 2014 and 2019 from 13 to 32 percent. In the UK, we also observe a 10 percentage point increase between 2014 and 2019 from 8.5 to 19% among the UKIP/Brexit party voters. But these two countries remain exceptions from an overall consistent pattern. *Generally, the potential gains from the radical right have been and remain clearly the lowest.* These findings indicate that the potential yield of electoral strategies might be very limited for social democratic parties who aim at “bringing back” radical right voters (who may actually never have voted social democratic in the first place). One may object that the numbers may be different had the social-democrats not already made the mistake of moving towards more socio-culturally liberal positions. However, the radical right electorate is consistently least tempted by the social-democratic vote choice, even in countries where a “new left” shift of the social democratic parties has occurred later or less strongly (such as in Southern Europe or in Germany).

One important thing needs to be kept in mind to qualify the relatively higher share of potential gains among the green and radical left parties: given the size of the moderate right party family, the moderate right electorate might indeed hold substantive potential gains for social-democratic parties, even though the propensity among all moderate right voters to vote social democratic is on average lower. I will address this point in the following section when relating the potential gains to the same denominator, i.e. the social-democratic vote share.

| | | Greens | Radical Left | Moderate Right | Radical Right |
|---|----------------|--------|--------------|----------------|---------------|
| | all countries | 28.5 | 22.0 | 12.9 | 9.2 |
| % of SD voters who are potential "X" voters | Austria | 45 | | 14 | 4 |
| | Denmark | | 46 | 6 | 11 |
| | Finland | 47 | 37 | 20 | 24 |
| | France | 53 | 23 | 9 | 17 |
| | Germany | 55 | 33 | 23 | 7 |
| | Italy | 23 | | 4 | 14 |
| | Netherlands | 48 | 34 | 10 | 15 |
| | Portugal | 24 | 10 | 15 | |
| | Spain | | 43 | 9 | 5 |
| | Sweden | 23 | 34 | 12 | 14 |
| | United Kingdom | 40 | | 17 | 8 |

Table 3: Potential losses - electoral overlaps by party family and country

Looking at potential losses, table 3 shows the share of social democratic voters who indicated that they could also very well imagine voting for green, radical left, moderate right or radical right parties. Across all countries, we recognize a symmetric pattern to the distribution of potential gains. 20-30% of all social democratic voters can also imagine voting green or radical left. About 13% think it is probable that they might at some point also vote for the moderate right, but only 9% indicate that they think it is likely they will ever (i.e. even if circumstances or programmatic profiles adapt) vote for the radical right. These shares of potential losses have on average somewhat increased for radical left and radical right parties when compared to 2014, and they have increased substantively (by about 8 percentage points) when it comes to green parties. When comparing shares between countries, we find that the general finding holds even much more consistently across countries than was the case with potential gains: *potential losses to green and/or radical left parties are in all countries massively higher than potential losses to radical right parties.*

However, even though the potential losses to the radical right seem small in comparison to other potential losses, it is still noticeable that they have *increased* by about 10 percentage points in Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden as compared to 2014 (see appendix 2). These observations underline how important an integrated perspective is to evaluate the magnitude of these potential gains and losses. In particular, we need to consider gains and losses jointly when gauging the likely payoffs of particular programmatic strategies. This is what the next section does in a country-comparative way.

III Winning strategies, loosing strategies and dilemmas

In this section, I integrate potential losses and potential gains to arrive at an evaluation of the likely payoffs of the four possible programmatic strategies across countries. The most important switch from the previous analyses is that from now on, I present potential losses and gains relative the same denominator (the vote share of social democratic parties), in order to better gauge the relative magnitude. This is important, since the relative size of the rival party electorates obviously matters for potential gains: if a very high share of e.g. green voters can imagine voting social democratic, this implies very different payoffs depending on whether the green party electorate is small or large. Figure 5 is too aggregate to hold insights on the actual payoffs of strategies, but simply illustrates the type of indicators and numbers I will use to identify winning, losing and trade-off strategies. It shows potential gains from and losses to rival partisan competitors as a percentage of the social democratic voters.




Figure 5: Potential gains and potential losses as a percentage of SD voters, pooled

I will subsequently compare specific sets of competitor parties and directions of gains and losses, depending on the programmatic strategy at hand. I will call a “winning strategy” those configurations where potential gains clearly outweigh potential losses. I will call “losing strategy” those configurations where there is little or nothing to win in terms of voters, but much more to be potentially lost. And I will call “trade-off strategies” those configurations where potential gains and losses are roughly balanced.

The tables above have showed that there is considerable variance across countries. Hence I proceed by country in the following analyses. I order the discussion of possible strategies according to their payoffs, starting with the most promising strategy for social democratic parties overall and proceeding to the least promising. I will only show winning and trade-off configurations (hence, focus on potential gains), and I will conclude each discussion with an analysis of the preferences of those voters who might be targeted in the respective scenario to gauge the type of programmatic appeals that might resonate most distinctively with them.

IIIa Cultural liberalism

Cultural liberalism is characterized as a “winning” strategy when potential electoral gains from green parties outweigh potential losses to the radical right. This strategy on average and in cross-national comparison appears as the most promising. Potential gains outweigh losses in three countries and are balanced with losses in four more countries. In Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the strategy turns out as losing because of absent or very small green parties (see appendix 3).

Unsurprisingly, the imbalance between gains and losses is most pronounced in the Netherlands, where the social democratic party has recently lost large shares of its electorate predominantly to rival left-progressive parties. It is clearly discernible also in Austria and Germany where the potential gains from the green are, however, smaller (in Germany, the share of green voters who are also potential social-democratic voters has declined from 50 to 24% between 2014 and 2019).

Payoffs are more balanced in France, Finland, Sweden and the UK. In France and Finland, Cultural Liberalism appears as a viable – yet potentially costly – choice, while the shares of gains and losses are overall more marginal in Sweden and the UK.




Figure 6: Cultural liberalism as a winning strategy: potential gains > potential losses




Figure 7: Cultural liberalism as a trade-off: balanced potential gains and losses

However, even though Cultural Liberalism appears as a viable and potentially winning strategy in a majority of Western European countries, the question remains whether and how green voters could indeed be attracted. What are the chances that potential gains might materialize? Knowing that X percent of green voters can imagine voting for social democratic parties is important information, but it does not tell us if these voters have any (programmatic) reason to consider “leaving” their preferred party. Why would they? I am here interested only in programmatic competition (i.e. I disregard other reasons for switching parties such as candidates, scandals etc., on which social democratic parties might capitalize given their high electoral potential indicates that they have remained a valid choice for many voters), i.e. in the question whether we have any indication that these potential voters may in some way be badly represented by the parties they chose in the last election. I approach this question by differentiating among the green electorate between those who are *also potential* social-democratic voters and those who are not. Hence, I want to see if there is something specific about those green voters who *also* sympathize with the social democrats as opposed

to those green voters who do not. If there is, there may be a better chance for social democratic parties to woo them over with specific programmatic appeals.

Also, I only include countries where the strategy in question is characterized as either winning or a trade-off. Empirically, I estimate the relationship between the rival party choice (as a dummy variable) and programmatic attitudes (controlled for education, age and sex), and I interact party choice with a dummy variable measuring whether an individual is or is not a potential social democratic voter. I then plot predicted attitudinal values (on the 1-10 scale) for all four resulting groups in order to check for group differences, particularly among the rival party voters.

Figure 8 presents findings for green voters from 6 countries with sizeable green parties (Germany, Austria, France, Netherlands, Finland and Sweden and the UK). The most likely expectation could be that green voters who are tempted by a social democratic vote might be more left-wing economically and/or more conservative culturally on average than the other green voters. Figure 8 shows, however, that there is no significant difference when it comes to the economic-distributive items. In other words, “tempted” green voters seem perfectly in line with the average green voters on economic issues, suggesting that there may be little reason for them to defect to the social democrats on the basis of more economically leftist positions. There is also no indication of “misrepresentation” of green-social democratic voters when it comes to same-sex marriage and environmental policies. The only tentative evidence we find indicates that “red-green” voters (as opposed to “green-green”) are more liberal on average when it comes to immigration control and consider themselves more to the left. Consequently, potential gains from the greens should be hard to realize, but if anything, they would require clearly culturally liberal positions.




Figure 8: Programmatic preference differences between Green voters with and without SD voting propensity (Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, UK)

IIIb Economic Leftism

Economic Leftism is characterized as a “winning” strategy when potential electoral gains from radical left parties outweigh potential losses to moderate right parties. This strategy on average and in cross-national comparison also appears as both viable and promising.

Potential gains outweigh losses in four countries and are balanced with losses in three more countries. In Austria, Germany, the UK and Italy, the strategy turns out as on balance losing (see appendix 3).




Figure 9: Economic Leftism as a winning strategy: potential gains > potential losses

Finland

Sweden

Portugal

$$\text{RL} \xrightarrow{25} \text{SD} \xrightarrow{20} \text{MR} \quad \text{RL} \xrightarrow{14} \text{SD} \xrightarrow{11} \text{MR} \quad \text{RL} \xrightarrow{18} \text{SD} \xrightarrow{11} \text{MR}$$

Figure 10: Economic Leftism as a trade-off: balanced potential gains and losses

Figures 9 and 10 show that potential gains are considerable in size, particularly in France and the Netherlands, again the two countries where social democratic parties have lost many voters in the last elections (hence, it is hard to assess if these numbers are stable or volatile, they were clearly lower in 2014, appendix 4). Gains clearly outweigh losses also in Denmark and Spain, and are roughly balanced in Finland, Sweden and Portugal. In these 5 countries, these patterns are stable across time.

In terms of preferences, Figure 11 shows again few significant differences between those radical left voters who can imagine voting social democratic and those who cannot, and the patterns are not consistent “within dimension”: potential voters from the radical left differ from their fellow radical left voters by slightly more moderate positions on redistribution and same-sex marriage, but more liberal positions regarding immigration issues. Hence, it is striking that for both green and radical left parties, it turns out the potential gains for social democrats could be realized more likely by means of more liberal positions on immigration rather than with more restrictive positions on this issue. The differences between the preference patterns we observe for immigration and same-sex marriage/environment also raise the question whether “within” the left sector, these issues might indeed not be as tightly connected as across the entire electorate.




Figure 11: Programmatic preference differences between RL voters with and without SD voting propensity (France, Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Spain)

IIIc Centristism

I evaluate the payoffs of centrist programmatic appeals by comparing potential gains from the moderate right to potential losses to *both* green or radical left parties, since it is not as clear whether centrism is culturally or economically connoted. The main finding here is that inter-block overlaps (still) seem much smaller and rarer than intra-block (potential) movements of voters. A Centrist strategy appears as “losing” in terms of electoral performance in a majority of countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. In all those countries, there is much more to lose to the left than to win from the right (see appendix 3).

However, the strategy does indeed appear as “winning” in France and the Netherlands, see Figure 12, and as a trade-off in Germany, see Figure 13. We have to note that the “winning” pattern in France and the Netherlands appears only in 2019, while potential gains and losses were also balanced in these two countries in 2014. In Germany, the centrist strategy turns out as balanced across both time points. Particularly noticeable here are the high vote shares

involved: given the size of the moderate right parties, potential gains are substantial. But given high intra-block volatility, so are potential losses to the left.




Figure 12: Centrism as a winning strategy: potential gains > potential losses




Figure 13: Centrism as a trade-off: balanced potential gains and losses




Figure 14: Programmatic preference differences between MR voters with and without SD voting propensity (France, Germany, Netherlands)

Interestingly, it seems that in these three countries, voters from the moderate right parties could be attracted to vote social-democratic not on the basis of the economic dimension, but rather on the basis of the cultural one. There is no difference between “tempted” and “non-tempted” moderate right voters when it comes to their attitudes regarding redistribution and state intervention. However, those moderate right voters who could as well see themselves voting social democratic tend to have more liberal attitudes on same-sex marriage and in particular immigration, and they also consider themselves more “leftist”. One might derive the interpretation that for centrist voters, being “left” is as much connoted with culturally liberal positions as with economically liberal ones.

IIId Left National-Conservatism

Finally, Left National-Conservatism – potential gains from the radical right, balanced against potential losses towards the greens or radical left - in this data turns out to be a clearly losing strategy in almost all countries: Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, Italy, Portugal and Spain (see appendix 3). It appears as a winning strategy nowhere, but it has emerged in 2019 as a viable trade-off strategy in both Finland and Denmark (where it also was a losing strategy back in 2014). In these two countries, potential gains from the radical right have become clearly substantial. However, they are also matched with massive potential losses towards the radical left (both parties do not have an explicitly “green” party), especially in Denmark where these potential losses have increased from 27 to 46 percent between 2014 and 2019.




Figure 15: Left National-Conservatism as a trade-off: balanced potential gains and losses

The preference patterns in Denmark and Finland are interesting (Figure 16): both “tempted” and “non-tempted” radical right voters are almost identical in their attitudes concerning redistribution, state intervention and very restrictive immigration attitudes. However, those

radical right voters who can imagine voting for the social democrats have distinctively more liberal attitudes when it comes to same-sex marriage and – in particular - environmental protection. Hence, depending on the saliency of these issues in the political debate, those gains might be realized if radical right voters were willing to prioritize these issues over their immigration attitudes. This highlights the point that to evaluate actual probabilities of realizing gains and losses, we would need to have information on the relative importance voters attribute to different programmatic issues, a task that this analysis cannot perform, but that we can study with other types of data (*ref to the conjoint chapter*).




Figure 16: Programmatic preference differences between RR voters with and without SD voting propensity (Denmark, Finland)

Discussion

In this research note, I have assessed electoral potentials of social democratic parties both in terms of potential losses and gains, in order to evaluate the prospects of some of the strategic programmatic decisions and options that are currently on the table for social democratic parties, and that are fervently debated both in politics and academia.

Based on data from 2019 and 2014, I found that social democratic parties still enjoy the highest electoral potential of all party families in almost all countries. Social democratic parties have remained a viable electoral alternative for between 30 and 50% of all voters (except for Germany in 2019 with lower and massively declined scores around 25%). Hence, there is both demand and room for social democratic politics. However, the competitive environment for social democratic parties has clearly intensified, because the electoral potentials of green, radical left and also radical right parties have increased massively between 2014 and 2019 to around 30% on average. Green parties in particular clearly start to close the gap towards social democratic parties when it comes to the electoral potential. This is an important finding for two reasons: on the one hand, it shows how real and acute the potential trade-off is between maximizing the vote share of the social democratic party and maximizing the vote share of the entire left bloc. On the other hand, it is relevant in the light of the fact that intra-block overlaps (between green, radical left and social democratic parties on the one hand and moderate right, as well as radical right parties on the other hand) remain generally weak. Hence, the increase in the electoral potential of radical right parties might be less of a direct threat to social democratic parties than one might assume.

Overall, the idea that voters today rather hold a “block identity” than a “party identity” (Steenbergen et al. XXXX) shines through in all the analyses of the payoffs of programmatic strategies. Generally, overlaps between either green and/or radical left parties and social democrats are much higher (both in terms of potential losses and gains) than between social democratic party electorates and the right. Overall Cultural Liberalism appears as an either winning or trade-off strategy in all countries where green parties actually exist as a substantial electoral force. Potential gains from radical left parties are equally or even more sizeable, and they exhibit comparatively lower or balanced potential losses to the moderate right. Germany is the only country that does have a substantive radical left party but where potential gains from the “Linke” remain far lower than potential losses to the moderate right CDU/CSU. Consequently, potential electoral gains clearly concentrate among the alternative electorates of the left block, and not among the right. Comparisons of programmatic preferences of left voters with and without propensity to vote for the social democrats reveal few differences, but most markedly a more liberal attitude regarding immigration among green and radical left voters who can imagine supporting the social democrats. Hence, it seems likely that social democratic parties might indeed capitalize in case of a right-shift of either of these parties on this issue, but it remains unclear if these voters could be actively

attracted to the social democratic parties via liberal stances on immigration, since the EES data does not allow us to study the relative importance voters attribute to these issues.

Both Centrist and Left National-Conservative strategies appear as much less promising throughout the countries with few exceptions. In France, the Netherlands and especially Germany, potential gains from the moderate right are substantive and they might indeed ensue losses to the radical left or greens. But a Left National-Conservative strategy appears as a viable trade-off only in Denmark and Finland, and also only in 2019 (whereas it was a losing strategy still in 2014). With regard to programmatic preferences, it is notable that “tempted” voters among the moderate right hold more liberal attitudes on immigration than their fellow “non-tempted” moderate right voters, but those two groups do not differ on immigration attitudes when it comes to radical right parties. Rather radical right voters who could imagine voting social democratic deviate from the rest of the radical right voters through more liberal positions on environmental protection and same-sex marriage.

From these comparisons, it appears that there is no easy and universal winning strategy for the social democratic parties, but there seems to be a predominantly losing one: the findings show that more decidedly culturally conservative positions of social democratic parties would not resonate with either radical left or moderate right or radical right voters (who do not consider SD a viable option anyways), but it could clearly alienate many voters further to the left. However, even where Cultural Liberalism and Economic Leftism appear as “winning strategies” those gains might be hard to realize, because we do not find strong differences between radical left/green voters with and without SD party affinity. Hence, there is rather little reason to think that they would have strong substantive reasons to massively defect from their parties. Overall, there is thus no simple winning strategy for the social democratic parties. But these parties remain viable electoral choices for most left-wing voters and they still have the highest electoral potential of all party families. Hence, even though vote maximizing strategies within the left sector seem somewhat constrained, the prospects for the left sector overall seem intact in terms of their electoral mobilization potential.

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Appendix 1: Party family recoding

List of parties included in the survey for variables qpp5 and qpp8 of the ESS Voter study 2014. Codebook at: <http://europeanelectionstudies.net/european-election-studies/ees-2014-study/voter-study-2014>

| Country | Social Democratic 3 | Green | Radical Left | Moderate Right | Radical Right |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|--|--|
| Austria | Austrian Social Democratic Party SPÖ | The Greens | | Austrian People's Party | Austrian Freedom Party, Alliance for the Future of Austria |
| Germany | Social Democratic Party SPD | The Greens | Left Party | Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union | Alternative for Germany |
| Denmark | Social Democratic Party | | Socialist People's Party, Red-Green Alliance | Venstre/Liberals, Radical liberals /Radikale Venstre, Liberal Alliance | Danish People's Party |
| Spain | Spanish Socialist Workers' Party PSOE | | United Left, Podemos | People's Party PP | Vox (only 2019) |
| Finland | Finnish Social Democrats | Green Union | Left-wing Alliance | National Coalition KoK, | Finn's Party |
| France | Socialist Party | Europe Ecology – The Greens | Left Front, France Insoumise | République en Marche, Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI/Modem) | National Front |
| Italy | Democratic Party PD | Ecology and Freedom (SEL) | | Forza Italia, Brothers of Italy – National Centre-Right | Northern League |
| Netherlands | Labour Party PVDA | Green-Left | Socialist Party | People's Party for Freedom and Democracy VVD, Democrats '66 | Freedom Party PVV |
| Portugal | Socialist Party PS | Earth Party | Social Democratic Center – Popular Party, Unified Democratic Coalition, Left Bloc | Social Democratic Party | |
| Sweden | Social Democratic Labour Party SAP | Green Ecology Party MP | Left Party VP | Moderate Coalition Party (M) | Sweden Democrats |
| UK | Labour Party | Green Party | | Conservative Party | UKIP, Brexit Party |

Appendix 2: Potential gains - electoral overlaps by party family 2014

| | Greens | Radical Left | Moderate Right | Radical Right | Abstention |
|--|--------|--------------|----------------|---------------|------------|
| % of potential "X" voters who are also potential SD voters | 38.4 | 35.5 | 29.6 | 17.8 | |
| % of "X" voters who are potential SD voters | 29.6 | 18 | 16.1 | 9.2 | 19.9 |

Table 1A: Potential gains - electoral overlaps by party family 2014


| | | Greens | Radical Left | Moderate Right | Radical Right | Abstention |
|---|-------------|--------|--------------|----------------|---------------|------------|
| % of "X" voters who are potential SD voters | Austria | 35.10 | | 22.24 | 9.86 | 29.91 |
| | France | 32.06 | 27.55 | 5.75 | 3.27 | 21.76 |
| | Germany | 48.62 | 23.42 | 19.09 | 14.86 | 21.07 |
| | Netherlands | 48.41 | 36.81 | 30.95 | 23.78 | 35.58 |
| | Denmark | | 63.00 | 19.71 | 12.76 | 31.89 |
| | Finland | 29.90 | 41.86 | 14.33 | 19.93 | 18.12 |
| | Sweden | 56.53 | 45.73 | 18.79 | 21.27 | 51.14 |
| | UK | 6.45 | | 5.84 | 8.47 | 18.17 |
| | Greece | | 2.94 | 7.42 | 0.00 | 3.84 |
| | Italy | 19.06 | | 10.14 | 2.17 | 20.88 |
| | Portugal | | 18.79 | 15.85 | | 18.41 |
| | Spain | | 20.00 | 8.05 | | 11.18 |

Table 2A: Potential gains

| | | Greens | Radical Left | Moderate Right | Radical Right |
|---|---------------|--------|--------------|----------------|---------------|
| % of SD voters who are potential "X" voters | all countries | 20.57 | 17.89 | 13.92 | 6.75 |
| | Austria | 26.00 | | 25.52 | 3.37 |
| | France | 31.12 | 8.30 | 17.29 | 6.92 |
| | Germany | 24.53 | 16.03 | 18.46 | 4.37 |
| | Netherlands | 57.28 | 54.75 | 49.68 | 5.07 |
| | Denmark | | 27.38 | 2.90 | 16.75 |
| | Finland | 16.57 | 25.14 | 10.28 | 14.85 |
| | Sweden | 45.46 | 41.39 | 6.65 | 5.17 |
| | UK | 12.91 | | 8.87 | 15.73 |
| | Greece | | 23.62 | 13.03 | 6.52 |
| | Italy | 10.05 | | 4.08 | 3.77 |
| | Portugal | 11.32 | 16.31 | 10.42 | |
| | Spain | | 18.01 | 2.00 | |

Table 3A: Potential gains

Appendix 3: Potential gains and losses as a percentage of SD voters 2019



Appendix 4: Potential gains and losses as a percentage of SD voters 2014

