

Social Democratic Parties and Trade Unions: Parting Ways or Facing the Same Challenges?

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Abstract

Both social democratic parties and trade unions in Western Europe have originated from the socio-structural emergence, political mobilization and institutional stabilization of the class cleavage. Together, they have been decisive proponents and allies for the development of social, economic and political rights over the past century. However, parties of the social democratic left have changed profoundly over the past 30 years with regard to their membership composition and – relatedly – their programmatic supply. Most of these parties are still struggling to decide on a strategic-programmatic orientation to opt for in the 21st century, both regarding the socio-economic policies they put to the forefront of their programs, as well as regarding the socio-cultural stances they take (and the relative weight of these policies). Since their strategic calculations depend, among others things, on the coalitional options they face when advancing core political claims, we ask if trade unions are still "natural" allies of social democratic parties or if they increasingly part ways both regarding the socio-demographic composition of constituencies as well as the political demands of these constituencies.

We study this question with micro-level data on membership composition from the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey from 1989 to 2014 as well as data on policy preferences from the European Social Survey from 2016 while focusing on the well-known welfare regimes when presenting and discussing the results. Our findings contradict a thesis of increasing estrangement: overall, both social democratic parties and trade unions exhibit very similar trends in terms of who they represent and what their supporters want. Today, both types of organizations represent more middle- than working-class voters and their constituencies, on average, support generous welfare policies, cultural liberalism and liberal immigration policies to almost identical degrees. Rather than parting ways, social democratic parties and trade unions face the same challenges.

Introduction

Both social democratic parties and trade unions in Western Europe have originated from the socio-structural emergence, political mobilization and institutional stabilization of the class cleavage in the early 20th century and Ebbinghaus (1995) describes them as "mutually dependent" organizations. They have been mobilizing the same people, with the same claims and – indeed – identities as members and supporters of the labor movement in that crucial period of Western European democratization and welfare state development. Consequently, the power resources literature (Esping-Andersen 1990, Korpi 1983, Stephens 1979, Bradley et al. 2003) has always conceptualized social democratic parties and trade unions as birds of a feather, mostly functionally differentiated, as trade unions first and foremost strengthened the power of employees in the workplace and social democratic parties strengthened their power in the parliamentary arena.

Today, as social democratic parties have come into strong headwinds in terms of electoral competition and programmatic disorientation, the question arises if trade unions are still "natural allies" for mainstream left parties, or if they have parted ways both in terms of their membership composition and their programmatic positions and priorities.¹ This is what we study in this paper. The ambition of the paper therefore is mainly to identify similarities and divergences, rather than to test an explanatory argument.

One may ask why the question even matters, given the many obituaries that have been written for social democratic parties and trade unions, both of which have suffered

¹ Even though social democratic voters are not "members" of these parties in the strict sense, we use the term membership interchangeably with constituency and base to refer to union members *and* social democratic voters.

strongly reduced shares of votes and membership over the past decades. Why would we care about the potential alliance between the blind and the lame in the face of vigorous competition by the new left- and right-wing nationalism at the poles of what has emerged as a massively polarizing dimension of socio-cultural conflict that seemingly dominates politics in the 21st century?

We should care for mainly three reasons: first – as with social democratic parties – trade unions face transformation just as much as decline. Unionization rates have certainly declined since the 1980s and yet they currently remain at around 70 percent in the Nordic countries and at around 25 to 30 percent in most continental and anglo-saxon European countries. Beyond changes in unionization, however, West European trade union movements increasingly experience differentiation and fragmentation, e.g. through the emergence of professional (white-collar) associations or shifts in membership composition towards high-income people (e.g. Kjellberg 2013, Arndt 2018, Mosimann and Pontusson 2018). Second, unionization and political action of organized labor still make a difference politically. Trade union organization is an effective political counterforce to growing top income inequality (Huber and Stephens 2014) and bias in electoral turnout (Kerrissey and Schofer 2013), and union membership still socializes unionized individuals into more pro-redistributive attitudes and voting behavior (Mosimann and Pontusson 2017, Mosimann 2017, Arndt and Rennwald 2016). Third, the payoffs of different strategic options for social democratic parties in terms of their programmatic reorientation and electoral appeals also depend on the coalitional opportunities that are associated with these different strategies. If trade unions are strongholds of social protectionism or even working-class conservatism, this creates different coalitional opportunities for both trade unions and social democratic parties than if trade unions generally support social investment and cultural liberalism. This is why we ask whether and to what extent social democratic parties and trade unions in Western Europe have drifted apart. The existing literature does not hold

extensive research on this topic, but the diagnosis that trade unions and social democratic parties have drifted apart seems to prevail (e.g., Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013, Allern and Bale 2012). This increasing distance is usually explained with reference to programmatic and strategic shifts of mainstream left parties, while trade unions have supposedly remained true to their programmatic core claims. Economically, it is argued that social democratic parties have become "ideologically blurred" (Pasture 1996) in the post-Keynesian world, an assessment that is usually connected to a "centrist" or "third way" shift of the mainstream left (Evans and Tilley 2017, Merkel and Petring 2007) away from pro-welfare and pro-redistribution positions towards the implementation of market- and employer-friendly policies (see Piazza 2001, Upchurch et al. 2008).

One version of this argument attributes the alleged centrist shift of social democratic parties to a treason of old programmatic stances for opportunistic or strategic reasons, another version refers to increased exogenous constraints (of globalization, neoliberalism, austerity etc.) that forces social democratic parties to implement policies that are at odds with trade unions' aims and interests. Alternatively, an increasing programmatic rift between trade unions and social democratic parties has been traced back to the (partial) integration of the new social movements (of the 1970s and 80s) into social democratic parties (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1999, Häusermann 2017, Oesch and Rennwald 2018). These movements put minority rights, environmentalism, cultural liberalism and international solidarism on the agenda of the (new) left. And even though green parties have emerged as the spearheads of the new left, in many countries all social democratic parties have been strongly affected by the universalistic socio-cultural emphasis of these movements and have integrated core claims of the new left into their programs.

On the one hand, one may think that these "new" issues may alienate trade unions from social democratic parties either via saliency (in the sense that trade unions mobilize on the socio-economic dimension) or via position (in the sense that trade unions are rooted in the production working class, who tends to be more conservative than the new middle classes who have carried the new social movements). It is this socio-cultural divide that has motivated speculations about a new "natural" alliance between right-wing nationalist organizations and trade unions in favor of social protectionism, anti-free trade or welfare chauvinism.

On the other hand, there is reason to think that trade unions may be exposed to the same socio-demographic and programmatic trends and transformations as social democratic parties. The white-collarization of the workforce does not only expand the electoral potential of the educated middle class for social democratic parties, but also increases potential (or actual) workforce segments trade unions want and need to organize (Oesch 2013). In addition and in a veritable dialectic twist, formerly deprived blue-collar workers have seen their employment rights and wages increase (not least thanks to unions), thereby counting to today's (lower) middle class, while the precarious new working class can be found most strongly among the expanding service working class, which is notoriously hard to organize (Esping-Andresen 1993, Oesch 2013, Ares 2017). Consequently, the average income of a union member throughout Western Europe is today higher than the overall median income, and unionization rates in the top income quintile exceed unionization rates among respondents in the bottom income quintile in 13 out of 15 West European countries (Becher and Pontusson 2011). This is reflected in a finding by Mosimann and Pontusson (2017), who show that European unions have, on average, become less low-income inclusive between 2002 and 2016. The question of whether membership composition and average programmatic positions of trade unions and social democratic parties have diverged or moved in sync over the past decades is thus relevant and non-trivial. We study this question both with

regard to socio-demographic membership composition, and with regard to the average programmatic preferences of trade union members and social democratic voters. These preferences have actually received very little attention in the existing literature, especially when it comes to current welfare politics and cultural liberalism. While research has shown that union members support redistribution and social insurance policies (e.g., Häusermann and Kriesi 2015) irrespective of their income level (e.g., Mosimann and Pontusson 2017), we know little about union members' preferences and preference gaps across unionized working- and middle-class individuals when it comes to activation, social investment policies and attitudes towards issues that are politicized along a second dimension of political competition that separates national demarcation and conservatism from internationalism and universalism.

This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we will provide the theoretical background of our research question and the motivation of the patterns we expect to play out empirically. In particular, we will start from the current political situation of social democratic parties and apply it comparatively to trade unions to derive expectations about the differences in membership composition and preference profiles between parties and trade unions. We then structure the empirical analysis in three parts. Based on combined Eurobarometer- and ESS-data from 1989 until 2014 (compiled by Gingrich and Häusermann 2015), we trace unionization trends for both the middle class and the working class over time to identify the relative share of these two classes among unions' rank and file today. In a second empirical section, we study the actual individual-level overlaps in the membership base of trade unions and social democratic parties from both perspectives, that is, by looking at voting patterns of union members as well as the share of unionized voters by party family. In a third empirical section, we investigate the average preference profiles of the constituencies of trade unions and social democratic parties based on ESS data for 2016. To anticipate, we find tendencies and trends that are highly similar across trade unions and social democratic parties

rather than an increasing divide between them. To deepen the analysis of the similarity of the challenges they face, we end by taking a closer look at internal heterogeneity among trade union members and social democratic voters. Again, we find highly similar patterns: while both working- and middle-class union members and social democratic voters agree on all dimensions of social policy development, members and voters differ across classes in their attitudes regarding cultural liberalism, immigration and EU integration. Hence, with the rising saliency of these issues on the political agenda, trade unions eventually find themselves in the same dilemmas as social democratic parties.

Theoretical expectations

Electoral landscapes have profoundly changed over the past 40 years in Western Europe (Beramendi et al. 2015, Oesch and Rennwald 2018). Two of the most important developments in the processes of electoral realignment and restructuring are the middle-class shift of mainstream left-wing parties and the emergence of right-wing nationalist parties mobilizing large sections of the working-class vote in most countries of Northern and continental Europe (Rydgren 2013, Oesch and Rennwald 2018). Based on time series data from the 1980s onwards, Gingrich and Häusermann (2015) show, for instance, that the propensity to vote left has clearly declined over time among working-class voters while the same propensity has increased among middle-class workers. Today, working-class voters are no longer more likely to vote for the left than middle-class voters while they were clearly more likely to do so in the early 1980s.

The decline in the working-class vote for the left has been well documented for some time (Evans 1999, Knutsen 2006, Rennwald 2015). Its flip side is the increase in the share of middle-class voters supporting the left (Kitschelt 1994). These changing

propensities, combined with the structural expansion of white-collar, middle class occupations in the post-industrial economy add up to a picture of a considerably realigned electoral map: today, social democratic parties in Western Europe count about two thirds of middle-class voters and one third of working-class voters in their electorate. In the early 1980s, this ratio was more or less reversed (Häusermann 2018). At the same time, the working-class vote for the populist right has increased steadily since the early 1990s (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015).

When looking at current electoral strongholds, that is, classes in which parties manage to mobilize a disproportional share of votes, social democratic parties find their stronghold among socio-cultural professionals whereas radical or nationalist right-wing parties find it among production workers. But even though social democratic parties mobilize, on average, only proportional – rather than disproportional – shares of the working-class vote today (Oesch and Rennwald 2018: 11), they are still strongly wedded to working-class politics for historical, ideological and programmatic reasons. Social democratic parties thus currently find themselves in a situation in which they have to balance the demands of two core constituencies that share much similarities in their social policy preferences but differ quite strongly when it comes to their attitudes towards socio-cultural issues such as immigration, internationalization and cultural liberalism.

In order to theorize how these developments affect the relationship between trade unions and social democratic parties, it is important to briefly reflect on the structural and institutional changes that underlie this realignment. On the one hand, the expansion of the welfare state has resolved many of the core demands of the working class movement from the mid-20th century (in terms of social rights, employment rights and political inclusion), so that the success of the left undermined the basis for working-class mobilization to some extent. On the other hand, structural economic change in

the same period, driven mainly by technological change and the expansion of education, has led to a massive expansion of middle-class employment and the emergence of a new social class of educated, middle-class service workers who have been the bearers of the claims of new social movement since the 1970s (Kitschelt 1994, Kriesi 1999).

Against the backdrop of a structurally dwindling electoral potential of working-class voters (Pontusson 1995), the mobilization of these "new left" claims has allowed the left – including the mainstream left – to "reinvent" themselves to some extent both in terms of their programmatic claims and their electorate. Because new types of nationalist, conservative right-wing parties started to mobilize precisely against these key demands and achievements of the new left from the 1990s onwards and thereby managed to attract small business owners and workers as voters (Bornschiefer 2010, Oesch and Rennwald 2018), socio-cultural demands have gained even more importance in the electoral arena. Processes of mobilization and counter-mobilization around cultural issues, have led to an increasing polarization and saliency of a second dimension of political competition that opposes internationalist-universalistic policy appeals to nationalist-conservative ones. Today, the socio-cultural conflict dimension has become the most polarized in most countries of Northern and continental Europe (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015, Kitschelt and Rehm 2015).

This electoral reconfiguration leaves social democratic parties at a crossroad: if they stick to pro-welfare positions and emphasize economic conflicts, they may keep the coalition of working- and middle-class voters intact but risk losing considerable vote shares because they fail to position themselves on the socio-cultural issues that drive vote choice most saliently. If they take, however, a firm stance in favor of either universalism and internationalism or, alternatively, nationalism and conservatism, social democratic parties are likely to lose voters among one class without necessarily winning

them among the other due to fierce competition from smaller parties with more extreme positions on these issues. Social investment might to some extent be a solution to this dilemma, as it is a strategy that appeals to economic-distributive and socio-cultural concerns. Yet, evidence on such an integrative capacity of social investment is weak to date and it seems that attitudes on social investment are empirically related to socio-cultural, second dimension issues appealing to the educated middle-class electorate of social democratic parties. The dwindling vote shares of social democratic parties across Europe and the increasing fragmentation of the left seem to be the symptoms of these parties being torn between strategic options, unable to make a choice.

In this situation, the positions and perspectives of other political actors are relevant since they can define rivals and allies of social democratic parties depending on the strategic option chosen by them. Trade unions are particularly important in this respect. If trade unions gravitate towards social protectionist and nationalist positions, they cannot be allies of social democratic parties that emphasize cultural liberalism. If the social policy preferences of union members and social democratic voters diverge strongly, they may not even be able to be allies in traditional key areas of joint politics. It is in this light that we comparatively study the membership composition and preference profile of the constituencies of trade unions and social democratic parties. To do so, we develop our theoretical expectations in a very broad, structural way. While we will present findings differentiated by welfare regime types, changes in the membership base of social democratic parties and trade unions as well as their preferences are basically driven by the same structural factors. Hence, the intensity in which countries have experienced structural change, welfare state development or second-dimension politics affects the extent to which we expect the hypothesized developments to differ cross-sectionally. Second-dimension politics are, for instance, more salient in Nordic and continental Europe than in Southern Europe. On these issues, we thus

expect more polarization across the party space and within the left in the former group of countries, but we do not expect structurally different patterns of realignment or preferences across regimes.

With regard to membership composition, we expect a relatively stronger skew towards the middle class among voters of social democratic parties than members of trade unions even though we have robust evidence that working-class unionization has declined over the past decades, primarily because of welfare state expansion, the white-collarization of the workforce and transformations of workplaces (Hechter 2004, Ebbinghaus et al. 2011, Mosimann and Pontusson 2017). Workers in growing sectors, especially low-skilled services, are harder to unionize than production workers in manufacturing, which is reflected in the underrepresentation of service sector workers among union members and the lower unionization of atypically employed outsiders as compared to stably employed insiders (e.g., Hassel 2015). To some extent, this decline in working-class unionization echoes the decline in the working-class vote for social democratic parties referred to above. While this hints at similar trends across the two types of organizations, social democratic parties have managed to appeal to new middle-class voters based on the socio-cultural electoral dimension of conflict whereas trade unions lack this possibility in as far as they are more firmly rooted in issues related to distributive-economic conflicts. For this reason, we would expect trade unions to retain a higher share of working-class people among their members than social democratic parties.

Two factors may, however, counteract this trend. First, trade unions have to some extent adapted to the changing occupational structure by mobilizing white-collar workers, in particular via professional unions often restricted to specific occupations (Arndt and Rennwald 2016, Kjellberg 2013). Second, and maybe more importantly, the structural transformation of the workforce has led to a massive expansion of middle-skilled

occupations. Even if unionization among the middle class remains rather weak, this massive expansion should increase the relative share of middle-class members within unions.

A second argument pertains to the preferences of social democratic voters and trade union members. Even if the ratio of middle-class supporters to working-class supporters were similar among union members and social democratic parties, this does not imply that their policy preferences align. Given the different (self-selection) processes that make individuals vote for parties and join unions, we could well imagine that middle-class voters who join unions are quite different from those who do not but may still vote social democratic. We know that educated middle-class voters are the strongest supporters of cultural liberalism, internationalism and universalism (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015, Kitschelt and Rehm 2016), and we also know that they strongly advocate social investment policies (Garritzmann, Busemeyer and Neimanns 2018). We know much less about the specific policy preferences of trade union members, except for the fact that they are strong supporters of redistribution and egalitarian social policies (Mosimann and Pontusson 2017). Yet, given the importance of the socio-cultural dimension for party politics and the importance of social protection for trade unions, we would expect social democratic voters to be on average more supportive of social investment, immigration, cultural liberalism and internationalism than trade union members. Conversely, we would expect trade union members to be on average more supportive of redistribution and social protection than social democratic voters.

In the following sections, we explore to what extent social democratic parties and trade unions have drifted apart in terms of membership and policy preference profiles. We present findings by welfare regimes, because the development of national labor movements (in terms of parties and unions) is specific to these regimes, and the welfare

capitalism they have brought about continues to shape the patterns of change we expect.

Empirical analysis I: membership composition

We focus, first, on unionization among the working class and the middle class to see relative change in unionization rates over time. Analyses are based on a dataset prepared by Gingrich and Häusermann (2015) for both analytical and practical reasons. Practically, it allows tracing membership composition for almost all West European countries over the past three decades; analytically, their article on social democratic party electorates provides some sort of "shadow analyses," that is, the foil against which we show and interpret our findings.

The dataset combines Eurobarometer (EB) and European Social Survey (ESS) surveys for sixteen countries from the 1970s to present, on the basis of the 1972-2002 EB trend file and seven waves of the ESS from 2002 to 2014).² The resulting panel is unbalanced, since not all countries participated in all years.³ Within this combined dataset, a question pertaining to respondents' union membership status is only available in the EB data from 1988 to 1991 and 2001 as well as in all ESS waves from 2002 onwards. Since the decline in union membership has started at the end of the 1970s (Pontusson 2013, Hassel 2015), it is of course unfortunate that we have information on respondents' membership in a trade union only from 1988 to 1994, as well as in

² From 2002 onwards, Eurobarometer no longer includes a vote choice item in the survey.

³ The EB was only conducted in European Union member states, meaning that Sweden, Finland and Austria are not included until 1995 and Switzerland not at all. Norway is included, but only from 1993. Moreover, not all countries participated in all 6 waves of the ESS.

2001 (and thereafter in all ESS waves) but not in earlier or intermediary waves of the Eurobarometer.


Among the West European countries for which we have data on any of these waves, we select the ones that have participated several times in the earlier period (1988-1994) based on Eurobarometer data *and* in the later period (2001-2014) based on Eurobarometer and ESS data. Our sample is thus composed of Denmark and Norway within the social democratic type of welfare regimes; Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands within the Christian democratic type of welfare regimes; Ireland and the United Kingdom within the liberal type of welfare regimes; and Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain within the Southern type of welfare regimes.⁴ At the individual level, the sample is restricted to employed respondents aged 18 and over.

Based on respondents' occupation and education levels, we divide respondents into different classes, that is, employers, middle class, manual workers and routine workers. Roughly speaking, we define people with upper secondary education who work in socio-cultural professions, technical professions, associate and higher management occupations, as well as office employees with upper secondary education as "middle-class." While the ESS data would allow for a more differentiated operationalization of the middle classes (e.g. according to sectors, industries or work logics), the Eurobarometer data does not contain such information. Appendix 1 provides the details of the recoding of the four groups.

Figure 1 shows overall union density rates across regimes, as well as density rates among the working class and the middle class. As mentioned, we enter the empirical

⁴ For details on the sample and number of cases per country-year see Appendix A2.

Figure 1. Percentages of unionized working-class and middle-class respondents




Eurobarometer 1988-1994, 2001 and ESS 2002-14.
 Calculations for the employed population aged 18 and over.
 SD: Social Democratic, CD: Christian Democratic.

trend about a decade after the peak in unionization rates. Nevertheless, we still see a slight general decline in overall unionization in the social democratic (-.087), liberal (-.032), and Southern (-.023) regimes, and stability in the countries of continental Europe. We also see no cross-regime divergence or convergence in unionization overall. Union density remains highest in the social democratic regimes and lowest in the Southern regimes, with somewhat intermediary and similar levels in the Christian democratic and liberal regimes.

When focusing on class differences in unionization, we see that unionization rates among middle-class respondents change much less than unionization rates among working-class respondents. Between 1988 and 2014, middle-class unionization declines by about 6 percentage points in the social democratic regimes and about 2 percentage points in the liberal and Southern regimes whereas working-class unionization shrinks by about 21 percentage points in the social democratic regimes, about 13 percentage points in the liberal regimes and about 9 percentage points in the Southern regimes in the same period. This decline in working-class unionization mirrors the findings for left-wing parties presented in Gingrich and Häusermann (2015, figure 2). By 2014, both trade unions and social democratic and other left-wing parties show a lower capacity in organizing the working class than three decades prior. As a result, middle-class unionization overall exceeds working-class unionization in all regimes except the Christian democratic countries by 2014.

The changing ratio of working-class unionization to middle-class unionization is also illustrated in Figure 2 that shows differences in unionization rates between the working class and the middle class. A value of 0 implies that working-class respondents are as likely to be union members as middle-class respondents, positive values indicate a higher propensity of unionization among the working class and negative values imply a higher propensity of unionization among the middle class. Across all regimes, we observe a decline in working-class unionization compared to middle-class unionization between 1988 and 2014. This decline is most pronounced in the social democratic regimes (-.145) and least pronounced in the Christian democratic regimes (-.045).

Figure 2. Differences in unionization between working class and middle class



Eurobarometer 1988-1994, 2001 and ESS 2002-14.
 Calculations for the employed population aged 18 and over.
 SD: Social Democratic, CD: Christian Democratic.


Changes in the liberal (-.118) and the Southern (-.076) regimes fall somewhere in between. Even though we present only regime averages in Figure 2, trends in single countries within regimes are very consistent with these overall patterns. However, within the Christian democratic regime, stability of unionization patterns stems mainly from Germany and Belgium while France and the Netherlands display slightly stronger middle-class unionization compared to working-class unionization at the end of the observation period.

The findings in Figure 2 are, again, highly consistent with the changing class-patterns that Gingrich and Häusermann (2015, figure 1) show for left-wing voters. As with unionization, the propensity of middle-class voters to vote left exceeds the propensity

of working-class voters to do so by 2012, whereas the working class was more likely to vote left than the middle class in the early 1990s.

Yet, there is one important difference that needs to be pointed out. While the propensity of the middle class to vote left has increased since the early 1990s, middle-class unionization is largely stable but not increasing in the same period. Left-wing parties seem to effectively attract the middle class based on socio-cultural issues close to the new social movements ("new" in differentiation to the "old" labor movement). Nothing would have led us to expect that trade unions exert a similar pull on the middle class.

It is therefore striking to see that even without an increase in middle-class mobilization by trade unions, the middle class has become the numerically predominant group among union members as shown in Figure 3. The figure shows the percentage of trade union members belonging to the middle class and the one of trade union members belonging to the working class. By 2014, middle-class members have clearly become the main constituency of trade unions in all regimes. While the gap between classes has become widest in the social democratic and liberal regimes, it has remained somewhat smaller in the Christian democratic and Southern regimes. This holds, again, across the individual countries in each regime group except in the Netherlands, where the gap between middle- and working-class union members is as large as in the Nordic countries. Since we observe no increase in the propensity of middle-class employees to join unions, this change in membership composition is due to declining working-class unionization on the one hand and structural occupational changes on the other hand.

Figure 3. Changes in unions' membership base

Eurobarometer 1988-1994, 2001 and ESS 2002-14.
 Calculations for the employed population aged 18 and over.
 SD: Social Democratic, CD: Christian Democratic.

As a result of to these structural changes, the picture we see for unions in Figure 3, again, closely resembles the one that has been documented for left-wing parties in general and social democratic parties in particular elsewhere (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015, Häusermann 2018).

As far as the composition of membership is concerned, trade unions and social democratic parties exhibit largely similar trends and patterns over the past decades. It is only in Belgium and Germany that working-class employees remain more likely to be unionized than middle-class employees. But even in these countries, the working class by now only supplies only 35 to 40 percent of union members.


Empirical analysis II: overlaps

In this section, we explore whether the similarities in the aggregate patterns that we have showed for trade unions and social democratic parties hold at the individual level, as well. This is not a foregone conclusion, as structural developments might be driving aggregate trends in all countries, irrespective of whether people who join a union actually vote for social democratic parties. We want to know to what extent union members (continue to) vote for left-wing parties in general and social democratic parties in particular. Relatedly, we are also interested in the degree to which the social democratic electorate remains unionized. A decline is actually even more likely than with regard to the latter than the former, as these parties have attracted many more middle-class voters over the past decades.

Figure 4 shows the share of trade union members voting for social democratic, other left or non-left parties over time. The coding of parties follows the ZEUS Eurobarometer coding in Gingrich and Häusermann (2015). The category "other left parties" is composed of Green and communist parties as well as a residual category of other left-wing parties. In contrast to the ZEUS coding, we have recoded the Belgian *N-VA* and *Vlaams Belang*, the German *AfD* and the Italian *Movimento 5 Stelle* into the category of populist right parties as described in Appendix A3.

Figure 4 provides at least three important findings. First, voting social democratic has been and still is the most likely electoral choice among union members in all regimes (and all countries within the regimes). Second, combined with union members' votes for other left parties, more than 60 percent of trade union members vote left in Social democratic and Christian democratic countries across the period under investigation, and that share even reaches 70 percent in Southern Europe. The social demo-

Figure 4. Changes in the percentage of union members voting for the social democratic, other left or non-left parties



Eurobarometer 1988-1994, 2001 and ESS 2002-14.
Calculations for the employed population aged 18 and over.
SD: Social Democratic, CD: Christian Democratic.

cratic and other left vote develop in complementary ways, suggesting that electoral volatility plays out within rather than across ideological blocks. Hence, while we see a decline in support for social democratic parties among union members (about 10 to 12 percentage points in social democratic, Christian democratic and liberal regimes between 1990 and 2014), the trade union vote still very clearly goes to the left in the 2010s. It is only in the liberal countries that union members' support for conservative and other non-left parties surpasses the one for social democratic and other left parties. This mainly reflects the particular political conflict structure in Ireland, where the class conflict was superseded by "civil war politics" for a long time. A third finding addresses speculations about a massive authoritarian shift of (unionized) working-class voters


towards the nationalist new right. In contradiction to such speculations, the share of trade union members voting for right-wing populist parties is actually extremely low and stably so. Again, the trade union vote is clearly a left vote and this is quite relevant for social democratic parties deciding on their strategic options.

To complete this picture, we also need to see the electoral relevance of trade union members for social democratic parties. It may be that trade union members keep voting social democratic but constitute an ever shrinking share of that electorate. Figure 5 allows us to address this possibility by displaying changes in the unionized share of the electorate of social democratic, other left and non-left parties.

In accordance with overall patterns in union density, electorates across all party families are most strongly penetrated by union members in Social Democratic regimes and least strongly penetrated by union members in Southern regimes. In all regime types except the Southern one, the electorate of the Social Democrats is the one most heavily unionized whereas the electorate of the non-left is the one least heavily unionized. In the Nordic countries, 80 percent and more of social democratic voters are simultaneously members of a union while this is only true for 60 percent of conservative voters. This share is obviously much lower in Christian democratic welfare states, where about a third of the social democratic electorate is unionized, similar to the shares found in the United Kingdom and Ireland. In Southern Europe, unionization rates are overall lower, and so are the overlappings between party and union constituencies.

Most important for our purposes is the finding of stability in these patterns across time everywhere but in the liberal countries. The unionized share of the social demo-

Figure 5. Changes in the unionized share of the electorate of social democratic, other left and non-left parties within regimes



Eurobarometer 1988-1994, 2001 and ESS 2002-14.
Calculations for the employed population aged 18 and over.
SD: Social Democratic, CD: Christian Democratic.

cratic electorate decreases in liberal regimes from about 46 percent to about 31 percent between 1990 and 2014. Conversely, it remains pretty stable in Christian democratic (33 to 32 percent), social democratic (77 to 80 percent), and Southern (22 to 18 percent) regimes over that same period.

Overall, we see much more similarity than divergence in terms of the socio-structural composition of trade unions and social democratic parties. Both organizations are massively affected by occupational change, which not only shrinks their working-class bases but also expands their middle class constituencies. Today, both organizations are predominantly composed of middle-class people. In terms of membership overlap, the Nordic countries show stable and very high levels of interpenetration between social

democratic parties and unions: almost two thirds of all union members vote for a left-wing party and around 80 percent of left-wing parties are unionized. In the other regimes, there is more asymmetry: while left-wing parties can count on a massive majority of the trade union vote, union members only represent about a third (liberal and continental countries) or a fifth (Southern Europe) of left-wing parties' voters. Despite union members' status as a minority within left-wing parties' electorates, the stability in the observed overlaps and the strong electoral support of union members for the left underline the continuing interconnection between these organizations' structural potentials.

Empirical analysis III: preferences

So far, we have seen that in terms of the very people trade unions and social democratic parties represent, they are still potentially important political allies. We also need to know, however, if the people they represent today share the same views on desirable policy goals.

We do not have good long-term longitudinal data on individual-level preferences. This is why we rely only on data from the European Social Survey 2016 for this section. The ESS 2016 includes a module on welfare preferences that allows us to evaluate preference profiles regarding different dimensions of social policy development.⁵ We compare the average preference profiles of trade union members and social democratic


⁵ The findings in this section are calculated based on a sample including Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. Austria, Switzerland, Finland and Sweden are not part of the Eurobarometer/ESS-Sample but of the ESS 2016-Sample. Denmark and Greece are part of the Eurobarometer/ESS-Sample but not of the ESS 2016-Sample. At the individual level, the sample is again restricted to employed respondents aged 18 and over.

voters regarding both distributive questions, that is, redistribution, old age pension generosity and childcare, and second-dimension issues, that is, adoption rights for homosexual couples, EU integration and immigration. The question we want to answer is whether social democratic electorates and trade union bases differ in their preferences or not.

We do not pursue any kind of causal argumentation in this section. In other words, we do not want to know if trade union membership or left voting *leads to* certain preferences but rather want to know how similar or different preferences of trade union members and social democratic parties are. Since composition effects driving such differences are not a concern of ours but part of what we are interested in, we simply regress preferences on union membership on the hand and party choice on the other hand without including any control variables.

To anticipate, we find that social democratic voters and trade union members exhibit highly similar policy preferences. There is not a single item on which their preferences differ substantially (and we have tested many more items than the ones shown here). Their constituencies are, on average, in favor of generous welfare policies and liberal when it comes to minority rights, EU integration and – importantly - immigration. Moreover, preferences of both trade union members and social democratic voters are much further away from the preferences of right-wing populist voters than new left voters even though the latter are more liberal when it comes to second-dimension issues than both trade union members and social democratic voters.

Figures 6 to 8 show average levels of support for redistribution, the notion that it is the government's responsibility to provide decent old-age pensions to everyone and


Figure 6. Predicted probabilities of support for redistribution

Full results available upon requests. ESS 2016.

the notion that it is the government's responsibility to provide sufficient childcare for working parents.⁶ The three items serve as illustrations of support for overall welfare generosity, consumption and investment policies.

Figure 6 shows that trade union members are more supportive of government redistribution than non-union members in Nordic and continental European countries

⁶ Supporters of redistribution are defined as those respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement, "the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels." Supporters of old age pension are those respondents self-placing between 8 and 10 (should be entirely governments' responsibility) on a 11-point scale regarding the question, "how much responsibility you think governments should have in ensuring a reasonable standard of living for the old." Similarly, supporters of childcare are those respondents self-placing between 8 and 10 (should be entirely governments' responsibility) on a 11-point scale regarding the question, "how much responsibility you think governments should have in ensuring sufficient child care services for working parents."


Figure 7. Predicted probabilities of support for old-age pension

Full results available upon requests. ESS 2016.

whereas support for redistribution is about the same among union members and non-members in liberal and southern welfare states (and overall higher in the South). Most important, levels of support for redistribution are about the same among left-wing voters and trade union members.

As expected, old-age pensions as a key feature of consumption policies are less controversial and politicized in most countries as depicted in Figure 7. This results in low variances in positions and high support levels across groups. It is only in Christian democratic and Southern countries that there is a noticeable political divide around the support for pension generosity. In both contexts, trade union members and social democratic voters are more or less in the middle-field of (overall high) pension support.

Figure 8. Predicted probabilities of support for childcare services for working parents



Full results available upon requests. ESS 2016.

This similarity in levels of support from trade union members and social democratic voters may be more remarkable and surprising when it comes to childcare services, a typical example of a "new" social policy of social investment. At least in Nordic and Christian democratic regimes, this policy is more politicized than old-age pensions as shown in Figure 8. On this issue, there is indeed a conservative skepticism, but we do not find support for the hypothesis that trade union members display a conservative, male breadwinner profile of preferences. On average, trade union members support government's provision of childcare clearly and in similar ways as social democratic voters.


Overall, we do not find relevant differences between the preference profiles of trade union members and social democratic voters. This finding is important, as it implies that there is no split between social democratic parties and trade unions when it comes to economic-distributive policy positions. Against suggestions of a centrist turn of social democratic voters, we do not find trade unions to be more "radically redistributive" than social democratic voters, nor are social democratic voters more in favor of social investment than trade union members. When it comes to social policy, trade unions' and social democratic parties' constituencies share highly similar preference profiles.⁷

The question remains to what extent this similarity holds for second-dimension issues. One may expect more divergence here, as it is precisely on this dimension that social democratic parties have attracted new middle-class voters. We have looked at a wide range of questions pertaining to policy choices associated with the political divide between universalism and particularism (Beramendi et al. 2015). In Figures 9-12, we show the ones on which we find the most divergence between trade union members and social democratic voters.⁸ The question at the heart of this part of the analy-

⁷ We may add here that the items used to measure social policy preferences only measure general and unconstrained levels of support, leaving intensity of preferences out of sight. Further analyses with data from the ERC-projects INVEDUC or WELFAREPRIORITIES may help investigate the importance given to these policies by different groups.

⁸ We use the following ESS questions to identify supporters of second-dimension issues. *Minority rights*: Supporters of minority rights agree or agree strongly with the statement, "gay male and lesbian couples should have the same rights to adopt children as straight couples." *European integration*: Supporters of European integration are those choosing a number between 6 and 10 (meaning "unification should go further") when reacting to the statement, "now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, which number on the scale best describes your position." *Immigration A*: Supporters of immigration allow some or many migrants when reacting to the statement, "to what extent do you think [country] should allow people from poorer countries outside Europe to come and live here." *Immigration B*: Supporters of immigrants are those choosing a number between 7 and 10 (meaning "good for the economy") when reacting to the statement, "would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries."


Figure 9. Predicted probabilities of support for equal rights for homosexual couples



Full results available upon requests. ESS 2016.

sis is whether trade union members are more conservative than left-wing voters in general and social democratic voters in particular, that is, whether union members exhibit tendencies of working-class conservatism similar to the one driving the electoral success of right-wing populist parties across Europe.

Figures 9-12 defy this expectation. On minority rights, that is, adoption rights for homosexual couples, the strongest opposition comes from voters of conservative, Christian democratic and right-wing populist parties. As shown in Figure 9, their probability of supporting equal rights may not exceed 20-30 percent. At the other extreme, voters of green and radical left parties have a probability of over 80 percent to agree with the notion of equal adoption rights for homosexual couples. In this highly polarized field, both trade union members and social democratic voters are,


Figure 10. Predicted probabilities of support for EU integration

Full results available upon requests. ESS 2016.

on average, supporters of equal rights. While their level of support is more moderate than the one from voters of the new left, it is clearly more pronounced than the one from the conservative right. Both social democrats' and trade unions' constituencies are moderately progressive regarding minority rights.

Support for EU integration is much less controversial than equal rights for homosexual couples as shown in Figure 10. The average probability of stating that EU integration should go further ranges from 20 to 50 percent in the Nordic countries and 20 to 60 percent in continental and anglo-saxon Europe. There is, conversely, more polarization around this issue in Southern Europe with voters of the new left being most in favor of EU integration. Both trade union members and social democratic voters are, on average, positioned among the constituencies rather supportive

Figure 11. Predicted probabilities of support for immigration from poorer countries outside Europe




Full results available upon requests. ESS 2016.

of EU integration (except in the United Kingdom), but not as pro-EU as voters of green parties. Again, we find no noticeable differences between unions' and social democrats' constituencies.

Regarding immigration, we look at support for immigration from poorer countries outside the EU (which alludes to refugee migration) and the evaluation of the economic costs or benefits of immigration (to capture preferences related to the economic dimension of immigration). In line with the notion that all second-dimension issues are part of the same conflict dimension, we find very similar patterns for these two dimensions of immigration when compared to the findings regarding minority rights and EU integration.

Figure 12. Predicted probabilities of support for the notion that immigration is good for the economy



Full results available upon requests. ESS 2016.


The spread of aggregate average positions in Figures 11 and 12 is very stark and thus more similar to the one found for minority rights than the one found for EU integration. At the extremes, we find voters of right-wing populist parties on the one hand, and voters of green and radical left parties on the other hand. In this polarized field, trade union members as well as social democratic voters clearly support immigration from poorer countries outside Europe. They are not the most extreme constituencies, but in hardly any country are their immigration preferences substantially more restrictive than the ones of new left voters. Regarding the economic evaluation of immigration, however, social democratic voters as well as trade union members are much more cautious than green and radical left constituencies. While not at all sharing the overall very critical evaluation of immigration with voters of the populist right, they are more skeptical on the benefits of immigration than voters of the new left.

In sum, we find, again, highly similar preference profiles for trade union members and social democratic voters when it comes to second-dimension politics.

Discussion: same challenges?

In contrast to a scenario of increasing divergence between unions' and social democrats' constituencies, we have found remarkable levels of similarity in the development of both their composition and preferences throughout our analyses. At this stage, we seem to find that trade unions find themselves in similar reconfiguration processes as social democratic parties. We started this article by presenting the types of strategic choices social democratic parties have. To better understand the extent to which trade unions face similar challenges, we use this final section of the analysis to explore within-constituency divergence among trade unions. As discussed in the theoretical section of this paper, social democratic parties seem to face a strategic dilemma when it comes to their voters' preferences on second-dimension issues but not when it comes to economic-distributive issues. While both middle- and working- class voters of social democratic parties are supportive of redistribution as well as generous social consumption and investment policies, they diverge with regard to cultural liberalism, internationalism and immigration. A programmatic shift of social democrats towards either of their core constituencies would thus almost necessarily imply losses among their other class constituency. Figures 13 and 14 investigate whether this dilemma applies to trade unions as well or whether unionized working and middle classes are more cohesive when it comes to preferences on second-dimension issues.


Figure 13. Predicted probabilities of support for issues on the economic dimension across all regimes



Full results available upon requests. ESS 2016.

Figures 13 and 14 show predicted probabilities of support for the same policy options as above for working- and middle-class supporters of trade unions and social democratic parties separately. The estimations rely on the same type of regression analyses as before and we use the class scheme by Oesch to get at the "typical" representatives of social democratic working- and middle-class voters, that is, production workers on the one hand and socio-cultural professionals on the other hand (Oesch and Rennwald 2018). We show findings pooled across regimes since the sample is much smaller and simultaneously introduce regime dummies into our regression analyses. Structurally, the findings hold in all countries but given the small sample sizes, confidence intervals become obviously large at the country-level. Pooling across regimes implies that the findings in Figures 13 and 14 are mainly driven by Nordic and continental European

Figure 14. Predicted probabilities of support for issues on the cultural dimension across all regimes



Full results available upon requests. ESS 2016.

countries due to their numbers and because they have more union members and social democratic voters. The thrust of the findings applies, however, in all regimes and countries.

For all social policy preferences, levels of support among working- and middle-class constituencies of unions and social democratic parties are about the same as shown in Figure 13. Both sub-constituencies favor generous distributive policies. This is where the class-alliance within either organization seems to hold firmly. However, when it comes to minority rights, EU integration and immigration, the preference gaps between the working and the middle class are more pronounced among both union members and social democratic voters and even more so among the former than the latter.

Gaps across classes are biggest when it comes to immigration from poorer countries outside Europe, especially among union members: the probability that working-class union members support immigration lies at slightly above 40 percent, whereas the same probability is about 80 percent for middle-class members. When it comes to immigration, working-class union members seem to be slightly more restrictive than working-class social democratic voters. Overall, trade unions seem to face very similar challenges as social democratic parties when it comes to internal heterogeneity. One may think that second-dimension issues are unimportant to trade unions, given their emphasis on distributive-economic questions. The current saliency of the immigration issue and the way in which it is increasingly politicized in both cultural and economic terms, imply, however, that trade unions might have to answer the same difficult questions as social democratic parties when trying to appeal to separate core constituencies simultaneously.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have asked to what extent trade unions and social democratic parties in Western Europe have diverged in terms of the class composition of their respective constituencies and their constituencies' preference profiles. Based on time-series data from the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey for twelve Western European countries, we have found a general decline in working-class unionization and stable middle-class unionization since the late 1980s as expected. While members of the working class were still more likely to be unionized than members of the middle class in the early 1990s, this is no longer the case today in all countries analyzed except Belgium and Germany. Across all countries in our sample, the share of middle-class union members exceeds the share of working-class union members by now and this

ratio is, on average, massive at about 2:1 except for smaller ratios in Belgium and Germany and somewhat smaller reconfiguration effects in Southern Europe.

We also find that there is much stability in the extent to which union members vote left and left-wing voters' degree of unionization. While there is a decline in the share of union members who opt for social democratic parties, they still vote for left-wing pro-welfare parties at rates well above 60 percent. Moreover, the share of social democratic voters who are unionized has remained roughly stable over the past 20 years at very high levels in Nordic countries (>80 percent) and lower but stable levels in continental and liberal countries (about a third). In terms of both the composition of constituencies as well as actual overlaps, the picture that emerges from our analysis is one of stability and similarity rather than divergence.

The same conclusion applies to our analysis of the preference profiles of trade union members and social democratic voters. Regarding redistribution, as well as "old" and "new" social policy measures, trade union constituencies and social democratic electorates are similarly supportive of generous policies. As a consequence, the pro-welfare pro-redistribution alliance within the left (including green, communist and radical left parties) still seems to hold. A first glance at support levels for second-dimension issues among trade unions' and social democrats' constituencies confirms this similarity further. Regarding minority rights, EU integration and immigration, both trade union members' and social democratic voters' preferences are moderately liberal and do not diverge strongly. However, we have also shown that these moderately liberal stances hide within-constituency divergences between middle- and working-class members. While middle-class voters and union members support these second-dimension topics, working-class voters and union members are more conservative when it comes to socio-cultural issues.

What is the upshot of these analyses when it comes to the strategic choices and dilemmas the left faces today? Basically, the same for social democratic parties and trade unions: their bases converge on economic-distributive issues, but diverge on issues of universalism, internationalism and immigration. Their two key constituencies, that is, socio-cultural professionals among the middle class and production workers among the working class, are the spearheads of second-dimension politics, which is currently dominating mass politics throughout Western Europe. Moreover, both actors seem unable to attract a new working-class base among the growing (younger and highly feminized) service working class.

In a scenario in which production workers and socio-cultural specialists make up their core constituencies and second-dimension politics are highly salient, three strategic options seem available to social democratic parties: first, an emphasis on socio-economic issues. Since they are currently less salient in the public discourse, this might imply lower vote shares overall and the need to broker coalitions for expansive fiscal policies; second and third, making a programmatic move towards either universalistic or particularistic policies, thereby accepting a fragmentation of the left vote into programmatically more distinct political parties which might or might not agree on socio-economic policy proposals.

At first glance, the options for trade unions seem different. While the democratic electoral process needs political parties and should thus allow the social democrats to survive even at lower vote shares (as brokers in the policy process), there is no functional stabilization for trade unions. If they do not appeal to what their members care about (with regard to second-dimension issues), they may as well simply disappear. However, this may only be true in Southern Europe and anglo-saxon countries, where trade union representation is not firmly institutionalized. In corporatist economies and welfare states that know the Ghent system, institutionalization stabilizes the political role of

trade unions as organizations. They may thus indeed take on a similar broker-status as social democratic parties.

Similarities may even extend beyond that. With EU integration and immigration becoming ever more politicized, not only culturally, but increasingly also economically (precisely by certain parties on the left), trade unions may – just like social democratic parties – become forced to position themselves more strongly on these issues. When looking at the preferences of their members, they are then likely to face the same dilemma as the Social Democrats. This makes a scenario of increased differentiation, fragmentation and professionalization of the union movement more likely – in contrast to scenarios of "social movement unionism" (Dreiling and Robinson 1998, Robinson 2000, Waterman 2001, Ghigliani 2005), which suggests the revitalization and renewal of a cohesive unionism "from below." The choices both social democratic parties and trade unions will be making in this difficult situation are likely to differ across countries. While social democratic parties and unions may remain at the core of (fragile) pro-welfare coalitions in some countries, they are likely to become more fragmented and polarized in others. Given the strong similarity in the kind of challenges they face, it would seem, however, that their strategic choices will be interdependent, just as they were in the past.

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Appendix

Appendix A1: Class coding

For all survey data used in the article (except ESS 2016), the class coding from Gingrich and Häusermann (2015) has been applied as follows.

ESS

The coding draws on Oesch's more fine-grained coding of seventeen occupational groups, based on ISCO codes, self-employment status and education level (Oesch 2006). It deviates from Oesch in including an educational restriction for categorization as a socio-cultural professional/semi-professional and skilled service (requiring upper secondary education or above for classification in these groups). We also placed those with higher levels of education (upper secondary or above) working in 'routine' jobs as skilled service. These educational restrictions provide continuity with the Euro-Barometer coding. We code only those in current employment, excluding the retired, unemployed and those temporarily out of the workforce. We then aggregate these into four groupings: small and large employers (including agricultural workers), middle classes, working classes and routine workers.

- The small and large employer grouping includes: agricultural routine workers, large employers, small employers, self-employed professional and small proprietors.
- The middle-class grouping includes socio-cultural professionals and semi-professionals, skilled service workers, technical experts, higher managers, associate managers, and skilled office workers.
- The worker grouping includes: technicians, skilled craft workers, and technical routine workers.

- The routine workers grouping includes: routine service workers and routine office workers.

Eurobarometer

Within the Eurobarometer data, three different forms of occupational coding are used, all of which are more aggregated than the ISCO categorization. We build on Knutsen's (2006) work on class voting using the Eurobarometer series, but modify it slightly to include education, making the groupings more directly comparable to the categories we define in the ESS. We use a country specific definition of upper secondary education, mapping the years of education onto the national threshold for ISCED-3 completion.

1. The small and large employer grouping includes:
 - a. EB 1-299: Self-employed farmers/fishermen, professionals, owner shop/business proprietor
 - b. EB 300-260: Self-employed farmers, fishermen, professionals, owner shop/business proprietor
 - c. EB 370-572: Self-employed farmers, fishermen, professionals, shop owners, business proprietors
2. The middle-class grouping includes:
 - a. EB 1-299: General Management, white collar with upper secondary education
 - b. EB 300-260: Employed Professionals, general management, middle management, other office employee with upper secondary education, non-office employed/non-manual with upper secondary education
 - c. EB 370-572: Employed Professionals, general management, middle management, employed position desk with upper secondary education,

employed position traveling with upper secondary education, and employed position service with upper secondary

3. The worker grouping includes:
 - a. EB 1-299: Manual Worker
 - b. EB 300-260: Skilled manual workers, supervisors, and unskilled workers with an upper-secondary education
 - c. EB 370-572: Skilled manual workers, supervisors, and unskilled workers with an upper-secondary education
4. The routine grouping includes:
 - a. EB 1-299: White collar without upper secondary education
 - b. EB 300-260: Unskilled worker without upper secondary, other office employee without upper secondary education, non-office employed/non-manual without upper secondary education
 - c. EB 370-572: Unskilled worker without upper secondary, employed position desk without upper secondary education, employed position traveling without upper secondary education, and employed position service without upper secondary.

Appendix A2. Sample

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	2001	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
<i>Social Democratic</i>																
Denmark*	562	1,788	1,756	1,752	1,722	1,658	1,103	542	926	838	872	932	851	892	831	17,025
Finland	469	1,062	1,055	989	1,182	891	1,094	987	7,729
Norway*	.	.	593	599	1,078	1,598	514	.	1,346	1,118	1,145	1,034	957	1,033	890	11,905
Sweden	545	1,197	1,127	1,182	1,113	832	995	990	7,981
<i>Christian Democratic</i>																
Austria	457	1260	1096	1410	.	.	.	995	5,218
Belgium*	498	1,430	1,505	1,532	1,421	1,430	939	497	966	860	892	891	852	930	887	15,530
France*	466	1,404	1,615	1,604	1,534	1,600	1,087	496	713	909	1,049	1,061	870	937	923	16,268
Germany*	509	1,912	2,895	3,509	3,431	3,339	2,221	988	1,430	1,328	1,402	1,504	1,551	1,542	1,664	29,225
Luxembourg	151	477	388	704	739	738	539	308	657	819	5,520
Netherlands*	408	1,245	1,406	1,396	1,346	1,430	947	466	1,287	1,006	1,061	1,015	1,006	961	945	15,925
Switzerland	1,262	1,247	1,040	1,063	895	903	898	7,368
<i>Liberal</i>																
Ireland*	422	1,237	1,371	1,316	1,253	1,200	849	458	1,093	1,157	949	790	950	1,072	1,033	5,150
United Kingdom*	678	1,863	2,014	1,996	1,940	1,935	1,239	576	1,086	921	1,252	1,229	1,192	1,056	1,116	20,093
<i>Southern</i>																
Greece*	459	1,419	1,365	1,314	1,393	1,459	901	393	1,052	929	.	1,164	1,051	.	.	12,899
Italy*	476	1,317	1,343	1,379	1,319	1,307	863	446	589	466	.	9,505
Portugal*	507	1,493	1,446	1,419	1,500	1,425	1,009	489	748	872	1,023	960	802	840	528	15,061
Spain*	332	1,088	1,109	1,352	1,215	1,287	789	427	744	873	1,014	1,351	912	.	902	13,395
Total	5,468	16,673	18,806	19,872	19,891	20,406	13,000	7,557	17,418	16,155	15,280	15,289	13,612	12,721	13,589	225,737

Eurobarometer 1988-1994, 2001 and ESS 2002-14.

Calculated for the employed population aged 18 and over.

* Countries to be used.

Appendix A3. List of parties

Austria

<i>Communists</i>	Communist Party of Austria, <i>KPÖ</i>
<i>Other left</i>	-
<i>Social democrats</i>	Social Democratic Party of Austria, <i>SPÖ</i>
<i>Greens</i>	The Greens – The Green Alternative, <i>Grüne</i>
<i>Liberals</i>	The New Austria, <i>NEOS</i>
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	Austrian People's Party, <i>ÖVP</i>
<i>Conservatives</i>	-
<i>Populist Right</i>	Freedom Party of Austria, <i>FPÖ</i> Alliance for the Future of Austria, <i>BZÖ</i> Team Stronach for Austria
<i>Other right</i>	-
<i>Regional</i>	-

Belgium

<i>Communists</i>	Labor Party (French), <i>PTB</i>
<i>Other left</i>	Labor Party (Flemish), <i>PVD/DA+</i>
<i>Social democrats</i>	Socialist Party (Flemish), <i>SP.A</i> Socialist Party (French), <i>PS</i>
<i>Greens</i>	Green (Flemish), <i>Groen</i> Ecologists (French), <i>Ecolo</i>
<i>Liberals</i>	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Flemish), <i>Open VLD</i> Reformist Movement (French), <i>MR</i>
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	Flemish Christian Democrats (Flemish), <i>CD&V</i> Humanistic and Democratic Center (French), <i>CDH</i>
<i>Conservatives</i>	People's Party, <i>PP</i>
<i>Populist Right</i>	New Flemish Alliance (Flemish), <i>N-VA</i> Flemish Interest (Flemish), <i>Vlaams Belang</i>
<i>Other right</i>	-
<i>Regional</i>	-

Switzerland

<i>Communists</i>	Swiss Labor Party, <i>PdA</i>
<i>Other left</i>	-
<i>Social democrats</i>	Social Democratic Party, <i>SP</i>
<i>Greens</i>	Green Party, <i>GPS</i>
<i>Liberals</i>	The Liberals, <i>FDP</i> Green Liberal Party, <i>GLP</i>
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	Christian Democratic Party, <i>CVP</i> Evangelical People's Party, <i>EVP</i>
<i>Conservatives</i>	Conservative Democratic Party, <i>BDP</i>
<i>Populist Right</i>	Swiss People's Party, <i>SVP</i> Federal Democratic Union, <i>EDU</i>
<i>Other right</i>	-
<i>Regional</i>	-

Germany

<i>Communists</i>	The Left Party of Democratic Socialism, <i>Die Linke</i>
<i>Other left</i>	-
<i>Social democrats</i>	Social Democratic Party, <i>SPD</i>
<i>Greens</i>	Green Party, <i>GPD</i>
<i>Liberals</i>	Liberal Democratic Party, <i>FDP</i>
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, <i>CDU/CSU</i>
<i>Conservatives</i>	-
<i>Populist Right</i>	National Democratic Party/German People's Union, <i>NPD</i> Alternative for Germany, <i>AfD</i>
<i>Other right</i>	-
<i>Regional</i>	-

Spain

<i>Communists</i>	-
<i>Other left</i>	Republican Left of Catalonia, <i>ERC</i> We Can, <i>Podemo</i> , En Masse, <i>En Marea</i> Euskal Herria Bildu («Gather»), <i>EH-Bildu</i>
<i>Social democrats</i>	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, <i>PSOE</i>
<i>Greens</i>	Commitment/We can/United Left, <i>Compromís-Podemos-EUPV</i>
<i>Liberals</i>	-
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	-
<i>Conservatives</i>	People's Party, <i>i</i>
<i>Populist Right</i>	-
<i>Other right</i>	Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya/Partido Demócrata Europeo Catalán, <i>CDC-PdeCAT</i>
<i>Regional</i>	Basque Nationalist Party, <i>EAJ-PNV</i> Canarian Coalition-New Canarians, <i>CC-NC</i>

Finland

<i>Communists</i>	Left Alliance, <i>VAS</i>
<i>Other left</i>	-
<i>Social democrats</i>	Social Democratic Party of Finland, <i>SDP</i>
<i>Greens</i>	Green League, <i>VIHR</i>
<i>Liberals</i>	-
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	Christian Democrats, <i>KD</i>
<i>Conservatives</i>	National Coalition Party, <i>KOK</i>
<i>Populist Right</i>	Finns Party, <i>PS</i>
<i>Other right</i>	Centre Party, <i>KESK</i>
<i>Regional</i>	Swedish People's Party, <i>RKP</i>

France

<i>Communists</i>	Worker's Fight, <i>LO</i>
<i>Other left</i>	The New Anticapitalist Party, <i>NPA</i> Left Front, <i>FDG</i> Left-wing radical Party, <i>PRG</i>
<i>Social democrats</i>	Socialist Party, <i>PS</i>
<i>Greens</i>	The Greens-Europe Ecology, <i>EELV</i> Other Green Movements

<i>Liberals</i>	-
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	-
<i>Conservatives</i>	Union for a Popular Movement, <i>UMP</i> Democrat Movement, <i>MODEM</i>
<i>Populist Right</i>	National Front, <i>FN</i> The Movement for France, <i>MPF</i>
<i>Other right</i>	-
<i>Regional</i>	-

United Kingdom

<i>Communists</i>	-
<i>Other left</i>	-
<i>Social democrats</i>	Labour
<i>Greens</i>	Green Party
<i>Liberals</i>	Liberal Democrats
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	-
<i>Conservatives</i>	Conservative
<i>Populist Right</i>	UK Independence Party, <i>UKIP</i>
<i>Other right</i>	-
<i>Regional</i>	Scottish National Party, <i>SNP</i> Plaid Cymru Ulster Unionist Party Democratic Unionist Party, <i>DUP</i> Sinn Fein Social Democratic and Labour Party Alliance Party Traditional Unionist Party

Ireland

<i>Communists</i>	-
<i>Other left</i>	Anti-Austerity Alliance-People Before Profit
<i>Social democrats</i>	Labour
<i>Greens</i>	Green Party
<i>Liberals</i>	-
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	Fine Gael
<i>Conservatives</i>	Fianna Fáil
<i>Populist Right</i>	-
<i>Other right</i>	-
<i>Regional</i>	Sinn Féin

Italy

<i>Communists</i>	-
<i>Other left</i>	-
<i>Social democrats</i>	Democratic Party, <i>PD</i>
<i>Greens</i>	Left Ecology Freedom, <i>SEL</i>
<i>Liberals</i>	Civil Revolution Civic Choice
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	Union of the Centre, <i>UDC</i>
<i>Conservatives</i>	The People of Freedom Brothers of Italy The Right
<i>Populist Right</i>	Five Star Movement

<i>Other right</i>	-
<i>Regional</i>	Lega Nord

Netherlands

<i>Communists</i>	Socialist Party, <i>SP</i>
<i>Other left</i>	-
<i>Social democrats</i>	Labor Party, <i>PvdA</i>
<i>Greens</i>	Green Left, <i>GL</i>
<i>Liberals</i>	People's Party for Freedom, <i>VVD</i> Democrats 66, <i>D66</i>
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	Christian Democratic Appeal, <i>CDA</i> Christian Union, <i>CU</i>
<i>Conservatives</i>	Reformed Political Party, <i>SGP</i>
<i>Populist Right</i>	Party for Freedom, <i>PVV</i>
<i>Other right</i>	-
<i>Regional</i>	-

Norway

<i>Communists</i>	The Party Red, <i>R</i> Socialist Left Party, <i>SV</i>
<i>Other left</i>	-
<i>Social democrats</i>	Labour Party, <i>A</i>
<i>Greens</i>	Green Party, <i>MDG</i>
<i>Liberals</i>	Liberal Party, <i>V</i>
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	Christian Democratic Party, <i>KRF</i>
<i>Conservatives</i>	Conservative Party, <i>H</i>
<i>Populist Right</i>	Progress Party, <i>FRP</i>
<i>Other right</i>	-
<i>Regional</i>	-

Portugal

<i>Communists</i>	Left Block, <i>BE</i> Unitarian Democratic Coalition, <i>PCP-PEV</i> Communist Party of the Portuguese Workers/Reorganized Movement of the Portuguese Proletariat, <i>PCTP/MRPP</i>
<i>Other left</i>	FREE/Time to Advance, <i>L/TDA</i>
<i>Social democrats</i>	Socialist Party, <i>PS</i>
<i>Greens</i>	Earth Party, <i>MPT</i> People-Animals-Nature, <i>PAN</i>
<i>Liberals</i>	-
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	Portugal Ahead, <i>PPD-PSD/CDS-PP</i>
<i>Conservatives</i>	-
<i>Populist Right</i>	National Renewal Party, <i>PNR</i>
<i>Other right</i>	-
<i>Regional</i>	-

Sweden

<i>Communists</i>	Left Party, <i>V</i>
<i>Other left</i>	-

<i>Social democrats</i>	Social Democrats, <i>S</i>
<i>Greens</i>	Green Party, <i>MP</i>
<i>Liberals</i>	Liberals, <i>L</i>
<i>Christian Democrats</i>	Christian Democrats, <i>KD</i>
<i>Conservatives</i>	Conservatives, <i>M</i>
<i>Populist Right</i>	Sweden Democrats, <i>SD</i>
<i>Other right</i>	Center Party, <i>C</i>
<i>Regional</i>	-